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The enlargement of the European Union – Poland's example. Between unity and diversity

Abstract: The history of Poland's integration activities, undertaken both before and after joining the EU, has featured several attempts to demonstrate its desire to become an independent entity in the internal EU game of the interests of other EU countries and institutions. This has been the case, since Poland's interests have not always been compatible with the interests of the other actors of integration. For instance, Poland has opposed the scenario of the faster development of countries forming the 'hard core' of the EU. On the other hand, Poland still supports the universal postulate of making Europe a continent of democracy, freedom, peace and progress. The European Union has remained the guarantee that the lines that divide Europe will be erased and stable and consistent development ensured. Therefore, the author believes that Europe (the European Union) has no alternative, and will have to opt for a universalist-and-particular synthesis of unity in multiplicity, and unity in diversity, which enriches and develops but does not divide countries. First and foremost, this synthesis emphasizes the common good while not losing sight of (abandoning) the individual good.

Key words: integration activity, enlargement, interests, common good, accession

Theoretical introduction

The period between 2015 and the present day can clearly be named the "decisive moment" (French: *l'instant decisive*) when the outcomes of Poland's accession to the European Union can be reviewed. There are three clashing perspectives here. One concerns the timeframe and the thirteenth anniversary of Poland's accession (May 1, 2017). Another concerns the most profound crisis of integration ever, encompassing the economic and financial crunch (the threat of the collapse of the Economic and Monetary Union with its common currency, the euro), Brexit, the collapse of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the refugee crisis. Finally, there is the electoral victory of the Law and Justice (PiS) party in the fall of 2015 in Poland.

The theoretical approach taken in this paper – the concept of the decisive moment – has been borrowed from Henri Cartier-Bresson, and it boils down to conducting a simultaneous analysis of numerous factors allowing Poland's membership of the EU to be assessed. This approach is the outcome of the clash of idealistic and pluralistic paradigms (neofunctionalism, first and foremost) with that of realism (neorealism) and realistic constructivism.

This approach may also be referred to as the theory of the decisive moment. Taking this point of view, it is worth considering whether the hitherto mainstream perception of the position of Poland in the European Union is likely to be undermined and replaced by a Eurorealistic or even Euroskeptical approach.

What is also significant here is the theory of context, which refers to the requirement of taking into a critical account a set of coexisting current factors and points of refer-

ence rooted in the political, ideological and socio-economic environment associated with a radically altered approach to the role of Poland in the EU.

The context makes it possible to precisely understand the determinants of Poland-EU integration before and after 2015. The context (political, ideological and socio-economic) is decisive for the present European policy in Poland. The context is also an element of narration and deliberation, as presenting a positive or negative image of the European Union influences the degree to which either the united or different strategic and tactical goals (interests) of Poland and the EU are emphasized.

The context also makes it possible to explain the change that has occurred in European policy in Poland after 2015, whose authors (primarily J. Kaczyński[1]) have decided that it should focus on reinforcing the independence of Poland in the European Union by emphasizing sovereignty and the concept of a Europe of Fatherlands (“Europe of equal and solidary states”).

Non-confrontational (idealistic) determinants of the Polish accession doctrine

1. Twenty years after the adoption of the National Integration Strategy, Poland’s EU membership continues to be a strategic development goal. The debate on the integration of Poland with the European Union has gone through several crucial stages over this period. Stage one was about the identification of integration objectives and intentions; it was concluded in Luxembourg when the European Council resolved to commence accession negotiations with Poland in 1997. Stage two spanned the period between March 1998 and the end of the negotiations in December 2002, and marked the time when Poland’s integration plans were confronted with the reality of European policies, in particular that of intergovernmental relations. Period three lasted from 2003 to the accession on May 1, 2004, and may be referred to as the period of celebration, since it witnessed the accession treaty being signed, ratified and coming into effect. The last, current, post-accession stage is the time when the formal provisions associated with membership are confronted with the extent to which they can be absorbed into the Polish legislation, economy and politics (*Narodowa*, p. 4).

This post-accession period can also be divided into the times of the governments of Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO) respectively. The political consensus on the position of Poland in the EU has clearly been destroyed over this period. The first reason for this was the dispute over the content and ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The second reason, which we are facing today, is related to the infringement procedure launched by the European Commission against Poland, and the serious disputes between Poland and the EU on the issue of immigrant relocation, as well as energy and climate policies, not to mention the election of the President of the European Council.

2. Talking about the recent years of Poland’s membership, both in 2004 and at present, the integration with the European Union has facilitated accelerated internal development, modernization of the economy and legislative system as well as bridging the developmental (civilizational) gap between Poland and many other European states. The

[1] Jarosław Kaczyński is the leader of the ruling party in Poland – PiS (translator’s note).

accession treaty entered into force on May 1, 2004, initiating a new, advanced stage of political and regulatory transformation processes. The present Poland’s legislative, political and economic systems are intrinsically coupled with those of the European Union.

3. Poland’s ambitions to become a full and serious member of the European Union have long been accompanied by thorough considerations of the benefits and consequences of abandoning efforts in this regard. The assumption is that Poland’s integration with the EU is associated with opportunities, increased potential and, therefore, with the spontaneously generated ‘added value’ of accession. The analysis must not ignore the alternative of ‘failed integration,’ however, which means consciously or unconsciously staying outside European integration or on the outskirts of the European Union. This has to be taken into consideration, because Poland’s membership of the European Union has required and continues to call for enhanced unification and harmonization in politics, economy and legislation. Had Poland failed to release its energy and kick start the accession potential, its participation in the EU might have been faulty and the benefits decidedly smaller. It remains an open question, however, whether or not the current government in Poland intends to continue these efforts. The answer appears to be affirmative.

4. Poland’s integration with the EU has been based on the conviction that this process is beneficial for both parties. Poland is trying to prevent any potential threats, continuously verifying, monitoring and assessing integration and applying mechanisms and instruments intended to prevent the adverse consequences of accession. This task is far from easy, though. Fortunately, Poland is not on its own in the EU system. It is accompanied by twenty-seven solidary states and the whole EU institutional system that supports it (Kubin, 2016, pp. 70–75).

EU membership generates political, economic and social benefits for Poland. The political gains primarily concern involvement in the project of building an integrated Europe by means of active participation in the European governance system and the operations of EU institutions and entities in broadly understood legislative terms. So far, it has been assumed that such an involvement makes it possible to increase the stability of the democratic system in Poland and promulgate standards and values rooted in the European public realm. Another political benefit concerns the tighter relations emerging between Poland and Europe (including also non-EU members) at the individual, local and regional levels. Following Poland’s accession to the European Union, regions have been reinforced and empowered, in particular as concerns the management of structural funds. In individual terms, Poland’s accession to the EU has enabled Poles (Polish citizens as on May 1, 2004) to partake in eliminating obstacles to free movement, settlement and employment in the EU (*Raport*, pp. 2–5).

The economic benefits encompass being part of the common single market with its advancing free flow of goods, services and capital, as well full access to EU financial transfers, communication exchange and inflow of investment and new technologies.

The social benefits include the implementation of European standards in Poland, especially as concerns internal security, labor conditions, health, education, information and quality of life. It is also about the benefits generated by the implementation of European environmental standards which pertain to rising living conditions, the implementation of modern and environmentally friendly technologies based on the rational consumption of raw materials and energy, as well as simultaneously improving the ef-

ficiency of operations and avoiding the scenario of continuously damaging the biological and environmental balance.

The integration of Poland and the EU is also associated with costs of both budgetary and socio-economic nature. The former are related to the member ‘contributions’ (payments to EU budget, co-financing of structural investments and the Common Agricultural Policy) and the costs borne to ensure the operation of the central structure of coordination and administration, alignment of legislation, personnel training and information activities. The socio-economic costs may, and actually do take the form of difficult challenges faced by some sectors of economies, regions or business entities.

It should be borne in mind that considerations on the topic of benefits and costs are typically relative in nature. What is a political cost for some, for instance transferring a portion of power exercised by certain state authorities to EU institutions, is a benefit for others who see it as participation in EU decision-making processes. The economic costs related to the implementation of EU legislation (*acquis communautaire*) and the overwhelming unification and harmonization bring modernization, increased competitiveness and enforce learning and self-improvement. Similarly, what one group sees as a possible increase of labor costs may mean growing remuneration and improved living conditions for another group (*Narodowa*, pp. 6–10).

It should not be forgotten that the costs generated by the unprecedented dynamics of transformations following the accession have not been the price Poland has paid for joining the EU, but the price for long-lasting economic backwardness and civilizational stagnation. These costs would most likely have had to be borne had Poland joined the EU or not. The experience of other states that have joined the Communities and EU shows that, in the long run, the economic benefits generated by integration are significantly greater than the costs of adaptation required by the specific operations of the EU.

The determinants of Poland’s membership of the European Union. Between unity and diversity

1. The transformations of the political system and economy which initiated the process of Poland’s integration with the European Union resulted from numerous domestic and external factors. The most significant external determinants included the following (Najder, pp. 1–3; Berend, 2012, pp. 5–15):

– the political and economic confrontation between the East and the West came to an end, resulting in the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union being undermined, and then in the collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance;
– the opposition and, later, the then new government in Poland (rooted in the Solidarity movement) enjoyed the support of the USA and countries and organizations in Western Europe (first and foremost, the European Communities, European Union and the Council of Europe);
– Poland’s seeking to take the North-Atlantic path was associated with Western Germany’s pursuit to reunite the FRG and GDR;

– the neighborhood of Poland changed thoroughly (in the aftermath of the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR and Czechoslovakia).

The following crucial domestic factors have been identified:

– the collapse of real socialism (its rejection by Polish society in the June 4, 1989 election);
– transformation of the system from socialism to capitalism (free-market economy) and a parliamentary democracy;
– the agreement of different political forces as to Poland’s foreign policy and, in particular, Poland’s preparation for joining the EU; this agreement was broken after some time by the PiS party, first and foremost, which has always pursued a Euro-realistic attitude and the sovereign position of Poland in Europe.

2. Talking about the more than a dozen years of Poland’s membership, both in 2004 and at present, the integration with the European Union was aimed to facilitate internal development, cohesion and modernization as well as bridging the developmental (civilizational) gap between Poland and its surroundings. Poland’s EU membership has been a strategic goal and apparently continues to be one. This goal was consistently implemented by successive governments in Poland from 1989 to 2004 as the expression of the majority of Polish society’s desire for Poland to be a member and active agent in European structures.

3. Membership of the European Union has given Poland a multitude of new political, economic and socio-cultural opportunities which have served the purpose of catching up with the most developed countries in the EU and globally. The system of agreements and connections between the European Union and the states and institutions/organizations across the globe has enabled Poland to employ them for the purposes of its own promotion and development (*Raport*, pp. 9–12).

Determinants against Poland’s accession to and membership of the European Union

1. Poland’s expectations to join the European Union were rooted in the national interest. From the very beginning, however, the accession was far from easy and called for a number of contradictory and mutually exclusive approaches and interests to be overcome (*Narodowa*, pp. 8–10).

2. Being an EU member, Poland has had the right and obligation to present and defend its own interests. Yet the extent and intensity of positive or negative interactions between Warsaw and Brussels remains an open question.

3. The greatest (and most profound) crisis of integration and the European Union, which started as early as in 2005 (and has not ended despite what the ‘official optimists’ claim), evidences that the status of Poland in the European Union has to be founded on Poland’s national interests being taken into account, and included in the interests of the integrating community of the 28 member states (or 27 after Brexit) and the extensive EU institutional system.

4. After over a dozen years of integration Poland has failed to acquire a strong political position and the reputation of a predictable and responsible country. This has been the case

despite the good economic situation, political stability in the difficult period of the economic crunch and the high support of Poles for integration, which has always distinguished Polish society from many other European societies (*10 PL-UE*, pp. 1–6). Political parties in Poland and successive governments from 2008 to 2015 committed countless mistakes and frequently abandoned the efforts to strengthen the position of Poland in the EU, not to mention the lack of European education in Polish schools and universities. The same can be said about the NGOs, whose activities aimed at the propagation of European ideas have not been supported, and even if they have, the financing has been provided by the EU, Norwegian funds and the resources of German political foundations.

5. Poland has negotiated billions of euros to be allocated under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 and has been assured of its strategic partnership by Germany and France. All that did not help the PO to win the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections.

6. At present (2017), the Polish government stresses that what continues to count in the process of European integration is the sovereignty of Poland and its independence from, and equality with other states and EU institutions. In this way, the Polish government is abandoning the mainstream approach to integration and the EU, and seeks such allies as Hungary and other Central European Countries, rather than Germany.

7. The European Union has been weakened by crises and is completely unable to deal with some EU countries, including Poland, infringing EU legislation and the Copenhagen criteria. This reinforces the political elite’s conviction that ‘you can do whatever you want’ in the EU without any repercussions.

