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Public Opinion in Ukraine on European Integration During Russia's War Against Ukraine

Abstract: The 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement marked a new phase in the cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. Concurrently, there have been ongoing hostilities initiated by Russia against Ukraine since 2014, culminating in a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. This study explores the shifts in public opinion regarding Ukraine's European integration over the decade during Russia's aggression against Ukraine and, concomitantly, between the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the formal opening of accession negotiations in 2024. The present research draws upon sociological data on public opinion on European integration, summarizing and comparing data from public opinion polls conducted by various Ukrainian and international institutions between 2014 and 2024. The study concludes that public opinion on European integration has become more favorable over the period analyzed. Moreover, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to a further consolidation of pro-EU sentiment across all demographic groups and regions, culminating in a notable increase in public support for EU membership (from around 60% in 2021 to around 80% in 2022–2024).

Key words: Public opinion, European Integration, Ukraine, public opinion and war, communication, Russia-Ukrainian war

Introduction

The integration of Ukraine into the EU has been a strategic objective of Ukraine since 1998 (*Stratehiia intehratsii...*, 1998). Signed in 2014, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement represented a significant development in the relationship between Ukraine and the EU, marking a new phase in their cooperation. In 2019, the Parliament of Ukraine promulgated an amendment to the Constitution of Ukraine, thereby enshrining the strategic goal of attaining full membership of the European Union (*Constitution...*, 1996). Concurrently with the achievements in the process of European integration in Ukraine over the past decade, Russia has engaged in acts of aggression against Ukraine, beginning with the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the armed conflict in parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk areas of Ukraine in 2014, and culminating in a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Notwithstanding Russia's aggression, Ukraine maintained its strategy for European integration, as evidenced by its application for EU membership on February 28, 2022. In 2022, the EU granted Ukraine candidate status and formally opened accession negotiations with Ukraine in June 2024.

It is imperative to acknowledge that considering public opinion is pivotal for effectively implementing the European integration strategy. Implementing such a strategic goal as European integration is achieved through public policy regarding the acquisition of EU membership, including in the domain of public information and communication.

The government of Ukraine has persistently pursued this course of action. It approved “The Concept for the Implementation of Public Policy in the Field of Public Information and Communication on Topical Issues of Ukraine’s European Integration for the Period until 2017” (*Kontseptsiiia...*, 2013), “The Communication Strategy in the Field of European Integration for 2018–2021” (*Stratehiia komunikatsii...*, 2017), and “The Communication Strategy on European Integration of Ukraine for the Period until 2026” (*Pro skhvalennia...*, 2022) in 2022, following the commencement of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.

This research is timely in light of the challenges previously outlined and the present state of EU-Ukraine relations. It aims to explore shifts in public opinion in Ukraine towards European integration during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology

The present article seeks to identify shifts in public opinion regarding Ukraine’s European integration over the decade during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (2014 – to date) and, concomitantly, between the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2014 and the formal opening of accession negotiations in 2024. Consequently, the period under analysis spans a decade, from 2014 to 2024.

The research question is as follows: what shifts in public opinion in Ukraine (if any), can be identified concerning the country’s European integration during Russia’s war against Ukraine?

The hypothesis is that there was an increase in favorable public opinion regarding Ukraine’s European integration between the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2014 and the formal opening of accession negotiations in 2024, despite Russia’s war against Ukraine during the same period. Moreover, it is hypothesized that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a contributing factor to a rise in public opinion that is more favorable to Ukraine’s strategy of acquiring potential EU membership in the future.

The present study employs a case study approach (Crowe et al., 2011) and is classified as historical explanatory research using the process-tracing method (Collier, 2011). It focuses on public opinion regarding Ukraine’s European integration from 2014 to 2024. The present study is primarily based upon sociological data on public opinion regarding European integration, utilizing this as its fundamental source material. This study presents a comprehensive overview and comparative analysis of data from public opinion polls conducted by a range of Ukrainian and international research institutions from 2014 to 2024. These institutions include the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Sociological Group “Rating,” the Center for Insights in Survey Research of the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Razumkov Centre’s Sociological Service, the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and the Center for Social and Market Research. The findings are presented in graphical form.