Change of the context, narration, discourse and deliberation concerning the paradigm of how to approach European Union membership in 2005–2007 and after 2015

1. The issue of Poland’s objectives (interests) becoming incompatible with the expectations of the European Union is related to the different outlooks Warsaw and Brussels have in the following areas:

– how Poland’s integration with the EU is defined as the conscious positioning (‘becoming engrafted’) in the system of Western Europe;
– how the process of economic, legislative and political transformations is understood;
– how Poland’s full participation in the Single Market is perceived, including the advancement of the free flow of goods, services and capital as well as the access to EU financial transfers and permanent, institutionalized communication;
– Poland’s economy and legislation have had to be significantly aligned with those of the EU, which has been expected to mean that European standards would be imposed, in particular in the fields of the economy, internal security, labor conditions, health, education, quality of life and environment;
– the energy and capacity released after the accession ensure that Poland’s development potential is not curbed by the outcomes of integration (Mucha-Leszko, 2014, pp. 40–41);

– the extent (level) of participation in the European governance system, in the full scope of operations of EU institutions and entities;
– the intensity with which Poland builds its relations with the rest of Europe at the individual, local and regional levels;
– the coordination of political, administrative and diplomatic activities by means of intensive domestic Europeanization.

2. The results of Poland’s EU membership evidence that Poland has taken better advantage of the EU than other countries in the same region which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Poland has become a leader in economic growth. Poland’s GDP has increased by half (48.7%) since joining the EU. EU funds in 2004–2013 have facilitated the implementation of over 160,000 projects at a cost of over EUR 120 bn (*10 PL-UE*, pp. 7–10).

On the other hand, having been an EU member for over a decade, Poland has stumbled over the serious problem of the medium level development trap. Despite being in the EU, Poland has been stuck, finding it difficult to move from the stage of rapid development based on quantitative factors (such as inexpensive labor, EU funds streaming in and foreign investment) to the intensification stage based on modern technology, high industrialization, export competitiveness (the requirement to strengthen its competitive position) and, thereby, higher labor efficiency, improved quality of products and services, and generating its own capital resources (Lissowska, 2014, pp. 1–4).

3. Poland has to become more independent in how it is positioned inside the EU and become a real EU power broker. This is of particular importance in the face of the growing rivalry, contradictions and conflicts in the integration system of the following triad:
– between EU member states;
– between EU institutions;
– between the former two.

This may be achieved within the framework of EU instruments (policies) (Czachór, 2009, pp. 1–5).

4. The integration crisis is not making it easier for Poland to maintain the unity of its interests with the EU. The EU does not give Poland much leeway in the implementation of its European policy. Poland cannot afford to find itself in the European peripheries or to fall into the medium development trap, by becoming dependent on external agents (the European Commission first and foremost), foreign investment and the economic situation of the largest partners (Germany). Therefore, it is necessary to complete the following tasks:
– intensively expand abilities, capacities, resources and reserves, man-made processes and manpower collected in order to be used in a strategic and reactive way. These resources primarily include: financing, raw materials, energy, human capital as well as experience, knowledge and competences/skills;
– seek authorization from the EU and its agents for Poland’s activities and acquire the skills to employ EU potential for the implementation of Poland’s objectives and plans which do not go against the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*;
– run an ongoing dialogue/debate without avoiding difficult topics, and thereby display assertiveness in terms of implementation and harmonization, while opposing those political and legislative solutions which defy the interests of Poland;

– firmly reject the assumption that EU decisions are/will be made only by selected members (a handful of the strongest EU members);
– permanently participate and unceasingly (stubbornly) voice the opinions of Poland’s representatives (the government, president, national parliament, local governments and NGOs, representative structures of Poland’s business, academia and culture) on every matter of the integration process. Poland must not merely be a passive observer and commentator;
– flexibly establish partnership agreements with other EU states (strategic or not) and links (bilateral and multilateral) resulting from shared interests and values. This will allow Poland to state its position on a particular topic and seek allies with a similar attitude. This policy will make it possible to undermine or eliminate such concepts as the ‘European directorate,’ ‘the core’ of Europe, or ‘different speeds,’ all of which are intended to reinforce the division of the EU into a center and peripheries;
– develop a network, or institutional and non-institutional links (including informal personal contacts and friendships);
– take advantage of emerging opportunities, yet avoid benefitting from others’ weaknesses;
– employ forward thinking to eliminate threats which may undermine Poland’s position in the EU. Potential issues need to be resolved through the ongoing review, monitoring and assessment of membership based on the mechanisms and instruments applied to prevent the adverse impact of potential risks and dysfunctions.

The outcome of Poland’s over a decade-long membership of the EU must be a question of Polish opinion on the future of the EU and eurozone

1. Poland is in the political elite of EU members, having both the moral right and the right following from its treaties to participate in shaping the future of Europe. After all, Poland has demonstrated (with the pace and depth of its economic and political transformations) it is a reliable partner in shaping the new European reality.

2. In this context, it should be Poland’s primary task to develop an efficient model for the coexistence of different, opposing entities, human experiences and opinions employing the *modus vivendi* principle.

3. The awareness that Poland is co-responsible for the future of Europe must not be a taboo in Poland. It is our task to define how Poland envisages the future of an integrated Europe and subject it to public debate, for the sake of Polish society, too, which has to realize what may happen once the flow of EU financial resources stops.

4. Poland’s membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone) is a crucial challenge for the future of Poland in 2017–2020. In conformity with the accession treaty which entered into force on May 1, 2004, Poland is obliged to adopt the common currency. Therefore, repeating “never” or “firmly negative” is of no formal significance.

Given the above, it may be assumed that the following will be required of Poland to join the eurozone:
– the conviction that gaining access to cheaper capital as a result of adopting a single currency is a positive development needs to be changed. Unfortunately, this is a trap.

When interest rates are too low, a speculation bubble might emerge which then bursts, triggering a crisis;
– competitiveness in terms of price and quality has to be achieved to facilitate exports, alongside high professional activity, low structural unemployment, people investing in themselves and high mobility;
– a flexible attitude to Poland’s participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II, which has been an official requirement so far. Participation in the ERM II may lead to Poland’s losing its competitiveness in terms of costs;
– Poland’s being invited to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) extended primarily by the Euro Group (primarily Germany), the European Commission and European Central Bank. All arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ need to be considered after such an invitation.

The European Union’s enlargement to include Poland and the opinion of Polish society

1. The high level of social support for European integration continues to be a highly important determinant of Poland’s position in the EU. It cannot be founded exclusively on Poland succeeding in acquiring further billions of euros from the EU, the lack of border controls due to the *Schengen acquis* and the access of the unemployed in Poland to the EU labor market. Therefore, a European education must not be neglected at both national and local levels, and with the participation of both public institutions and NGOs. The goals of this education (“learn Europe, learn through Europe, learn about Europe”) have to continue to encompass the following:
– the promulgation and implementation of European integration within the framework of “Europe’s go-to people” formula;
– research, education and cultural activities related to European topics in order to support the endeavors to strengthen the position of Poland in the EU;
– full implementation of membership results in the domestic system of integration by means of designing and preparing the appropriate background (triad I): institutions (structures) – procedures – people (triad II: politicians – officials – experts);
– participation in the development of European civil society and commitment to the revival of the European project;
– a debate on the European future of Poland after 2020.

2. The current and future condition of public discourse on Poland’s membership of the EU is influenced by the following factors (Czachór, 2010, pp. 14–15):
– the financial and economic situation in Poland, in particular in the times of a European and global crisis;
– the level/scale of absorption of EU financial resources;
– the attitude of political parties and their leaders to European integration;
– the political agreement/agreement between political parties (or its lack) on Poland’s integration with the EU;
– the negotiating skills of Poland/the Polish government, and the ability to reach the necessary compromise;

– the ability to express Polish interests at the European level;
– Poland’s position in the EU (both imagined and actual);
– Poland’s representation in the European Union’s institutions;
– the conformity of Polish legislation to European/EU legislation;
– preparedness to adopt a single currency – the euro;
– the extent and quality of information spread by the mass media about the EU and European integration;
– public polls which evidence the extent to which Polish society supports the EU, given the continued low level of knowledge about European integration and the EU in Poland.

3. EU membership of Poland continues to enjoy high support among Polish society. On the other hand, the attitudes of Poles to the issue of Poland’s membership of the EU are far from unanimous. 37% of Poles believe that their country would handle future challenges better if it were outside the EU. It can therefore be understood that nearly 40% of Poles do not perceive the EU as the only alternative for the future development of Poland and that, under specific circumstances, this group could envisage being outside the EU framework. In a survey carried out in February 2016, over one third of Poles (35%) said that EU membership excessively curbs the sovereignty and independence of Poland. Another interesting feature is that, compared to other countries, Poles seem to be against the idea of enhanced integration (Balcer, Buras, Gromadzki, Smolar, 2016, pp. 5–6).

Due to the above-mentioned factors, the outlook presented in the following quotation does not resonate well among Poles: “We are killed by nations. It’s a poison running in our veins. It doesn’t allow us to unite on supranational problems. Democracy is unable to keep up with the economy and control it because nations do not allow democracy to go beyond state borders. If we allowed that, a supranational democracy would be empowered and people would get the sense of having an influence. They would not have to vent their frustration by voting for populists. When we don’t allow the EU to seriously integrate we surrender to the power of the global economy, or nationalist populists” (Sierakowski, 2016, p. 12). The more so, as practically nothing has been done since accession to help Poles become more familiar with and better understand the transformations occurring in Europe and the European Union.

Conclusion

1. Despite the multitude of problems related to Poland’s EU membership, our joining was based on respect for the values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union, which reads as follows: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

2. Having been an EU member for over a dozen years marks the right time for Poland to consider the coordination of European policy in Poland. European policy is not a de-

pendent element of foreign policy. Since the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Aid was established in the early 1990s, European policy has been considered to be independent, or at least autonomous, from state foreign policy. The situation changed when the Office of the Committee for European Integration was included in the system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was justifiable to combine the departments dealing with foreign affairs and European policy, as was evidenced in the course of the Polish presidency of the EU council.

3. After the period of over a dozen years since joining the EU, Poland should be guided by the following principles (Jaskulski, 2013, p. 23):

– further integration of Poland with the EU makes sense only provided that it is mutually beneficial;
– EU member states, in particular the countries of the ‘Old EU,’ have to be continuously persuaded that Poland has a unique position in Central and Eastern Europe;
– Poland’s European policy has to seek to achieve (maintain) the balance between the European and the Atlantic;
– the principle of the mutuality of asymmetric adjustments jointly negotiated (before and after accession), whether in or outside treaties, needs to be maintained;
– the conduct of EU institutions and any member state must not breach the principle of non-discrimination, solidarity and European cohesion. All the proponents of the implementation of the EU’s hard core (kernel – a union within the Union) should hear a firm ‘no’ from Poland;
– Poland is obliged to continuously evidence (confirm) its ability to fulfill the obligations related to integration that it has accepted;
– Polish borders must not become the lines of any new divisions and must not close and isolate;
– succeeding in the EU depends on national specializations (including Poland’s specialization) in specific topics – different EU policies and fields of activity (for instance, the European Neighbourhood Policy, strong and efficient agriculture and energy policy);
– Poland is becoming a partner of actors who are bigger and stronger. Poland wants to be distinguished by its firmness and consistency on the one hand, and by innovation and resourcefulness on the other. This is particularly noticeable in the activities of Polish MEPs;
– it continues to be necessary to present a precise definition of Poland’s vision of an integrated Union (Europe), also in the context of the future of integration (Bachmann, 1999, pp. 144–145);
– the only limitation on Poland’s independent position in the European Union will be imposed by the respect for the *acquis communautaire*. Yet whenever EU legislation is not in line with Poland’s national interest it should be opposed by all available (lawful) legislative and political measures. Failing to meet the obligations towards the EU which are stipulated in the treaties may be a path to nowhere;
– Poland must not give the impression of feeling like a guest, rather than a member of the EU. It cannot only dig into EU financial resources, while forgetting the legislative, economic and financial achievements of the EU (Kosikowski, 2016, p. D6).

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Rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej – przykład Polski. Między jednością a różnorodnością

Streszczenie

Polska kilka razy w swej historii aktywności integracyjnej przed i po przystąpieniu do UE podjęła próbę zademonstrowania pozostałym krajom UE i unijnym instytucjom, że chce być samodzielnym podmiotem wewnątrz-unijnej gry interesów. Tym bardziej, że nie zawsze interesy Polski są zgodne z interesami pozostałych aktorów integracji. Na przykład sprzeciwiamy się postulatowi szybszego rozwoju krajów należących do „twardego jądra” UE. Z drugiej strony Polsce nadal bliskie jest uniwersa-

listyczne przesłanie, które brzmi: naszym wspólnym życzeniem jest uczynienie Europy kontynentem demokracji, wolności, pokoju i postępu. Unia pozostaje dla Polski nadal gwarantem redukowania linii podziału w Europie i popierania stabilności i pomyślnego rozwoju. Z uwagi na powyższe, zdaniem autora nie ma innego wyjścia, Europa (UE) musi postawić na uniwersalistyczno-partykularną syntezę jedności w wielości oraz jedności w różnorodności, która wzbogaca i rozwija, ale nie rozbija. A przede wszystkim eksponuje dobro wspólne bez zaniku (zatracania) dobra indywidualnego.

Słowa kluczowe: działania integracyjne, rozszerzenie, interesy, dobro wspólne, przystąpienie

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A two-speed Europe – a risk of total disintegration, or an opportunity for the development of the European Union? an attempt at a projection

Abstract: The economic and debt crises in the Eurozone have exacerbated divisions within the European Union and are leading to an increase in competition among the Member States. The aim of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether this proposed "two-speed Europe" will lead to the total disintegration of the EU, or rather to its development in other dimensions. The structure of work and the analysis conducted in this paper are devoted to this question. A fundamental issue is the character of multipolarity at the regional level. What role will be played in the integration process by the currently discussed idea of a "two-speed Europe"? The author has adopted the method of critical analysis of literature. As the result of the analysis it has been shown that the "two-speed Europe", will lead the current integration of Europe to total ruin, entailing dangerous economic and political consequences resulting from the collapse of the integration project.

Key words: integration, multipolarity, disintegration, two-speed Europe, development

Introduction

The current interdependence among entities in international relations is simultaneously accompanied by a trend towards multipolarity. This process in particular concerns the European Union (EU), at the regional level as well as in the global arena.

The economic and debt crises in the Eurozone have exacerbated divisions within the European Union and are leading to an increase in competition among the Member States. As a result, the dynamics of integration processes and also disintegration processes influenced by the crisis are leading to an inevitable evolution of the EU. The possibilities of the EU to exercise its influence and share in the creation of a new, multipolar order will depend on the form taken by the European integration project in the coming years.

A fundamental issue is the character of multipolarity at the regional level. Will the EU evolve in the direction of cooperative or confrontational multipolarity? To what extent will it support the integration of the new Member States? What role will be played in the integration process by the currently discussed idea of a "two-speed Europe"? To what degree could the disintegration of the EU contribute to the growing tendency towards confrontational multipolarity in the global arena?

The aim of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether this proposed "two-speed Europe" will lead to the total disintegration of the EU, or rather to its development in other dimensions. The structure of work and the analysis conducted in this paper are devoted to this question.

Disintegration of European states in selected political, legal and economic doctrines

The roots of the concept of European disintegration can be found in political, legal and economic doctrines relating to international relations dating back to the second half of the 18th century.

Among them, we can find separatist tendencies. They are evidenced by the doctrine of one of the greatest expert in the law of nations of the time, Swiss lawyer Emer de Vattel (1714–1767) (Sadowski, Szymaniec, 2011, pp. 13–15, 20–21, 29–30). According to Vattel, the subjects of the law of nations – which modifies the law of nature – and at the same time, the entities operating on international arenas, should always be sovereign nations – states. This was the principle that Vattel stood by strongly. Nations, irrespective of their size, are independent and equal to each other, as in the light of the law of nature, it is not strength that determines the law, but justice and obligations towards others. Therefore, relations between sovereign states must be based on the principle of equality, and no state may interfere with the internal affairs of another (Malec, 1999, p. 148). Vattel considered the state of peace, not war, between nations as the natural state and supported limiting the use of violence in international relations, but also believed that sometimes war may constitute an efficient means of enforcing justice. He accepted the use of war not only in case of injustice being committed, but also if the national security is at threat. He also did not rule out the possibility that both sides of an armed conflict may be right in some respects (Vattel, 1958, pp. 53–67, 90, 329–331, 354–367, 593–597).

Vattel’s views gained popularity among the academics of his time. Their echoes are found in, for instance, the reflections of a Scottish thinker and Professor at the Edinburgh University – Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), presented in his work published at the end of the century, in 1792, entitled *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, which constitutes a synthesis of the author’s considerations on the subject of morality, the foundations of law and politics. He claimed that nations – states are artificial persons, which hold – similarly to natural persons – certain rights, arising from certain actions (such as ownership of a territory), or agreements and customs. If other means of defending one’s rights prove unsuccessful, the ultimate means the state may use is military force. According to Ferguson, war should be considered justified or fair not only in case of open aggression expressed by one state towards another, but also if a somewhat potential threat exists, which the Scottish author covers by the scope of each state’s right to defend itself. “Nations are, […] almost in every instance, mutual objects of jealousy and distrust”. Therefore, they may only consider themselves safe as long as they are able to protect their own rights (Ferguson, 1792, pp. 300–301). Alike Vattel, not believing in the possibility of completely eliminating military conflicts from international relations, Ferguson called for their humanitarisation. By negating the possibility of close peaceful cooperation, also for the purpose of settling any possible disputes between states comprising the international community and even the Concert of Europe, Ferguson – just as the Swiss lawyer – presented a view which could be considered anti-integration (Sadowski, Szymaniec, 2011, pp. 13–15, 20–21, 29–30).

Trends supporting disintegration of European states can be found in the doctrine of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). He is the author of *The Closed Commercial State*

(*Der geschlossene Handelsstaat*). The main idea behind it was that the state should constitute a closed space in commercial terms, just as it is closed as a territory governed by one legal system. The concept of the closed commercial state is therefore an extreme consequence of the sovereignty of states. The German philosopher justified his idea with arguments of an ethical nature, namely, he stressed the injustice and exploitation caused by the current colonial policy of European states. A division of Europe, and then the rest of the world, into self-sufficient economic areas should eliminate the cause of war, which is the desire to gain access to resources. Therefore, the transformation of the current international community into a system of closed commercial states – which may possibly exchange goods by barter – in the long-term should lead to the total elimination of war (Fichte, 1996, p. 154). Fichte’s views therefore reflect on his dreams of eternal peace. Only this time, realisation of that dream should not lead to integration, but radical disintegration of states. Fichte’s idea was of a socialist utopian character, with strong republican roots. It is a radical extension of the concept of sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the nation, presented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *The Social Contract* and in the draft constitution for Corsica (Sadowski, Szymaniec, 2011, pp. 13–15, 20–21, 29–30).

Towards the end of the 18th century, an ethnic definition of the nation emerged in the European thought, whose concept was developed by a German thinker of the ‘Sturm und Drang’ era, Johann Gottfried Herder (Szymaniec, 2008, pp. 18–36). At the dawn of the next century, nationalistic ideology began developing, towards which Fichte himself greatly contributed – through his Addresses to the German Nation, presented during the Napoleonic Wars in 1807 (Fichte, 1963, pp. 160–173). The character of those ideas became strongly anti-integration. This also affected the science of economics. Some of Fichte’s concepts relating to the closed commercial state inspired the representatives of the so-called ‘Nationalökonomie’, i.e. an economic thought developed mainly in German cultural areas which saw the nation managing its resources as the foundation for its considerations. As Jerzy Chodorowski noted, Fichte may be considered the precursor of the German “anti-integration economic doctrines,” supported by the representatives of various political trends: from democrat Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919) all the way to the Nazis (Chodorowski, 1972, p. 19).

The political, legal and economic thought of the second half of the 18th century also makes references to anti-integration concepts. On the opposite side, we have Vattel’s and Ferguson’s reflections on international relations, which accentuate the national sovereignty, as well as Fichte’s socialist utopia, which started the “national economy” doctrines with strong disintegration overtones. Whereas the views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on international relations were so ambiguous that they could serve both Kant and Fichte. However, it should be emphasised that in all of those concepts we can find seeds of ideas which were developed, in various directions, over the next two centuries (Sadowski, Szymaniec, 2011, pp. 13–15, 20–21, 29–30). Those contemporary critical economic doctrines which take into consideration EU disintegration drivers, unequivocally point out to structural problems.

J. Sozański (Sozański, 2014, p. 10) deems the research into the EU law an extraordinarily complex discipline, given the amount of legislature (over 90 thousand legal acts), growth dynamics, intricate structure and the resulting difficulties in application and presentation within the doctrine. The Lisbon Treaty has further tangled up system mecha-

nisms and structure, which however has as yet been reflected in neither the application of law by EU and member states authorities, nor in the literature, which in particular all ignore a new, hierarchically exposed category: the EU values and the related broadly meant human rights and general principles, thus contorting the shape of the system. The EU’s powers having been weakened, such situation adversely affects the consistency and efficiency of the legal regime, as well as the implementation and application of law. Another material change is including, in the EU treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, harmonised with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Strasburg jurisprudence, connected with the EU’s (not yet performed) obligation to access ECHR. Opening of the EU legal regime onto international law and the legal system of the UN and other international organisations has further undermined the autonomy of the EU system. Such repeated distortions of *acquis*, caused by EU authorities’ pragmatism, is to a material detriment of the EU and its population, consequently leading to disintegration.

R. Cox (Czaputowicz, 2007, pp. 283–288) observed that critical theories focus on analysing how a given political system has come to be and how it should be modified. It is so, because these theories challenge the idea of a sovereign state as a form of political commonwealth, a form defining the identity of the commonwealth’s participants. Supporters of critical theories strive to develop an alternative theory of international relations and to overcome the problems posed by the existence of sovereign states, with a view to creating post-sovereign global politics, contradicting that implemented within the EU.

Even before the onset of the 2007 economic crisis, there appeared theorists of the European integration questioning the *status quo*. Some researchers deemed integration in certain fields excessive and suggested that the Union should withdraw from some areas or more often use mechanisms of flexible integration (Scharpf, 2006, pp. 20–25). Other suggested a deeper integration in terms of both substance (social policy, defence or external relations), and system model (constitution for the EU, political union or federation). Important factors included the debate over democratic deficit and inefficiency of EU’s implemented policies, so frustrating for EU population (Schmidt, 2006; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40).

On the back of the economic crisis, stronger have after 2008 been opinions that Europe is ‘over-integrated’(Scharpf, 2014, p. 18). While formal powers of EU institutions have been growing, the resources those institutions could use to implement EU policies have remained unchanged. In numerous areas, integration initiatives proved asymmetric and partial only. Critics believe the integration has become too deep, entering new areas, accompanied by excessive optimism, which however lacked any intellectual reflection. Selective negative integration, leaving behind key sectors of the economy, as well as the unavoidable threats of positive integration, all have given rise to the population’s disappointment and distrust (Giandomenico, 2002, p. 383; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40). Against this background, the following paradox comes out, so characteristic of the current inter-paradigm period: discarding the ‘ever closer union’ paradigm and controlled disintegration (including, for instance, more widespread application of opt-out clauses, as well as instruments enabling a closer cooperation among fewer states) are here seen as the only way to save the guiding principle of the united Europe. Fritz W. Scharpf

has particularly clearly stated the idea; he maintains that, following the implementation of Euro-rescuing steps, the EU has become an authoritarian regime run by technocrats (believers in false religion of monetarism) or institutionalised manifestation of creditor states’ control over debtor states (Scharpf, 2014, pp. 3–4). The crisis has brought forward a discord between declared solidarity and practically implemented maximising of sovereignty by leading states (Scharpf, 2014, pp. 3–4; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40; Czaputowicz, 2014). The discord has revealed that the integration based exclusively on ‘managing interrelations’ may prove difficult to sustain (Hayward, 2012, pp. 10–12). In such circumstances, Scharpf sees the only hope in a revolt of debtor states (acting with strong support of their populations), leading to disintegration of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or to such remodelling of EMU which would more evenly distribute the cost of overcoming the crisis (Scharpf, 2014, pp. 13,17; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40). The EU, created in line with the still existing integration paradigm, has proven weak, which makes the Union unable to counteract the ongoing limitation of public authorities’ ability to solve material social and economic problems, while this limitation is among the consequences of globalisation (Conrad, 2012, p. 245). Despite the opinions voiced in the course of a debate over democratic deficit, the problem is not so citizens’ control of decisions of public or quasi-public bodies (e.g., with accountability mechanisms), as such bodies’ ability to control decision-making processes in social, economic and international relations (Lord, 2009, p. 15; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40). Among proposed answers to the problem of the EU’s structural insufficiency is that given by federalism, on which a new consolidation-oriented integration paradigm might be based in the post-crisis Europe (Conrad, 2012, p. 245). In some respects, the EU already operates as a federation; it might also be called a ‘reinvented confederation’ (Kelemen, 2007, p. 305; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40). This notwithstanding, federalism for long remained put on the back burner by European integration theorists (Witkowska, 2013b, p. 178). It was treated as a normative theory of even ideology or, at best, as a descriptive and hardly inspiring approach, which has failed to provide material knowledge-enhancing explanations or analogies useful in studying the contemporary EU. However, supporters of federalism argue that it may be an up-to-date and valuable theory, which not only pertains to the issues fundamental to integration process (such as the division of powers between supra-national and national tiers or the principle of subsidiarity), but also explains the operation of the current and shaping of the future institutions of the European Union (Kelemen, 2007; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40). The fundamental problem preventing the potential of federalist thought from being used is sticking to the rigid conceptual frame of its conventional current. Indeed, if federalism is to realise the ‘United in diversity’ motto, then one must bear in mind that Europe today lacks any politically material form of ‘unity’, be it the sense of European identity or European belonginess (Conrad, 2012, p. 248). This statement urges those discussing the federalisation of the EU to revise accepted views on state and democracy. Joseph H. H. Weiler points out the specific structure of the EU political system. The federal (top-down) hierarchy of legal rules is accompanied by the confederal (bottom-up) hierarchy of actual power and authority, which allows to see the EU system as an innovative form of non-domination institutionalisation (Weiler, 2003; Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40). It could serve a basis for a global cosmopolitan political culture and constitutionalisation (or just legal formalisation) of transna-

tional interrelations. This system does, however, reveal serious drawbacks, referred to above. The consensus-led decision-making process prevents flexible response to signals from the dynamically changing world. Moreover, the yesterday consensus may become the dictate of individual states if the others have changed their preferences. Abandoning these rules would require member state citizens to develop a sense of identification with EU co-citizens. However, shifting the democratic practice from the national level onto the EU level appears impossible without prior rewording of the federation idea and its separation from the statehood in the form of a nation state (Schmalz-Bruns, 2010). Accordingly, new federalists see it necessary to go beyond the familiar model of the nation-state democracy. The democracy of a supra-national federation would be so far from the national democracy, as the latter is far from the democracy of ancient Athens. The new federal reconfiguration of democracy calls for a new approach to the theory of democracy, going off the well-trodden paths of thinking and imagining democracy organised differently from what it looks like in the nation states. It is thus a current of thought opposite to the EU constitutionalisation in the first ten years of this century. It should be stressed that this paradigm is still in the initial development phase and may thus develop in various directions. However, it inspires discussion on a possible solution to the crucial problem faced by the existing federalist ideas: a lack of a deep sense of identity among Europeans. Replacing the search for identity with a focus on trust as the constitutive value of federation might enable the development of institutional structure founded on non-centralised understanding of democracy. Democracy would thus be based not on the sovereignty of a uniform people, but on non-hierarchical coexistence of multiple national and sub-national political communities, accompanied by the European *demos*, so that they would not affect one-another’s status of a carrier of rights. It is such federation only that could be a both legitimate form of organising society, and effective tool to cope with the changing world, including manifestations of arbitrary behaviour within and without (Ławniczak, 2014, pp. 36–40).