The concept of public opinion arose due to the rise of democracy (Freeland, 2015, p. 562). Moreover, public opinion, publicity, and the public sphere are characteristic fea-

tures of every democratic society (Splichal, 2022). As defined by Davidson, a prominent scholar in the field, public opinion is “an aggregate of the individual views, attitudes, and beliefs about a particular topic, expressed by a significant proportion of a community” (Davison, 2024).

The prevailing emphasis among political scientists is on the role of public opinion in the formation, progression and assessment of public policy (Burstein, 2003; Monroe, 1998; Page, 1994; Palagnyuk, 2012; Toshkov, 2011; Wlezien, 2017, etc.). As Wlezien and Soroka rightfully assert, the relationship between public opinion and public policy is reciprocal: “Public opinion is ... an important driver of public policy change – but it is also ... one that is a consequence of policy itself” (Wlezien, Soroka, 2021). However, it is crucial to acknowledge the seminal contributions of Page and Shapiro in their 1983 work *“Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”*, which examined policy data and public opinion in the USA from 1935 to 1979, and demonstrated that “public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy influences opinion” (Page, Shapiro, 1983).

In contradiction to the standpoint of political scientists, sociologists primarily subscribe to the notion that public opinion is the consequence of communication and social interaction. Moreover, it is hypothesized that beliefs will not constitute a public opinion until they are communicated to others in some form, whether through traditional media, social media, or a conversation (Davison, 2024). A prominent American public opinion researcher Irving Crespi propounds that public opinion is “an interactive, multi-dimensional and continuously changing phenomenon”. (Crespi, 1997, p. ix).

Specialists in the fields of social communication and media studies similarly emphasize the role of media and social communication in the shaping of public opinion (Anstead, O’Loughlin, 2014; Ausat, 2023; Moy, Bosch, 1997; Sanchez et al., 2019; Splichal, 1999, etc.). For instance, Moy and Bosch propose that “theories of public opinion must account for how media content is constructed and disseminated” (Moy, Bosch, 1997, p. 281). The primary assumption of the 1994 book *“Public Opinion, the Press, and Public Policy”* was that “the news media are a major way by which the public is linked with the institutions and individuals concerned with governing” (Kennamer, 1994, p. 2).

Recent studies have indicated an increased emphasis among researchers on the multidisciplinary nature of public opinion, drawing upon fields such as political science, sociology, media studies, and social communication (for instance, Carballo et al., 2018; Chong, Druckman, 2010; Splichal, 2022; Sun, Zhang, 2023). Furthermore, an eminent scientific journal, namely *“Public Opinion Quarterly”* is a multidisciplinary publication encompassing a wide range of scientific domains, including, but not limited to, social communication and media sciences, political and administrative sciences, management and quality sciences, sociological sciences, and international relations.

The present study employs an interdisciplinary approach to analyze public opinion. It approaches the concept of public opinion from the political science perspective, examining the interconnection between public opinion and public policy concerning a specific issue. Furthermore, the present study aligns with the perspectives of sociologists and media scholars who assert that public policy constitutes a dynamic process, one that is driven by social communication, particularly, through the media. The aforementioned corresponds to the following definition of public opinion: a “dynamically changing state

of consciousness of large social groups, consisting of more or less permanent views and beliefs related to usually controversial issues, whose resolution directly or indirectly impacts the current or future interests of society” (Kuśmierski, 1997, p. 26). This study contends that this definition applies to the subject of European integration and Ukrainians’ perspectives on it.

Public Opinion on European Integration in Ukraine

According to Zolkina, a recognized expert at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, a clear relationship exists between awareness of Ukraine-EU relations and public support for Ukraine’s potential EU membership. For instance, in 2011, 52% of respondents expressing support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU were aware of the negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, while only 37% of those not aware of Ukraine’s process of European integration held a positive view of EU-Ukraine relations (Zolkina, 2012, p. 6). Hence, Ukraine’s information policy on European integration has been a factor in shifting public opinion, as increased information about the EU and Ukraine’s integration into it raises public awareness about this issue.

In 2013, before the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, public opinion regarding Ukraine’s European integration can be summarized as follows. As the data by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine indicated, support for Ukraine’s EU membership stood at 41.6% during the initial half of 2013 (Vorona, Shulha, 2013, p. 152). In April 2013, the Razumkov Center on Public Opinion Monitoring indicated that 46% of respondents supported the EU membership (*Yevropeiskyi...*, 2013, p. 104). A survey conducted in May 2013 by the Ilko Kucherov Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center on Public Opinion Monitoring revealed that 42% of the population viewed EU accession as Ukraine’s primary integration strategy (*Ilko...*, 2013a). A salient finding from this analysis is the absence of any prevailing majority in favor of EU membership across all regions and age demographics at the time.

However, a shift in public opinion became evident at the end of 2013, concurrent with the Euromaidan pro-European protests and the Revolution of Dignity. These events were triggered by the Ukrainian government’s decision not to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement at the 2013 Vilnius EU Summit. A survey conducted in December 2013 by the Ilko Kucherov Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center revealed that, had a referendum on EU membership had been held at that time, 48% of the population would have cast their vote in favor, while 36% would have opposed it (*Ilko...*, 2013b). Similarly, a survey conducted by the Center for Social and Market Research and the Sociological Group “Rating” in December 2013 revealed that 49.1% of Ukrainians would have voted for EU accession, while 29.6% would have voted against it (*Center...*, 2013). In January 2014, survey data from the Center for Social and Market Research indicated that 43% of respondents would vote for EU membership. Of those who intended to participate in a referendum and had decided, 57.6% indicated their intention to vote in favor of EU membership (*Center...*, 2014).

Therefore, as demonstrated in the present study, which is supported by data from several sociological sources, an examination of public opinion regarding Ukraine’s Europe-

an integration reveals a modest increase in support for European integration in late 2013 and early 2014. This rise occurred during the mass pro-European protests in 2013 (the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity events) that followed the Ukrainian government’s decision to suspend European integration and not to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in November 2013. It is imperative to underscore that in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity events in the late 2013 – early 2014, Russia instigated aggressive actions against Ukraine, culminating in the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the start of the armed conflict in parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine in early 2014.

The Government of Ukraine has reported that public support for European integration has remained consistent, averaging 54% from 2014 to 2021 and peaking at 92% in 2022 (*Pro skhvalennia...*, 2022). The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology has published comparable statistics based on their research: as of May 2023, 92% of Ukrainians expressed support for EU membership (Hrushetsky, 2023). The present study will analyze this period using data from various research institutions to verify the extent of this highly positive public opinion.

The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, in collaboration with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center, conducted nationwide public opinion polls in 2018 and 2019. The funding provided by the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. Their findings indicate that more than half of the population (52% in 2018, 53% in 2019) supported Ukraine’s accession to the EU (*Ilko...*, 2019). The respondents also attached significant importance to the following issues in the information campaign on European integration: firstly, the requirements for candidate countries for EU membership, and secondly, the impact of EU membership on citizens’ lives and economic prospects (*Ilko...*, 2019).

In 2021, before Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, 58% of Ukrainians expressed their preference for joining the EU in a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on behalf of the Center of Insights and Survey Research (CISR) of the International Republican Institute, funded by the USAID. The survey was conducted throughout the country, except for the occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions between March 13–21, 2021 (face-to-face interviews). The survey’s respondents answered a question, which international economic union would they choose if Ukraine could only join one union (*International...*, 2021, p. 53). Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022, there was a significant increase in favorable public opinion towards Ukraine’s EU membership. The survey “*Ninth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey*”, conducted in April–May 2024 by the Sociological Group “Rating” on behalf of the Center for Insights in Survey Research (CIRS) of the International Republican Institute (IRI), demonstrated this trend (see Table 1).

Table 1

Public Opinion in Ukraine Toward Choosing the EU over Other Unions (in %)

	11. 2021	04.2022	06.2022	02.2023	09.2023	02.2024
In favor of the EU	58%	80%	80%	85%	81%	77%

Source: Author’s analysis based on: *International...*, 2021, p. 53; *International...*, 2024b, p. 45.

Therefore, as evidenced by the previously referenced polls, public support for the EU membership increased from around 42% in 2013 to around 52–58% in 2014–2021. This increase followed significant political events, including the Euromaidan protests, the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. The data further reveals a substantial rise to approximately 80% in 2022, following Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine.