A two-speed Europe – risk or opportunity for the development of the EU?

Currently, the European Union is drifting ever farther from its ideals. The most visible changes began to occur at the start of the economic crisis at the turn of 2007 and 2008. In truth, these changes had been visible before, but today their consequences are slowly leading to the total reconstruction of the European community. The EU no longer resembles the institution which it aimed to become at the start of its existence. It is also different from the EU which functioned at least to a certain extent in the 1990s and at the dawn of the 21st century. The EU project at the beginning assumed on the one hand balanced and sustainable developed of the Member States, and on the other community actions including aid from the stronger members for the benefit of the weaker ones. Nowadays, the EU is an organisation in which divisions in levels of development, the nature and extent of national problems, and certainly the increasingly clear disparities between the national interests of individual states. Paradoxically, the problems began at the moment that a common currency was adopted. At that time, the growing distance between the rich countries of the north, such as Germany, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway, and the countries of the south, such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

The authors of a group paper published by the University of Nantes entitled *“Europe: Crise et critique”* (Auffray-Seguette, Leclerc, Ferry, 2015), noted that the absence of democratic legitimacy of the EU was associated among others with lack of sufficiently clear signs of the creation of EU citizenship, as well as with the technocratic character of EU policies. Such a ration, non-populist critique of the EU suggests two conclusions; first, that the centralist institutional construct of the EU, not supported by democratic legitimisation, is unsatisfactory for many states and citizens, and second, that the EU has distanced itself from activities which have a real chance of improving the welfare of its citizens, not in this case meaning centrally planned strategies, but rather increased economic freedom.

The ongoing internal disintegration of the EU is apparent in the great cultural differences between the separate segments of the Union. These differences concern a great many issues, from decision making styles, the definition of authority, time management, aspirations, and work ethics, to methods of teaching, obtaining knowledge, and education. Money is treated differently in different segments, as are borrowing and attitudes towards saving. The type of consequences that can arise from these differences under a top-down generation and implementation model of economic policies can be understood based on the example, for instance, of Bulgaria, which for quite some time has attempted to follow a German model. Moreover, the main institutions of the EU are currently striving to increase their control over the discrepancies among individual states. These institutions are taking on the role of policeman, in hopes that thanks to such an approach they will gain greater control over future events (via, for instance, financial pacts). Meanwhile, the countries of the periphery are losing control over their own debt burdens, as decision concerning their fiscal policies are starting to be made elsewhere.

This division of Europe is increasingly noticeable, with the countries centred on Germany, France, and Italy on the one hand, and the unstable “outlying” countries of the south, now transformed into lenders and debtors. This division entails serious consequences regarding the current form of the EU. It is no longer a federation whose aim is to benefit all of the members of the community, but rather a group of institutions which are being used to create spheres of influence (in particular for the benefit of Germany).

Discussion on the topic of differentiated integration (a Europe of differences) has appeared in the theory and practice of the functioning of the EU as a result of a deepening divergence in categories of economic development, cultural heritage, and national preferences in political and social policy[1] (Zielińska-Głębocka, 1999, pp. 25–26). As a result

[1] **The multi-speed model** is based on the assumption that the Member States will decide to implement the same policies and actions, though not simultaneously, rather at various tempos. This means that all the EU countries accept the common aims resulting from the integration project, and thus accept the existing *acquis communautaire* and agree to its further development. However, some of these countries may choose to implement at a faster pace, while others will choose to join the leading group at a later date. This deceleration of the tempo of integration by the second group may be due to delays in adapting to mutually agreed criteria or to national preferences.

of turbulence in the EU,[2] referred to as a crisis of identity, there has been a return to these concepts, and there is much to suggest that they will find a rationale and ultimately an application. One indication of such a tendency is a nine-page document prepared by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled “*Ein starkes Europa in einer unsicheren Welt*” (A Strong Europe in an Uncertain World), which suggests opening the doors to the development of a two-speed Europe.



Figure 1. A diagram of a two-speed Europe

Source: Own work based on: (Bachmann, 2004, p. 1).

Currently, in the wake of the aforementioned EU crisis, we are faced with the task of creating a multivalent model which combines elements of the multispeed model and the variable geometry model. The integration model which has been proposed, and which itself is a development of the processes described above, can be described as a new-old two-speed model (NOTSM).

The variable geometry model assumes differing methods of implementing integration tasks, and provides for less solidarity. The basis of this variable geometry model, appearing also in the concentric circles model, is the creation of a group of “core” countries which will implement selective cooperation in defined types of policies, such as technological, industrial, or energy policy.

[2] Symptom of which are, inter alia, the gigantic debt of the EU countries, the permanent stagnation of the European economy, the support of the European electorate for the destructive policy of the parties ruling the EU, the lack of economic growth, the demographic gap, the Eurozone crisis, the immigration crisis, Brexit, increasing Euroscepticism, unemployment, the growing developmental disproportion among national economies, the lack of adequate regulation of monetary policy on supranational level, and the increasing tendency to particularism in the interests of individual countries.



Figure 2. Flexibility and legitimisation towards the countries of the hard core

Source: Own work based on: (Bachmann, 2004, p. 10).

In the literature, a two-speed Europe is defined as one in which the European Union is permanently divided into two groups of countries (Fig. 1). Within the first group (the hard core), the network of mutual ties is more dense, and the number of areas of integration is greater than those between this first group and the second group (the rear guard[3]), and this difference between the two groups can only be overcome with the approval of the first group (Figs. 2 and 3) (Bachmann, 2004, p. 1).

This NOTSM model proposed involves the implementation of the same policies and actions in the various countries, but not at the same tempo. The Member States which choose to implement these policies simultaneously and on the principle of unanimity will form the core group of countries. This first group of countries would by design create a political union resembling a federal superstate, whereas the remaining countries would stay at their current level of integration. Those Member States which cannot or do not wish to implement common policies towards the achievement of common aims together with the core would have the opportunity to join the leading states at a later time.

[3] Within the rear guard group, subgroups can be identified:
- the willing and able group (WAG): a group which has become part of the rear guard despite meeting the requirements of the intensified cooperation project, and which has expressed a willingness to participate in the project;
- the unwilling but able (UAG): a group which has become part of the rear guard as a result of its own unwillingness to engage fully in the intensified cooperation, but which meets its requirements for participation;
- the unable but willing group (UWG): a group which has become part of the rear guard as a result of its own inability (failure to meet requirements of participation) to participate, but which nevertheless is willing to participate;
- the unwilling and unable group (UUG): a group which neither meets the requirements for participation, nor is willing to participate.

In practice, however, this would mean their marginalisation, which as a result would lead to the division of Europe into two zones, an A zone and a B zone, and further lead to disintegration.



Figure 3. Flexibility and legitimacy towards the UAG, UUG, and UWG

Source: Own work based on: (Bachmann, 2004, p. 11).

In Europe, the game has already begun, and its result will ultimately be decisive in shaping the balance of power in the EU and the future state of its integration. The tone of discussion is being set by France, Germany, and Italy, already known as the Big Three.

The plan to establish a “European army”, which is meant to be an antidote for the integration problems of a post-Brexit EU, may signal the beginning of a lasting change in the EU balance of power. The mini-summit, which took place on the island of Ventotene on 22 August 2016 with the participation of leaders of France, Germany, and Italy, was the beginning of a new alliance within the EU. Francois Hollande, Angela Merkel and Matteo Renzi hope that the tightening cooperation in defence will be a test of the potential of the countries of Europe to integrate. This plan, championed by the Big Three, to tighten defence cooperation is in fact quite realistic, as Brexit has removed the greatest barrier to the creation of a European army. The greatest influence on the future of the EU will be had by the countries of Western Europe, whereas those countries which remain outside the Eurozone, or which refuse to cooperate with Brussels, will risk ever greater marginalisation. For this reason, full integration of the EU will no longer be a topic of discussion, replaced by partial and fragmentary integration.

The discussion on deepening integration by creating a “defensive union” has itself opened another debate. This debate centres on the tightening of integration in accord

with the two-speed Europe model in a new guise, the NOTSM model. The Italians have already presented a plan for a Union comprising 7 to 12 countries. This is confirmed by the words of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paolo Gentiloni, who stated that Italy will fight for the creation of a “smaller circle” within the EU. The criteria for acceptance into this “circle”, according to Gentiloni, will be a common currency, participation in the Schengen Treaty, and greater coordination of defence. Such an approach threatens the EU with division into “core” and “periphery” areas. It also threatens the Visegrad Group with division. It can be assumed that the “core” (from among the current 28 countries of the EU) would be formed by, apart from Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Austria. Those countries which would remain outside of this “core”, due to their unwillingness to deepen integration, would be those which have not introduced the common currency, nine countries including Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain (until the formal implementation of Brexit, i.e. until 1 April 2017).

The consequences of this proposed NOTSM model for the “peripheral” countries will primarily consist of their marginalisation in terms of the redistribution of funds from the EU budget. In the case of many countries, including Poland, the budget for the years 2014–2020 is the last one in which these countries are to be significant beneficiaries of structural funds which support modernisation and development. After this time, the Eurozone would be the primary mechanism for redistributing funds among the Member States of the “old Union”. Funds earmarked for countries remaining outside the Eurozone will have only marginal significance. In such conditions, for a real convergence to take place, nearly all the funding would have to be provided by the new Member States themselves, which would considerably delay the achievement of this convergence, or even put in question the possibility of bringing the economic development of the countries of the “periphery” up to the level of the developed countries of Europe forming the “core”.

If the “peripheral” countries were to find themselves in this second Europe, with a slower speed of integration, then entry to the high-speed Europe, the Europe of the Eurozone and “core” countries, would be extremely difficult and dependent on the achievement of an economic level equal to the developed countries. Without the support of structural funds from the EU, the convergence process would be exceptionally difficult, if not completely impossible.

The position of the nine “peripheral” countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will not be taken into account in the decision-making process regarding the creation of a fiscal union, as these countries do not belong to the Eurozone, and thus do not have the right to vote on systems of establishing sanctions making decisions within the new fiscal union.

The stabilisation fund, created with the participation of the countries singled out as “peripheral”, will be earmarked for the countries of the Eurozone, meaning that countries which do not experience difficulties due to their retention of national currencies will support those which have problems resulting from a common, politicised currency. This is nothing more than agreement to pay the price for financial problems for which a given country is not responsible, as the current crisis is not a crisis of confidence in individual countries, but a crisis of the Eurozone as such. For this reason, a basic consequence of

this decision will be a drop in competitiveness of the economies of the “peripheral” countries, as a result of the planned unification of the tax sector.

A crucial consequence of introducing this division into Europe will be the lowering of the credit rating of the national currencies of the periphery. The guarantee of loans to the amount of billions of Euro to the IMF from the central reserve banks on conditions which remain unknown is an invitation to speculative games which will result in the significant weakening of these currencies. As a result, there will be turbulence and disturbances in the currency and monetary policies of these countries, and in the long run, the spectre of another financial crisis will arise.

Another consequence of this division in “EU A and EU B” will be a breakdown of European solidarity, which does not bode well for a common policy on Russia, or for chances of solving the immigrant crisis and sharing in the defence of EU borders. The old Europe of the West would concentrate on the problems of its part of the continent, further deepening the disproportion along “core-periphery” lines. Such a division would also have a rebound effect on the NATO forum. It is for this reason that the USA reminds Europe that its guarantee of security is not only NATO, but also the EU. The creation of a two-speed Europe will mean for nine countries of the EU, mainly for those countries in the eastern part of the continent but in particular for Poland, a weakening the this guarantee of security. The diversification of levels of integration and the creation of a “little EU” would lead to a weakening of the guarantee of security for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The proposed NOTSM model will be an opportunity for Russia to expand its influence in Europe and to limit the solidarity of the countries of Europe in the face of a potential threat.

NATO plays a key role in the military sense, but the EU provides security and “scares off threats” at the political level, for example by the threat of the application of sanctions as was the case with Russia. For this reason, each “crack” in European solidarity will undermine the possibility of close cooperation and the guarantee of stability.