A public opinion poll "*Attitude to foreign countries, international organizations and politicians, and Ukraine's accession to the European Union*" conducted by the Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service in January 19–25, 2024 as a part of its USAID/ENGAGE project, funded by the USAID and implemented by the Pact, revealed similar results: 84% of respondents expressed support for Ukraine's EU membership in 2024, compared to 79% in December 2022. A mere 7% (in 2024) and 8% (in 2022) did not express support for Ukraine's EU membership (*Attitude...*, 2024). The face-to-face poll was conducted only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities. So, it did not include occupied territories of Crimea, parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions (*Attitude...*, 2024).

The International Republican Institute's (the IRI) analysts have reported a 45-percentage point increase in support for EU membership of Ukraine since 2012 (Thompson, 2023). The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has been identified as a key contributing factor to the dramatic shift in public opinion regarding Ukraine's European integration and potential EU membership. As illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, this trend is evident in data from multiple sociological centers.


In Thompson's opinion, IRI's polling data indicates a substantial increase in public support for EU membership over the past 11 years. The Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 are identified as crucial contributing factors to this trend (Thompson, 2023).

Whilst concurring with Thompson's primary assertion, the subsequent argument warrants further elaboration. Indeed, the considerable increase in public support for Ukraine's European integration in 2022 is one of the consequences of the full-scale invasion by Russia in February 2022. The earlier Russian invasion of 2014, which included the annexation of Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the armed conflict in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, has also been identified as a contributing factor to this increased support for European integration. However, a shift in public opinion occurred in late 2013, following the Euromaidan protests, which erupted after the Ukrainian government refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit. These protests, which occurred before Russia's 2014 invasion, indicate that public support for European integration had begun to grow earlier, possibly due to the information policy in this sphere.

The following analysis will examine public opinion in Ukraine's regions before and after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Kindly direct your attention to Figure 1 entitled "Public Opinion in Regions of Ukraine Toward Choosing the EU Over Other Unions." Figure 1 presents responses in 2019 and 2024 to the following question: "If you had to choose only one option, which union do you think Ukraine should most likely join in the future?" Figure 1 data on 2019 is from a nationwide public opinion poll, conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in collabora-

tion with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on November 4–19, 2019 in all regions of Ukraine except for the occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. The funding provided by the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. The respondents chose between such variants: the European Union, the Eurasian Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, neither the European Union nor the Eurasian Economic Union (*Ilko...*, 2019). Figure 1 data on 2024 is from a nationwide public opinion poll, conducted by Sociological Group “Rating” on behalf of the Center of Insights and Survey Research (CISR) of the International Republican Institute, funded by the USAID. The survey was conducted throughout the country, except for the occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions between February 17–21, 2024 (through computer-assisted telephone interviews). The respondents chose between such variants: the European Union; the Eurasian Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; other; difficult to answer/no answer (*International...*, 2024a).

Figure 1. Public Opinion in Regions of Ukraine Toward Choosing the EU Over Other Unions (in%)



Source: Author’s analysis based on: *Ilko...*, 2019; *International...*, 2024a, p. 46.

The predominant trend is a substantial rise in support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU across all regions of Ukraine following the full-scale invasion by Russia in 2022. Opinion polls consistently indicate that the western region of Ukraine is the most favorable towards EU accession, with Ukrainians in the central part of the country also expressing strong support for European integration. However, in 2019, opinions in Ukraine’s southern and eastern parts were more divided. In the southern region, 32% of respondents supported EU integration, while 31% opposed Ukraine joining any union. A similar situation existed in the eastern region of Ukraine, where 34% of respondents favored EU integration and 30% were against joining any union (*Ilko...*, 2019).