The creation of an “Intersea” zone between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas, would only partially compensate for the division of Europe along a two-speed model. The states of the eastern part of the continent are only now building economic and military strength, making them vulnerable to pressure on the part of Russia, for whom every disruption in the EU will be an invitation to such activities. The simple fact of the division of Europe into A and B zones will also weaken the security position of the Baltic States.

Summary

A “two-speed Europe” is at the moment a very realistic possibility, all the more so since the declaration of the prime minister of Belgium, Charles Michel, that in Rome in March of 2017 during a planned meeting of EU leaders a final decision is to be reached regarding the choice of the future model of integration. At that time, the EU is also set to decide what common actions to take in the areas of security policy, migration, and economic growth.

The question also remains of how to tighten defence cooperation – and whether to do so at all. It must be remembered though, that Brexit has retarded the drive towards inte-

gration, and that the possibility of the division of Europe into “core” and “periphery” has become real like never before. Moreover, behind the scenes of the debate on the creation of a “European army”, a real struggle is taking place to determine who will be the leader of Europe in the nearest future.

The “two-speed Europe” which is currently being proposed by the countries of “old Europe” is a conception which, in the form that it may ultimately be implemented, will lead the current integration of Europe to total ruin, entailing dangerous economic and political consequences resulting from the collapse of the integration project. It will also be a significant threat for order and security at the European and global levels.

The division of Europe into A and B zones will result in a weakening of the internal bonds of the Union, and rather than further integration – to total disintegration.

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Europa dwóch prędkości – ryzyko całkowitej dezintegracji czy możliwość rozwoju Unii Europejskiej? Próba projekcji

Streszczenie

Kryzys gospodarczy i kryzys zadłużenia w strefie euro wzmocniły podziały w Unii i prowadzą do wzrostu konkurencji między państwami członkowskimi. Podstawowy dylemat dotyczy charakteru wielobiegunowości na poziomie regionalnym. Jaką rolę w procesie integracji odegra propagowana obecnie idea „Europy dwóch prędkości”? Celem opracowania jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie: czy proponowana „Europa dwóch prędkości” przyczyni się do totalnej dezintegracji czy rozwoju w innym wymiarze UE. Temu celowi zostanie podporządkowana cała struktura pracy oraz przeprowadzona analiza. W pracy przyjęto metodę krytycznej analizy literatury przedmiotu. W efekcie przeprowadzonej analizy wykazano, że „Europa dwóch prędkości” doprowadzi obecną integrację europejską do całkowitego zniszczenia, a tym samym spowoduje groźne konsekwencje gospodarcze i polityczne upadku integracyjnego projektu.

Słowa kluczowe: integracja, wielobiegunowość, dezintegracja, Europa dwóch prędkości, rozwój

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A new approach to policy evaluation in the Europe Union

Abstract: The significant role of the European Union in diffusion of evaluation in Europe is widely acknowledged (Stern, 2009). Although evaluation has a long-standing tradition in the EU, and in particular within the European Commission, in recent years one can observe the process of its expansion, diversification and institutionalisation.
The aim of the paper is to explore the new developments in evaluation policy in the EU, which can be characterised, among others, by strengthening the links between ex ante and ex post impact evaluations and thus closing the policy cycle, where ex post evaluation feeds into ex ante assessment of new public actions. Hence, the problem of utilisation of evaluation findings is discussed. The scope of evaluation performed at the EU level has also been extended from expenditure to regulatory instruments. Moreover, there has been a shift from evaluating merely projects and programmes to evaluating policies and aggregated activities. To this end, a literature and documentary review on evaluation theory and practice have been conducted, as well as the analysis of the normative provisions that are applied to guide the practice of evaluation in the EU.

Key words: evaluation, evidence-based policy making, use of evaluation findings, better regulation

Introduction

The concept of the public policy cycle divides the policy process into a series of stages, starting from the identification of a problem that needs public intervention (agenda setting), defining the possible solutions and public policy tools to address the identified problem (policy formulation), choosing one of the alternatives (decision-making), its implementation and evaluation, that is – assessing the extent to which the policy (programme, a new regulation), actually solves the problem, what the general costs and benefits of the policy are, as well as the indirect and unintended effects. On this basis, it is decided whether the policy should be continued, modified or discontinued. It is also the initial stage of a new policy cycle, as the lessons learned in the past influence the agenda setting and choices to be made in the future, thus closing the loop of the cycle. Although there are some differences in the literature concerning the number of stages, the idea is that public policy making should be seen as a continuous process rather than a single event (Versluis, van Keulen, Stephenson, 2011; Cairney, 2012). From this perspective, evaluation plays an important role in evidence-based policy-making and policy learning, however it is not always fully utilised.

Although evaluation has a long-standing tradition in the EU, and in particular within the European Commission, in recent years one can observe the process of its expansion, diversification and institutionalisation. Thus, the aim of the paper is to explore the new developments in evaluation policy in the EU. To this end, a literature and documentary review on evaluation theory and practice have been conducted, as well as the analysis of the relevant EU normative provisions.

The article is organised into three sections. First, it explains the role of evaluation in the public policy cycle, its possible functions and the interplay between evaluation, monitoring and audit, which are distinct processes, which, however, feed into the evaluation process. Second, it deals with the problem of linking *ex post* evaluations with *ex ante* assessments, relating challenges and factors affecting the use of evaluation findings. Third, it analyses EU practices with the evaluation of regulatory policy, which is the EU’s new leitmotif.

Evaluation and its role in the public policy cycle

The term ‘evaluation’ in the *Encyclopedia of Evaluation* is defined as “an applied inquiry process for collecting and synthesizing evidence that culminates in conclusions about the state of affairs, value, merit, worth, significance, or quality of a program, product, person, policy, proposal, or plan.” The important feature of evaluation is that “conclusions made in evaluations encompass both an empirical aspect (that something is the case) and a normative aspect (judgment about the value of something). It is the value feature that distinguishes evaluation from other types of inquiry, such as basic science research” (Fournier, 2005, p. 140).

In the literature, two important aspects of the evaluation process are highlighted. First, it is the analytical and systemic character of evaluation studies, and the application of scientific approach and rigour in the methodology (Ferry, Olejniczak, 2008; Langbein, Felbinger, 2006; Patton, 2004). The aim of an evaluation is to provide reliable information which can be used in the decision-making process and improve the implementation of public interventions (policies, strategies, programmes or projects). Therefore, the second important aspect of evaluation is its utilitarian character (Bienias, Gapski, Jąkalski, Lewandowska, Opałka, Strzęboszewski, 2012). Evaluation is performed in order to ensure: sound evidence and learning; accountability, transparency and participation; policy coherence; and reducing the regulatory burden (European Commission, 2015).

Depending on the purpose of evaluation, we can distinguish two basic types of evaluation:[1] a formative evaluation, which examines the organisational context, personnel, procedures, inputs etc. in order to improve the intervention design; and summative evaluation which examines the effects of public intervention. Special attention is paid in EU policies to the latter one. The European Commission in its Communication on “Public consultation on Commission Guidelines for Evaluation” characterises evaluation as “a critical, evidence-based judgement of whether an intervention has met the needs it aimed to satisfy and actually achieved its expected effects. It goes beyond an assessment of whether something happened or not, and looks at causality – whether the action taken by a given party altered behaviours and led to the expected changes and/or any other unintended or unexpected changes.” With reference to the EU’s actions – “as a minimum, an evaluation should look at the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, EU-added value and relevance of an intervention or justify why this is not the case” (European Commis-

[1] Sometimes a third type of evaluation is added to the formative/summative dichotomy – developmental evaluation, which primary focus is on exploring possibilities and experimenting, rather than arriving at a fixed intervention.

sion, 2013a, p. 13). The evaluation of socio-economic development in general, includes judgement criteria which fall into the following categories: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, utility and sustainability (EVALSED, 2013).

Evaluation, monitoring and audit are complementary, but quite different exercises. Monitoring is, contrary to evaluation, a systematic, continuous process carried out during the duration of the intervention (and some time after its completion). It generates quantitative data on the implementation of the intervention, albeit, not generally on its effects (unlike evaluation, it does not take into account the outcomes and longer term impact of the intervention). Its aim is to track the progress of a public action and take remedial measures in the case of a deviation from the operational objectives. Thus, monitoring improves the performance of a public project, programme etc., and, by providing relevant factual data, facilitates subsequent evaluation (European Commission, 2015; Olejniczak, 2007; Olejniczak, Ferry, 2008). It differs from formative evaluation in the regularity of the process and the depth of the analysis (see: Markiewicz, Patrick, 2016).

Audit in the public sector has traditionally focused on financial reporting and compliance with the rules. In this case, the centre of interest for the auditors is the effectiveness of the management and internal control system (a so-called compliance audit). However, with the development of the performance audit, which goes beyond the questions of legality and sound financial management, the distinction between evaluation and audit has become less obvious. They both examine the policy design, implementation processes and their consequences, require similar knowledge and skills, and apply much the same methods. However, an audit has a stronger focus on how the work has been done to achieve the desired objectives, with special attention paid to the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public actions, while an evaluation also seeks to answer the questions of whether the observed effects are due to a specific public intervention and why this public intervention has been more or less successful. It takes a broader perspective – examines the economic, social and environmental aspects of the intervention and compares this with other policy alternatives (Simismans, 2015; European Commission, 2013).

Although evaluation has a relatively long tradition in the European Commission (1980s), it used to be restricted to the EU expenditure programmes (under cohesion policy, common agriculture policy or development aid) and developed within different Directorates-General (Departments) of the European Commission. The increase in the EU budget and, consequently, EU expenditure, instances of corruption and misuse of the EU funds as well as legitimacy crises led to a more systematic approach towards evaluation in the Commission (see more: Højlund, 2015). Recent developments in evaluation policy in the EU can be characterised by the following three features: (1) greater emphasis placed on the use of evaluation, in particular, as an input into policy-making; by the introduction of the *evaluate first* principle, evaluation has been placed firmly within the policy cycle; (2) evaluation has been extended from expenditure policies to other types of public interventions, in particular, regulatory activities; evaluation has been embedded within better-regulations-initiatives; (3) a shift from evaluating merely projects and programmes to evaluating policies and aggregated activities (e.g. fitness checks).

Utilisation of evaluation findings

As the Commission states in its Communication “Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation (2013): changes are costly and take time to implement – so they need to be justified and greater attention needs to be paid to looking back before moving forward. Thus, the links between ex ante and ex post impact evaluations should be strengthened. This should be a continuous loop: a good evaluation should be influenced by the quality of the preparation which went into an intervention (i.e. the impact assessment); good impact assessments should draw on the lessons learnt from evaluations, which should identify problems, deficiencies, challenges and successes” (p. 5).

The new approach towards evaluation policy in the UE has been underpinned by the institutional reforms in the EU and a postulate for more citizen-based governance of the EU. It is worth noting that with the change of a paradigm of public administration from “the new public management,” where inspiration has been drawn from private sector management techniques and market mechanisms, and citizens were perceived merely as clients of public services, to “the new public governance,” civil society has become at the heart of public administration (Izdebski, 2007). As Boyte (2005, p. 536) put it: “[t]he shift involves a move from citizens as simply voters, volunteers and consumers to citizens as problem solvers and creators of public goods.” In this new strand of development “government’s role [is] to arrange and facilitate interactions processes within networks in a such a way that problems of under or non representation are properly addressed and interests are articulated and dealt in an open, transparent and balanced manner” (Klijn, Koppenjan, 2000, p. 135).

This altered viewpoint implies the application of relevant approaches and techniques in the evaluation process. Also the usefulness of evaluation should be considered in close relation with the expectations towards it, which have been reshaped along with reforms implemented in public administrations. Therefore, in the literature, apart from considering the use of evaluation in the strict sense, i.e. as a learning tool, broader implications of evaluation are discussed. The following different types of evaluation use are distinguished, where the first three represent use of evaluation findings and the last two – evaluation influence: (1) instrumental use (to modify the object of the evaluation, directly improve programming); (2) enlightenment use (conceptual use and reflective use; to generate knowledge about the type of intervention under study or generally in the field of interest); (3) symbolic use (to fulfil a requirement to perform evaluation); as well as (4) persuasive use (to legitimise or criticise an intervention) and (5) process use (to better understand both the object of evaluation and evaluation process, however, this is achieved through engagement in the evaluation process not merely on the basis on the evaluation findings), (for a review, see: Mayne, 2014). It has been acknowledged that dialogue and interactions between the stakeholders in the course of evaluation process may enhance relational capital which is crucial in the new public governance paradigm.