As demonstrated by the 2024 “National Survey of Ukraine” (IRI), the most prominent shift in public opinion regarding the EU accession was observed in Ukrainian southern and eastern regions. The survey revealed a notable increase in support for EU accession, with the proportion of respondents in the south rising from 32% in 2019 to 77% in 2024, and from 34% in 2019 to 70% in 2024 in the east. (*International...*, 2024b, p. 46). In May 2024, the results of a public survey revealed that 91% of respondents in Lviv city, located in western Ukraine, expressed their support for EU membership, while only 49% respondents supported the EU membership in Odesa city, located in southern Ukraine (*Attitude...*, 2024, p. 162). It should be noted, however, that proportion of respondents in Ukraine expressing a favorable opinion of EU membership decreased slightly from May 2023 to May 2024 (*Attitude...*, 2024, p. 163).

It is important to note that since 2022, opinion polls have not included Ukrainians residing in the temporarily occupied territories by Russia in eastern and southern Ukraine (for instance, (*Attitude...*, 2024; *Foreign...*, 2023)). Furthermore, since 2014, no polls have been conducted in the annexed Crimea and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions in Ukraine due to the ongoing military conflict (*Ilko...*, 2019; *International...*, 2021; *International...*, 2024a). As demonstrated in Figure 1, the analysis has revealed a consistently less favorable public opinion in Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions regarding the country’s accession to the EU, in contrast to the more positive sentiment observed in the western and central Ukrainian parts. Therefore, it is evident that the opinion polls overall fail to reflect the perspectives of the substantial number of Ukrainians residing in the temporarily occupied territories by Russia in the east and the south of Ukraine. This non-representation of public opinion has persisted for a decade in certain regions and has likely contributed to the significant rise in favorable opinion on EU membership across Ukraine.

The results of a survey conducted in 2024 by the Sociological Group “Rating” for the IRI indicate no significant disparities in support for EU membership based on age demographics (*International...*, 2024b, p. 46). However, the Razumkov Centre poll presents slightly different results: “The younger the respondents, the more likely they are to support EU membership, with support increasing from 80% in the 60+ age group to 89% among those under 30 years old” (*Attitude...*, 2024). Nonetheless, these variations are relatively negligible.

As illustrated in Table 2, there has been a discernible shift in public opinion regarding a possible referendum on Ukraine’s EU accession (see Table 2). Respondents who would vote “in favor” in a referendum on possible Ukraine’s EU accession were as follows: March 2021 – 59.4%, March 2023 – 78.6%, and November 2023 – 78% (*Foreign...*, 2023; *Twenty-fifth ...*, 2023). Presented data as a comparison from March 2023 and March 2021 is from results of a public opinion poll “*Foreign Policy Preferences of Ukrainian Citizens, Assessments of the Government’s Foreign Policy, Attitude to Foreign Countries and Politicians*” held by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on February 22 – March 1, 2023 within the frameworks of the MATRA Programme supported by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine. Face-to-face interviews were held only in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian government and free from hostilities (*Foreign...*, 2023). Data on November 2023 is from the “*Twenty-fifth National Survey: Dynamics of Ukrainians’ Attitudes Towards International Unions*”, conducted

by the Sociological Group Rating on November 22–23 throughout the country, except for the occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions as well as territories where there was no Ukrainian mobile coverage at the time of the survey (through computer-assisted telephone interviews) (*Twenty-fifth...*, 2023).

Table 2

Votes “For” in a Possible Referendum on Ukraine’s EU Accession (in %)

Date	% of Votes “For”
March 2021	59.4
March 2023	78.6
November 2023	78.0

Source: Author’s analysis based on: *Foreign...*, 2023; *Twenty-fifth...*, 2023.

A survey by the Rating Group in November 2023, revealed that a mere 5% of respondents expressed opposition to Ukraine’s accession to the EU. The proportion of respondents who had not yet decided or were not to participate in the possible referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the EU increased to 3% and 14%, respectively (*Twenty-fifth...*, 2023).

To summarize, in a possible referendum, Ukrainians would overwhelmingly support the country’s membership of the EU. This support increased significantly following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, with favorable votes rising from approximately 60% in 2021 to around 80% in 2022–2023, as indicated by various sociological polls (refer to the Table 2).

Conclusions

The interrelated nature of public opinion, strategy of information and communication with the public, and public policy of Ukraine towards European integration has been instrumental in propelling Ukraine towards its European integration path, as evidenced by significant milestones, including the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2014 and the commencement of accession negotiations with Ukraine in 2024.