In reference to the use of evaluation as input for setting policy priorities and policy formulation, de Laat and Williams (2015) indicate six crucial factors for fostering the use of evaluation. How qever, in practice, all of them might pose specific challenges that must be faced. These factors are:

1) timeliness of evaluation in reference to the programme or policy cycle, since, for an evaluation to provide relevant advice and support decision-making at the strategic

level and at the level of the design of a new intervention, it must be carried out within adequate time frame (however it might be challenging to find an adequate position on the trade-off between ensuring that evaluation results are available at a given point in programme or policy cycle and having the full picture of programme or policy impacts, as some of them may be observed in a longer time perspective);
2) building a good evaluation culture in an organisation, ensuring buy-in and ownership, securing support from senior management in the use of evaluation findings as it can improve their strategic use; this can be done, at least partially, by institutionalising evaluation within an organisation (however, there may be the risk that evaluation becomes a routine procedure),
3) evaluation quality – the fact that an evaluation is methodologically and empirically sound is important, however, that does not guarantee that recommendations will be followed up, therefore of the utmost importance is the approach taken to the evaluation, the involvement of stakeholders and the selection of the right evaluators together with evaluation and subject-matter expertise;
4) involvement of stakeholders, who should be divided into two groups: one group, which will be closely involved in the concrete follow-up, and the other, which will be more broadly concerned with evaluation findings; different forms of stakeholder involvement should be foreseen for both of these groups, from empowerment and participation, to merely consultation (however, the identification of stakeholders in the case of policy evaluation is much more challenging in comparison with project or programme evaluation);
5) fit with an organisation, its broader policy processes as well as the setting/context that evaluation relates to;
6) complementarity with other methods, tools to support decision-making.

Studies conducted on the use of evaluation findings in Poland in reference to EU programmes indicate, however, that they are most used in the implementation and design of interventions, focus on technical aspects and process improvement. The instrumental use of evaluation findings prevails. Ferry and Olejniczak (2008) analysed six evaluations of EU-funded programmes (four *ex post* evaluations of pre-accession programmes, one interim evaluation of a pre-accession programme and one on-going evaluation of IRDOP) and demonstrated the limited use of the knowledge generated (the use of evaluation findings was more technical than strategic, also in reference to *ex post* evaluations). The following factors were found significant in supporting evaluation use: the presence of “strong, consistent, ‘patronage’ or support from the evaluation team in the Contracting Authority,” institutional stability in the Contracting Authority, not combining evaluation of processes with evaluation of effects in the same research, and interactive evaluation processes.

The study “Evaluation of the system of application of recommendations by institutions involved in the implementation of the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development and the EQUAL Community Initiative Programme” (Ośrodek Ewaluacji Sp. z o.o. 2007) pointed out the lack of an effective system for implementing recommendations. There were no standards defining the way of using the knowledge obtained in the evaluation process, nor requirements to monitor putting into practice evaluation recommendations. This was also found to be a serious drawback of the system for implementation of cohesion policy 2004–2006 in the “Assessment of the cohesion policy

implementation system 2004–2006” (EGO s.c. 2008). Thus, the extent of implementation of evaluation recommendations was difficult to determine. (However, following the study, an innovative model for implementation of evaluation recommendations was developed, but only in reference to OP Human Capital, which has been hailed as good practice; for more see: National Evaluation Unit, 2014a, pp. 32–33). The main objective of an evaluation, then, was to identify the barriers to EU funds absorption. It should be stressed that, prior to the Polish accession to the EU, evaluation of public interventions was a novelty for the Polish public sector. The evaluation requirements of cohesion policy support were the impulse to build evaluation capacity in Poland (National Evaluation Unit, 2014b). The fact that there was no national evaluation culture and it had to be taken ‘from outside’ is an important factor affecting the use of evaluation findings.

The study “Assessment of the cohesion policy implementation system 2007–2013” (EGO s.c. 2013) reveals that the main sources of information for the public authorities about public interventions were project control, monitoring and contact with beneficiaries. The low utilisation of evaluations was attributed to the lack of interest in research findings that go beyond process issues, focus on research delivery, which led to inflation of information, and not necessarily to a growth in knowledge. The provisions of the Public Procurement Act and its narrow interpretation were instrumental in the selection of evaluators with unsatisfactory qualifications, and the time stipulated for submitting evaluation reports was too short to prepare and consult their findings.

Kupiec (2014), in the study: “The use of evaluation in the operational programmes management. The case of regional operational programmes,” on the basis of three case studies, verified key factors which enhance the use of evaluation. These are: (1) credibility of recommendations – the link between recommendations and conclusions, comprehensibility, the possibility of implementation, quality of methodology applied; (2) importance of the generated knowledge – whether recommendations relate to significant, positive changes or minor issues; and (3) adequacy of findings – fulfilment of recipients’ expectations of information, completeness of reports, timing. He reported serious shortcomings in all three areas, which explains why evaluations do not fulfil their potential to support strategic decisions.

Similarly, the study on the use of evaluation findings in the European Commission indicates that evaluation findings contributed more to incremental changes than to significant changes in policy or the choice of policy options. They also did not lead substantially to efficient allocation of resources. The study was carried out in 2005, nevertheless, according to one of its authors – Bastin de Laat (de Laat, Williams, 2015, p. 153) it is still highly relevant today.

Extending evaluation to regulatory interventions

The European Commission is committed to evaluate EU spending as well as non-spending activities (regulatory interventions). The EU’s Better Regulation agenda is about designing and evaluating EU policies and law in an open and transparent manner, and to which citizens and stakeholders have a chance to contribute throughout the whole policy cycle and law-making process. Importantly, the process should be backed up by

evidence and understanding of the impacts, in order to ensure that the selected policy solution is the best and least burdensome way to achieve the intended objectives (European Commission, 2015). Although the idea of performing evaluations beyond expenditure policies dates back more than a decade, concrete measures for a more systemic application of evaluations to regulatory interventions have only been put forward more recently (see: Simismans, 2015).

First, the Commission publishes an indicative calendar of all planned evaluations of law, policies and spending programmes up to five years in advance.[2] This forward planning of evaluations against the strategic priorities of the Commission is important from the point of view of enhancing the use of evaluation findings. Moreover, apart from evaluations of individual instruments, from 2012[3] onwards, fitness checks of policy sectors are to be performed. These are comprehensive policy evaluations aiming at verifying “whether the regulatory framework for a policy sector is fit for purpose.” To this end, a group of measures with a common set of objectives are evaluated together to identify the cumulative impact of legislation. In the process, “excessive regulatory burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and obsolete measures which may have appeared over time” are to be revealed (European Commission, 2013b, p. 7). Beyond that, the Commission has established an “evaluation roadmap,” which is the “project plan” for each evaluation, developed using a standard template, to ensure consistency in the level of information obtained from evaluation studies. They are published on a special web portal, where stakeholders have a chance to provide feedback (*Roadmaps/Inception impact assessments*).

The principles and good practice tips that the Commission follows when evaluating regulatory interventions are set out in the Better Regulations Guidelines (2015) and associated Better Regulation ‘Toolbox’. Moreover, the quality of draft reports relating to major evaluations and fitness checks is reviewed by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), an independent body of the Commission which consists of three high-level Commission officials and three experts recruited from outside the Commission. Contrary to the review of impact assessments of new initiatives, where the RSB issues an opinion (a positive opinion is required for an initiative accompanied by an impact assessment to be tabled for adoption by the Commission), in reference to evaluations and fitness checks of existing legislation, the RSB gives recommendations for improvement. They are also available on-line with the relevant evaluation reports.[4]

Evaluations, along with fitness checks, are important components of the Better Regulation Agenda and the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT), which aims primarily to cut red tape and remove needless regulatory burdens. While it is widely argued that too much regulation can have adverse effects on market and economic growth, some authors claim that the approach taken by the Commission is not balanced (Vogel, Van den Abeele, 2010; Van den Abeele, 2015). The policy documents depict the *acquis communautaire* merely as a source of burdens and costs that weigh on the economy. The use of evaluation findings concentrates on the systematic reduction of regulatory costs and burdens, and not enough consideration is given to the potential benefits of EU legislation, not to mention that EU estimates are rather shaky. The view that

[2] See: e.g. Commission Forward Planning of Evaluations and Studies, 2016 and beyond.

[3] Commission Communication, *“EU Regulatory Fitness”*, COM (2012) 746 final.

[4] http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/search.do.

better regulation means less regulation is oversimplified, and paradoxically the BRA has generated its own bureaucracy. As Van de Abeele (2015, p. 9) acknowledges: the Better Regulation Agenda “has gradually become the foundation stone for those calling for less state intervention and a return to the national, regional or local level, with increasingly insistent demands for respect for subsidiarity and proportionality.”

Conclusions

A number of EU documents demonstrate the role of evaluation in building and maintaining a culture of accountability and learning. As the European Commission (2014, p. 3) argues: “[e]valuation is a key learning tool for the European Union to understand not only what works and what does not, but critically why, and under what circumstances.” It is important to learn from past experience and be able to recognise efficient and effective ways of operating. The recent Commission initiatives to improve evaluation revolve around two main areas: linking *ex post* evaluation with *ex ante* assessments, as well as extending evaluation to all types of policy-making, including regulatory interventions. This, however, seems to be very challenging. Taking the example of cohesion policy programmes implemented in Poland, it can be argued that evaluation findings were mostly used in the implementation and design of on-going interventions. The focus was more on technical aspects and process improvement than to support decision-making at strategic level. The same was found relevant in reference to the evaluations carried out by the European Commission itself. And as regulatory interventions are concerned, the use of *ex post* evaluations for new actions appears to be particularly visible in one area only – reducing regulatory costs and burdens.

In order to enhance the use of evaluation findings, several key factors can be distinguished, among others, timeliness of evaluation in reference to the programme or policy cycle, thus, the EU initiative of forward planning of all evaluations (‘evaluation calendar’) serves the purpose of ensuring stakeholder involvement – the Commission has increased the amount and length of public consultation, and has given the chance to provide feedback for every EU citizen or organisation from an early stage of the evaluation process (through ‘evaluation roadmaps’ and ‘initial impact assessments’). However, in this regard, voices of concern have been expressed. Van den Abeele (2015, p. 26) describes the problem as “bypassing the democratic consultation chain, namely: member states’ experts and social partners” (the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions), in favour of “a new category of actors whose legitimacy must be questioned, particularly as their influence will be difficult to monitor.” The problem may be worth further investigation.

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Nowe podejście do polityki ewaluacyjnej w Unii Europejskiej

Streszczenie

Znacząca rola Unii Europejskiej w rozpowszechnianiu ewaluacji w Europie jest ogólnie uznana (Stern, 2009). Chociaż ewaluacja ma długoletnią tradycję w Unii, a zwłaszcza w Komisji Europejskiej, w ostatnich latach można zaobserwować proces jej ekspansji, dywersyfikacji i instytucjonalizacji.

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie nowych rozwiązań w dziedzinie polityki ewaluacyjnej w Unii Europejskiej, którą można scharakteryzować między innymi, wzmocnieniem powiązań między oceną wpływu *ex ante* i *ex post*, zamykając tym samym cykl polityki, w którym wnioski z ewaluacji *ex post* przekładają się na ocenę nowych przedsięwzięć publicznych. Stąd też, w artykule poruszony został problem wykorzystania wyników ewaluacji. Zakres ewaluacji również został rozszerzony i obejmuje nie tylko instrumenty związane z wydatkowaniem środków finansowych, ale także instrumenty regulacyjne. Ponadto, ewaluacji podlegają nie tylko pojedyncze programy czy projekty, ale polityki i grupy powiązanych ze sobą działań. W tym celu dokonano przeglądu literatury i dokumentów w dziedzinie teorii i praktyki ewaluacyjnej, w tym analizy przepisów prawnych regulujących praktykę ewaluacyjną w Unii Europejskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: ewaluacja, polityka oparta na dowodach, wykorzystanie wyników ewaluacji, lepsze stanowienie prawa

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Energy security cultures in the European Union

Abstract: The research problem under analysis in this text is 'energy security cultures' in the European Union. The main goal of the research is to conduct a comparative analysis involving selected existing research papers on 'energy cultures.' In the analysis, attention is drawn to research employing quantitative methods based on object clustering methods.

Given the necessity to make the research problem more specific, the text addresses the following research questions: (1) Is the claim that the European Union presents special 'energy security cultures' legitimate?, (2) Did the period of 2008–2012 witness changes to the above-established 'energy security cultures' in the European Union?

In order to conduct the analysis concerned with the existence or non-existence of 'energy security cultures' in the European Union, the following indices have been adopted: (1) the index of the energy intensity of the economy, (2) the index of energy dependence, (3) the Stirling index, (4) the index of network losses and (5) the index of renewable energy use. It is considered that the selected indices constitute a definiens of the adopted term of an 'energy security culture.'

To verify the assumptions made in the analysis, use was made of one agglomerative method (i.e. Ward's method) and one method for optimising a given cluster of objects (the k-means method).

Key words: energy security, energy security indices, indices of energy security cultures, energy cultures, energy security cultures, methods of multidimensional comparative analysis, European Union

Introduction

The object of analysis in the present text is 'energy security cultures' in the European Union, that is an attempt at verifying the assumed legitimacy of the statements whereby European Union member states should be divided according to certain special practices of energy consumption which would thus mirror specific 'energy security cultures.' To begin with, the existence of two main directions in the analyses concerned with security cultures and energy cultures should be pointed out, which can be expressed as: (1) a presentation of culture in the form of the conversion of resources as well as the impact of that conversion on reality, (2) a culture as a special sphere of social awareness. These two directions of thought are associated with the two main origins of the research into culture itself (Kłosowska, 1969; Kłosowska 1972; Keesing, 1974, pp. 73–94; Nowicka, 1991, pp. 55–88; Burszta, 1998, pp. 35–57; Gajda, 2008, pp. 17–60; Strinati, 1998, pp. 15–49).