The principal conclusion of this study is that public opinion regarding European integration of Ukraine has become more favorable over the analysis period (2014–2024) despite Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine (from 2014 until the present). This augmentation in favorable opinion is evidenced by two notable peaks during the observed period.

Before the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a general lack of enthusiasm for European integration was evident amongst the Ukrainian population, with opinion polls revealing less than 50% of the populace supporting this idea. However, this changed in response to the Ukrainian government’s decision to suspend the European integration and reject the Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit in November 2013. This decision was followed by the mass pro-European protests, known as the Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity events. From 2014 to 2021, during the implementation of the Association Agreement and the ongoing aggression of Russia against

Ukraine, public opinion stabilized at around 55% support for European integration of Ukraine.

Furthermore, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was pivotal in the significant increase of favorable public opinion regarding Ukraine's European integration and its possible future EU membership. To illustrate this point, support for EU membership increased significantly following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, rising from 58% in 2021 to 80% in 2022. Moreover, a marked shift in public opinion regarding a potential referendum on Ukraine's EU accession is evident, with favorable votes rising significantly following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022: from around 60% in 2021 to approximately 78% in 2023. Since 2022, public opinion on European integration has remained relatively stable, despite the EU granting Ukraine candidate status in 2022 and the commencement of accession negotiations in 2024.

Notably, there has been a substantial increase in public opinion in support of EU membership across all age groups and regions of Ukraine since the full-scale military invasion of Russia in 2022. The most marked shift in opinion is evident in Ukraine's southern and eastern parts, where support for EU membership increased from 32% in 2019 to 77% in 2024 in the south and from 34% in 2019 to 70% in 2024 in the east. However, it is important to emphasize that opinion polls did not include the views of Ukrainians residing in the territories temporarily occupied by Russia in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine. The author hypothesizes that it is an additional factor that may have contributed to the rapid rise in favorable public opinion regarding EU membership in Ukraine.

In conclusion, the findings demonstrate that the events of 2013–2014, specifically the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, indicated that a considerable proportion of the Ukrainian population held favorable opinions of European integration and were willing to defend the country's pro-European path. However, Russia's aggression in 2014 and, more evidently, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had an even more profound impact on public opinion, leading to a significant increase in support for Ukraine's EU membership across all demographic groups and regions.

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Opinia publiczna na Ukrainie wobec integracji europejskiej w czasie wojny Rosji z Ukrainą

Streszczenie

Układ stowarzyszeniowy UE-Ukraina z 2014 r. zapoczątkował nową fazę współpracy między Ukrainą a UE. Jednocześnie od 2014 r. trwały działania wojenne wszczęte przez Rosję przeciwko Ukrainie, które zakończyły się pełnoskalową inwazją 24 lutego 2022 r. Pomimo agresji Rosji Ukraina nie zmieniła swojej strategii integracji europejskiej, o czym świadczy złożenie przez nią wniosku o członkostwo w UE 28 lutego 2022 r. Niniejsze badanie ma na celu zbadanie, jakie zmiany zaszły w opinii publicznej dotyczącej integracji europejskiej Ukrainy w ciągu dekady podczas agresji Rosji na Ukrainę, a jednocześnie między podpisaniem Układu stowarzyszeniowego UE-Ukraina a formalnym otwarciem negocjacji akcesyjnych w 2024 r. Opierając się na dane socjologiczne dotyczące opinii publicznej wobec integracji europejskiej, niniejsze badanie podsumowuje i porównuje dane z sondaży opinii publicznej przeprowadzonych przez różne ukraińskie i międzynarodowe instytucje w latach 2014–2024 i stwierdza, że opinia publiczna na temat integracji europejskiej stała się bardziej przychylna w analizowanym okresie. Co więcej, pełnoskalowa inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę w 2022 r. jeszcze bardziej wzmocniła nastroje pronijne we wszystkich grupach demograficznych i regionach, co zakończyło się zauważalnym wzrostem poparcia społecznego dla członkostwa w UE (z około 60% w 2021 r. do około 80% w latach 2022–2024).

Słowa kluczowe: opinia publiczna, integracja europejska, Ukraina, opinia publiczna i wojna, komunikacja, wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska

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