The main goal set in this text is to conduct a comparative analysis involving the research already featuring in scientific literature, and concerning 'energy cultures.' In the analysis presented, attention has been drawn to research employing statistical methods of multidimensional comparative analysis. In the first place, the comparative analysis draws on the research by A. Pach-Gurgul, but also on research by P. Tapio and his research team, as well as on research by P. Frączek and A. Majka (Tapio et al., 2007,

pp. 433–451; Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 160–202; Frączek, Majka, 2015, pp. 215–223). There have also been attempts at putting the problem of ‘energy cultures’ within a broader context, which is to be seen in the adduction of other traditions concerned with the research into an ‘energy culture.’

In the text, an ‘energy security culture’ has been adopted as an analytical category, which is both a development of the previous research into an ‘energy culture’ itself and a research proposition. Following A. Pach-Gurgul, specific indices of energy security have been adopted, and these are recognised as diagnostic characteristic of an ‘energy security culture.’

Given the necessity to make the research problem more specific, the text addresses the following research questions: (1) Is the claim that the European Union displays special ‘energy security cultures’ legitimate?, (2) Did the period of 2008–2012 witness changes to the above-identified ‘energy security cultures’ in the European Union? In order to see the research process through, the following working research hypotheses have been subjected to verification: (1) It must be posited that the discrepancies in the statistical indices for individual member states are a sufficient premise on which to base the existence of special ‘energy security cultures’ in the European Union, (2) It must be posited that the period of 2008–2012 witnessed changes to ‘energy security cultures’ in the European Union.

1. The concept of ‘energy security cultures’

It is impossible to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the comprehension of the notion of ‘culture,’ which is used in many branches of humanities and social sciences. As it was pointed out in the introduction to the text, the issue of culture can be approached using at least two basic lines of thought. In the first case it can be assumed that a culture is a specific way of converting resources and the impact of such conversion upon reality; whereas in the second case, a culture is to be linked with a special sphere of social awareness.

The two above-mentioned approaches come to be reflected in the research into ‘energy cultures.’ The first case, which is connected with the special way of converting resources, relates to the presentation of characteristic features of the production of broadly-understood energy. In this case, the most frequently conducted analyses are those of: energy production (and its diversity); energy consumption (and its diversity); import dependence; development of new energy technologies; pollution resulting from energy consumption. The second case, which is connected with a special kind of awareness, relates to an analysis of environmental awareness, green practices and attitudes towards infrastructure investments, such as nuclear power plants, wind farms and biogas plants (cf. Rosicki, 2016, pp. 225–237).

In the case of analyses concerned with special kinds of energy production and consumption practices, both qualitative and quantitative approaches can be highlighted. The qualitative approach is usually based on descriptive research involving synthesis and generalisation in terms of energy cultures. Such research results in ‘synthetic models’ exhibiting dominant features in the energy structures of individual states or/and groups

of states (Łucki, Misiak, 2010, pp. 47–50, 72–78). For instance, the existence of the following types of energy cultures can be listed: Anglo-Saxon, French, Scandinavian, Mediterranean, etc. (Łucki, Misiak, 2010, pp. 75; Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 163–166). As regards quantitative research, with regard to energy production and consumption practices, analyses conducted on the basis of a variety of classification algorithms may serve here as an example. Research papers containing cluster analyses should be reckoned among such research (Tapio et al., 2007, pp. 433–451; Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 160–202; Frączek, Majka, 2015, pp. 215–223; Rosicki, 2016, pp. 225–237).

As for research into awareness, eco-friendly behaviours and attitudes concerned with energy saving, the most representative studies are quantitative ones based on questionnaire techniques or qualitative studies based on a variety of unstructured interviews. Scientific research in this area follows from the construction of a model of behaviours and customs – usually of households – to the construction of questionnaire studies targeted at a specific statistical sample of a population. In-depth analyses are frequently performed on the socio-demographic and psychological factors which are supposed to illustrate behaviours concerned with the consumption of energy by its end users (cf. Stern, Gardner, 1981, pp. 329–342; van Raaij, Verhallen, 1981, pp. 253–257; van Raaij, Verhallen, 1983a, pp. 39–63; van Raaij, Verhallen, 1983b, pp. 85–106; Stern, 2000, pp. 407–424; Lindén, Carlsson-Kanyama, Eriksson, 2006, pp. 1918–1927; Papuziński, 2006, pp. 33–40; Tuszyńska, 2007, pp. 233–236; Hłobił, 2010, pp. 87–94; Frederiks, Stenner, Hobman, 2015, pp. 573–609). Such analyses result in a variety of models of energy cultures which can be termed normative-cultural ones, that is, ones that point to the significance of factors affecting the goals of behaviour related to energy consumption, as well as ones that point to the significance of the ways of attaining goals related to energy consumption. In these models a number of dimensions are emphasised, e.g. the behavioural, the social, the economic and the systemic (cf. Lutzenhiser, 1992, pp. 47–60; Keirstead, 2006, pp. 3065–3077; Biggart, Lutzenhiser, 2007, pp. 1070–1087; Stephenson et al., 2010, pp. 6120–6129; Ford, Karlin, Frantz, 2016).

The concept of an ‘energy security culture’ on the one hand constitutes a proposition that points to a specific objective scope of the security-related issues; on the other hand, it is a consequence of the main goal set in the text, namely a comparative analysis of the research results presented by A. Pach-Gurgul. The research assumptions contained in the work of A. Pach-Gurgul are a consequence of the concepts and methods that were employed in the research by P. Tapio and his team, as well as descriptively presented in the publication by Z. Łucki and W. Misiak. The above-mentioned publications presented only research into ‘energy culture’ alone. It must, however, be pointed out that A. Pach-Gurgul was lacking either confidence or consistency with regard to the presentation of a coherent proposition of a terminological framework in the analysis of subsequent spheres of the energy industry (at the same time applying the same methods, while applying different groups of indices). The author’s lack of confidence and consistency resulted in her using only the category of ‘energy culture,’ whereas, in the analysis of the issues concerned with energy security itself and energy markets, she did not apply the category of an ‘energy security culture’ or the category of ‘energy market cultures’ (Tapio et al., 2007, pp. 433–451; Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 160–202).

It is to be noted that the use of the category of a ‘security culture’ within energy issues does not relate to the research papers on ‘strategic cultures of security,’ which feature in the research on international relations. We owe the approach to the issues of military security itself, with relation to the concept of a ‘strategic culture,’ to J. Snyder. However, his proposition served to expose ‘cultural’ factors, which were to affect the practice and normative assumptions in the sphere of military security. Hence, one cannot but get the impression that the category was there to cater to the jargon, which was supposed to legitimise the analyses focused on the presentation of socio-political factors affecting military security (cf. Snyder, 1977; Sondhaus, 2006, pp. 1–13; Toje, 2008, pp. 15–19; Czaputowicz, 2012, pp. 172–174).

2. Methodology

2.1. The scope of comparative analysis

The text proposes that an ‘energy security culture’ be adopted as an analytical category, which constitutes a development and elaboration of the previous research into ‘energy cultures.’ The analytical proposition constitutes a basis for the accomplishment of the goal identified in the text, that is the verification of the assumptions and results of the research presented in the publication by A. Pach-Gurgul, and concerned with the energy security of Poland and the European Union. It is also noteworthy that A. Pach-Gurgul’s publication contains a quantitative analysis of energy security in three thematic groups: (1) energy cultures, (2) energy security *sensu stricto*, and (3) a uniform energy market (Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 163–202).

The assumptions and research methods adopted in the work by A. Pach-Gurgul, which had earlier been proposed by A. Tapio and his research team, were employed with a view to analysing both ‘energy cultures’ and energy security *sensu stricto* as well as the uniform energy market. There is some terminological inconsistency in the nomenclature adopted by A. Pach-Gurgul, for if the same methods were to be applied to the analysis of various spheres of energy production, then it must be posited that adopting such coherent terms as (1) ‘energy cultures,’ (2) ‘energy security cultures’ and (3) ‘energy market cultures’ would not pose a problem (cf. ibid.). In a consistent manner, in keeping with the remark made here, the present text proposes a category of an ‘energy security culture,’ while preserving the same indices that were used for the analysis of energy security *sensu stricto* in the work of A. Pach-Gurgul.

The text postulates that individual ‘energy security cultures’ can be characterised by the following statistical indices: (1) the index of the energy intensity of the economy, (2) the index of import dependence, (3) the Stirling index, (4) the index of network losses, (5) the index of renewable energy use. The above-mentioned indices have been adopted as a set of diagnostic characteristics useful in identifying countries with similar “energy security cultures” and/or as a set of diagnostic characteristics to be used in distinguishing the countries for that reason (cf. ibid., pp. 177–188).

The analysis timeframe presented in the work of A. Pach-Gurgul spanned the years 2000–2008, that is the analysis included the research results related to the attempt at group-

ing the countries according to various kinds of energy security *sensu stricto*, on account of the selected set of diagnostic characteristics for 2000 and 2008. In the case of the author’s own analysis, undertaken in this text, the recognised set of diagnostic characteristics for 2008 and 2012 has been adopted. A repetition of the research for 2008 might show possible differences in the grouping of the countries with regard to their being assigned to individual ‘energy security cultures.’ In this case, the differences may above all result from a lack of the possibility of employing the data concerned with the value of the statistical indices selected for analysis. In the first place, there is the problem of the possibility of using the same sources of secondary data, whereas in the second place a possible emergence of differences in the indices resulting from differing methodologies in their calculation must be accentuated. The latter may be exemplified with the value of the Stirling index, whose evaluation and value may depend on the number of energy carriers taken in by the researcher (Kałążna, Rosicki, 2010, pp. 69–73; Leszczyński, 2012, p. 4). In addition, it must be pointed out that the comparative analysis involving the research results of A. Pach-Gurgul applies to 2008 only, and so it does not include the 2000 data presented by the author.

Conducting original research for 2012 makes it possible to capture potential dynamics in the attempt to group countries according to particular ‘energy security cultures’ with the aid of statistical analysis. It must also be noted that the differences between the results of the research by A. Pach-Gurgul and the results presented in the text for 2008 will be decisively impacted by the subjective scope of the analysis, because the publication by A. Pach-Gurgul contains the analysis for EU-27, whereas the research conducted for the sake of the comparative analysis in this text includes the analysis for EU-28.

2.2. The range of clustering methods

Given the intention to conduct a kind of comparative analysis, following A. Pach-Gurgul, only a selection of statistical methods has been adopted in the research, that is (1) *Ward’s method* (the minimum variance method) and (2) the *k-means method* (Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 159–177).

The first of the selected methods is *Ward’s method*. It is one of the most frequently applied agglomerative clustering methods. The distinctive feature of this method is the use of variance analysis in order to determine the distance between clusters. The distance between one cluster composed of objects and another one cannot be directly expressed by way of the distance between the objects belonging to these clusters (Kaufman, Rousseeuw, 2005, pp. 230–234; Mirkin, 2015, pp. 111–136). Hence, “the method aims to minimise the sum of squared deviations of any two clusters which can be formed at any stage” (*Analiza skupień*, 2017). As a result of this operation, the clusters that “ensure the minimum sum of squared distances from the centre of mass of a new cluster that they create” are merged (Roszko-Wójtowicz, 2014, p. 74). The literature points out that this kind of agglomerative method is cognitively effective, while it yields small, and yet most natural clusters (Roszko-Wójtowicz, 2014, p. 74; *Analiza skupień*, 2017).

The other applied method is the *k-means method* (i.e. a non-hierarchical algorithm of cluster analysis). This clustering method is by design different from agglomerative and divisive methods (including *Ward’s method*). While hierarchical methods generate

arranged cluster trees, whereby lower-order clusters are subsumed under higher-order ones, the *k-means method* divides clusters in such a manner that no cluster is a sub-cluster of another one (Stanisz, 2007, pp. 127–128). The choice of a specified number of clusters results in groups of objects that are most similar (close), whereas objects from other groups are most different (distant). Importantly, it must be pointed out that it is the person conducting the analysis who makes an arbitrary choice as to the number of groups made up of particular objects (Sokołowski, 2002; Mirkin, 2015, pp. 75–110).

3. Indices of ‘energy security cultures’

3.1. A selection of indices

The introduction contains assumptions to be verified, that is, in the first case, the assumptions of the existence or non-existence of special ‘energy security cultures,’ whereas in the second case, the assumption is made of any possible changes occurring in ‘energy security cultures,’ which have or have not been recognised. For these assumptions to be verified, the proper selection of indices is of vital importance, as these are intended to characterise an ‘energy security culture.’ Arguably, the very selection of indices is a *definiens* of sorts of the term of an ‘energy security culture.’

A culture contains at least three components, a normative one, a component connected with specific practices, and a material component. It is possible to point to several dimensions within each one of these components; for instance, we can analyse a culture with regard to an individual or a larger group of people (cf. Nowicka, 1991, pp. 55–88; Gajda, 2008, pp. 17–60). By and large, the problem of security may also be analysed through the prism of the above-mentioned components, which frequently comes to be reflected in the discussion of the very concept or definition of security. The result of this assumption is the statement that similar components can be pointed out in the analysis of ‘energy security’ and ‘energy security cultures’ (cf. Baumann, 2008, pp. 4–12; Cherp, Jewell, 2011, pp. 202–212; Barton et al., 2013, pp. 13–15).

The concept of ‘energy security,’ and by extension of an ‘energy security culture,’ which would in addition incorporate the above-mentioned components along with their various dimensions, can be described as “a state of the economy that makes it possible to cover the end users’ current and prospective demand for fuels and energy in a manner technologically and economically justified, while complying with the requirements of the natural environment protection” (Rosicki, 2012, pp. 35–66). The main points of energy security so understood will encompass the following aspects: (1) a social, (2) economic, (3) technological and (4) an environmental one. The following indices have been adopted as diagnostic characteristics of these four aspects: (1) the index of the energy intensity of the economy, (2) the index of energy dependence, (3) the Stirling index, (4) the index of network losses and (5) the index of renewable energy use. It must be pointed out that these indices were adopted as being crucial for such research by A. Pach-Gurgul, whereas in the present analysis they have been adopted only with a view to conducting comparative studies (see Table 1).

Table 1

Indices of energy security cultures in European Union member states in 2012 (EU-28)

STATES	Energy intensity of economy (kgoe /1 000 €)	Energy dependency rate	Stirling Index	Index of network losses	Index of renewable energy use
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
BE	172.2	0.740	1.528	0.049	0.258
BG	669.9	0.361	1.514	0.088	0.414
CZ	355.4	0.252	1.514	0.047	0.219
DK	87.2	–0.034	1.390	0.071	0.324
DE	129.2	0.611	1.534	0.039	0.424
EE	478.7	0.171	1.091	0.075	0.093
IE	82.8	0.848	1.181	0.076	0.261
EL	165.7	0.666	1.197	0.026	0.292
ES	136.4	0.733	1.482	0.086	0.455
FR	142.9	0.481	1.379	0.066	0.286
HR	225.6	0.536	1.170	0.179	0.550
IT	117.3	0.808	1.262	0.070	0.379
CY	167.0	0.970	0.167	0.021	0.100
LV	328.6	0.564	1.252	0.180	0.614
LT	291.6	0.803	1.136	0.096	0.273
LU	133.8	0.974	0.808	0.026	0.708
HU	268.7	0.523	1.485	0.106	0.041
MT	147.4	1.005	0	0.130	0.032
NL	149.4	0.307	1.191	0.043	0.094
AT	123.9	0.636	1.365	0.050	0.643
PL	298.7	0.307	1.207	0.067	0.139
PT	146.5	0.795	1.293	0.100	0.526
RO	378.8	0.227	1.529	0.120	0.386
SI	227.7	0.516	1.519	0.057	0.416
SK	329.3	0.600	1.553	0.045	0.361
FI	204.0	0.454	1.528	0.041	0.204
SE	148.2	0.287	1.344	0.066	0.529
UK	105.1	0.422	1.419	0.078	0.159

Source: Author’s own study based on Eurostat and International Energy Agency data (some of the data have been obtained with the aid of the use of the indices after secondary data have been calculated).

3.2. A description of indices

The first of the indices is energy intensity, which is a diagnostic characteristic related to the workings of the economy. This index defines energy consumption in production processes in individual economic sectors. Differences in the level of energy intensity may be indicative of the level of economic development, an economic structure, a technological advancement as well as the kind of carriers used in primary energy production. A low level of energy intensity may give rise to conclusions of the higher efficiency of energy resource management. Still, it must be pointed out that a low energy intensity may characterise economically underdeveloped countries, with the proviso that we are dealing with low energy consumption in general. As regards the analysis of the issues concerned with energy intensity, a variety of indices may be applied, e.g. (1) an index of GDP energy intensity (calculated as the ratio of the amount of energy consumed to the value of GDP), (2) an index of energy consumption per capita (calculated as the ratio of primary energy consumed to the population) (Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 166–167; *Energy glossary*, 2016; Rosicki, 2016, p. 232). In the analysis featuring in the text, the index defines the amount of energy consumed to generate a unit of GDP (expressed in kilograms

of oil equivalent per 1000 euro), and hence a low value of the index means that less energy is needed to produce the same volume of GDP (GUS, 2016).

The second index that has been applied to analyse energy security cultures is the index of energy dependence, which constitutes a diagnostic characteristic of a country’s energy self-sufficiency, for it defines the level of its import dependency. This index is used by Eurostat, among others, and thus it encompasses an assessment of import dependency for three energy carriers (gas, oil and coal) as well as a general assessment of import dependency. The value of the index is a ratio of net import to the gross internal consumption of a given carrier, allowing for reserves. The higher the index, the higher the import dependency of the particular country (Kałążna, Rosicki, 2010, pp. 76–85; EC, 2013, pp. 11–27; EC, 2014, pp. 37–38).

The third index that has been applied is the Stirling index, which constitutes a diagnostic characteristic of energy structure diversity in individual European Union member states. It is worth noting that this index enables an analysis of the diversification of various energy structures, e.g. the structure of primary energy production, the structure of electric energy production, as well as the structure of energy consumption. In the case of the presented analysis, the Stirling index served to calculate the structural diversification level of the gross internal energy consumption with a breakdown to the following kinds of fuel: (1) solid fuels, (2) oil, (3) gas, (4) nuclear energy, (5) RES, (6) waste not classified as RES (*non*-RES).

The Stirling index defines the relation between energy carriers and the share of individual carriers in energy supply (e.g. the share in the structure of gross internal energy consumption). This index depicts the degree to which the energy structure of a given country is balanced, whereby the more diversified the structure is, the better the appraisal of the level of energy security is (Kaliski, Staśko, 2003, p. 4; Kaliski, Staśko, 2007, pp. 11–12; Kałążna, Rosicki, 2010, pp. 69–73; Leszczyński, 2012. p. 4). Still, it must be pointed out that the assumption may be interpreted differently, which results from the fact that in some cases a lack of diversification may not necessarily be viewed as negative. For instance, if a given country has one dominant carrier in its energy structure, and at the same time it has substantial reserves of the very same carrier, then it is difficult to directly deem it negative in the situation where there is a necessity to quickly change the energy structure, or in the situation where a given country does not have sufficient reserves of a carrier that is the dominant one in the energy structure. Hence, it must be recognised that sometimes the use of the Stirling index alone may be of little explanatory value as regards the issues of energy security.

The optimal mathematical value of the Stirling index (i.e. an ideal state of diversification) depends on the number of carriers, e.g. for five carriers (and hence 20% share for each of the carriers in the energy structure) it will be 1.6. In the case of four carriers (and hence 25% share for each of the carriers in the energy structure) it will be 1.38 (cf. Kałążna, Rosicki, 2010, pp. 69–72).

The fourth index applied is the index of network losses, which constitutes a diagnostic characteristic for technical aspects of the culture of energy security. The index characterises the state of electric energy transmission and distribution infrastructure. The index value defines the difference between the electric energy that has been introduced to the electric energy network and the electric energy that has been received from the network (cf. Nazarko, Rybaczuk, 2003, pp. 320–330; Pach-Gurgul, 2012, p. 178; Niewiedział,

Niewiedział, 2014). It must, however, be noted that by way of a deeper analysis of network losses, a variety of these can be enumerated, e.g. the balance, technical (current and voltage) and trade losses (Nazarko, Rybaczuk, 2003, pp. 322–325).

The fifth, and the last index applied in the analysis is the index of renewable energy use. This index constitutes a diagnostic characteristic for the development potential of new technologies, and additionally its value may affect the level of the diversification of carriers, the level of energy dependence and emission. The value of this index is a ratio of the share of the capacity installed in renewable energy to the total installed capacity (cf. Pach-Gurgul, 2012, p. 179; GUS, 2015).

4. An attempt at grouping the European Union member states

4.1. Ward’s method

Ward’s method was used to group the European Union member states (EU-28) in 2012, which made it possible to distinguish five existing clusters: (1) Belgium, Greece, Germany, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Spain and Portugal (however, it must be pointed out that the group shows a clear division into the former five countries and the latter five); (2) Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Luxembourg; (3) the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, France, the United Kingdom, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary (however, it must be pointed out that the group shows a clear division into the former three countries and the latter five); (4) Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Latvia; (5) Cyprus and Malta (see Diagram 1).

Diagram 1. Dendrogram (*Ward’s method* with Euclidean distance)



Source: Author’s own study.

4.2. *K-means method*

With the optimal number of clusters established, the text sets out to find out what areas characterising an 'energy security culture' display the biggest differences between the distinguished groups (see Table 2). Thanks to the *k-means method* it is possible to conclude that the differences between the distinguished clusters are highly significant ($p<0.01$) in respect of all the analysed variables (see Table 3).

Table 2

The mean values of the analysed indices in individual clusters (*k-means method*)

Individual indices	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Energy intensity of the economy	0.3309	0.1102	0.1790	0.2163	0.1267	0.7262
Energy dependency rate	0.5621	0.8023	0.5691	0.3395	0.9832	0.2762
Stirling Index	0.7798	0.7844	0.9248	0.8954	0.0538	0.8873
Index of network losses	0.9969	0.3208	0.1806	0.2749	0.3428	0.4612
Index of renewable energy use	0.8136	0.6384	0.4949	0.2020	0.0503	0.3930

Source: Author's own study.

Table 3

Differences between clusters – variance analysis results (ANOVA)

Individual indices	ANOVA					
	Between	Df	Within	Df	F	P
Energy intensity of the economy	0.90	5	0.49	22	8.14	0.0002
Index of energy dependence	1.35	5	0.38	22	15.47	<0.0001
Stirling Index	1.31	5	0.27	22	21.71	<0.0001
Index of network losses	1.12	5	0.62	22	7.89	0.0002
Index of renewable energy use	1.28	5	0.78	22	7.27	0.0004

Source: Author's own study.

An extension of Table 2 is Diagram 2, which graphically presents mean levels of the analysed characteristics for the six distinguished clusters. The **first cluster** includes Croatia and Latvia (which is related to the high value of network losses and of the index of renewable energy use). The **second cluster** includes Ireland, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal (a distinctive feature of this cluster is a high value of the index of energy dependence, of the Stirling index and of the index of renewable energy use). The **third cluster** includes Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden (a distinctive feature of this cluster is a high value of the Stirling index and the attendant lower value of other indices). The **fourth cluster** includes the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland and the UK (a distinctive feature of this cluster is a high value of the Stirling index and the attendant lower value of the other indices). The **fifth cluster** includes Cyprus and Malta (a distinctive feature of this cluster is a very high index of import dependency). The **sixth cluster** includes Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania (a distinctive feature of this cluster is the highest value of energy intensity).

Diagram 2. Means values of particular clusters (*k-means method*)



Individual indices: [1] energy intensity of the economy, **[2]** index of energy dependence, **[3]** Stirling Index, **[4]** index of network losses, **[5]** index of renewable energy use.

Source: Author’s own study.

Summary of research results

Within the research process the following hypotheses have been subjected to verification: (1) It must be posited that discrepancies in the statistical indices for individual member states are a sufficient premise on which to base the existence of special ‘energy security cultures’ in the European Union, (2) It must be posited that the period of 2008–2012 witnessed changes to ‘energy security cultures in the European Union. With regard to the analysis conducted to verify the hypotheses, the following conclusions are to be drawn.

I. CONCLUSIONS

In a summary of the results of the author’s own research into an ‘energy security culture,’ obtained with the aid of *Ward’s method* (with Euclidean distance), compared to the

results of the research conducted by A. Pach-Gurgul for 2008, it must be noted that the recurrent cluster in both result sets is: Cyprus and Malta. In other cases there is a different distribution of countries within the distinguished clusters. However, attention should be drawn to the concomitance of individual countries in particular groups – in these two studies. The recognised groups with concomitant countries are as follows: (1) Austria, Sweden, Portugal, Spain; (2) Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania; (3) the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Hungary; (4) Ireland, Italy, Greece; (5) Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Slovenia. In the case of the latter group of concomitant countries, the clusters identified in the two separate studies give rise to the recognition of a relatively lasting coherence.

Interestingly, a comparison of the author’s own research results with the research results obtained by A. Pach-Gurgul with the aid of the *k-means method* for 2008 leads to the establishment of three recurrent clusters: (1) Austria, Luxembourg, Latvia, Portugal and Sweden; (2) Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia and Italy; (3) Cyprus and Malta. In the case of the first recurrent cluster, one can point to its following features: a mean value of the Stirling index at a relatively high level; a mean value of energy intensity in these countries at a low level; a mean value of the index of renewable energy use at a high level. As for the second recurrent cluster, the following features are to be observed: a mean value of the Stirling index at a high level; a mean value of the index of renewable energy use; the lowest mean value of the index of network losses; a mean value of energy intensity at a low level; a mean value of energy dependence at a high, but not the highest level – compared to Malta and Cyprus (cf. Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 181–186). The third recurrent cluster will be described later in the conclusions.

As for the *k-means method* applied in the author’s own research concerned with an ‘energy security culture’ for 2008 and 2012, it must be pointed out that the recurrent cluster in the two results is Cyprus and Malta. Other cases offer a different distribution of countries within the distinguished clusters. Still, attention should be drawn to the fact of the concomitance of individual countries within particular groups in both analyses. The identified groups with concomitant countries are as follows: (1) Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Slovenia and Slovakia; (2) the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK; (3) Bulgaria and Estonia; as well as (4) Ireland, Spain and Italy; (5) Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal.

As for the results obtained, compared with other research into ‘energy cultures,’ it is difficult to point to deeper and more stable relationships between specific diagnostic characteristics and the specific locations of the countries which were obtained in the research by P. Tapio and his team (cf. Tapio et al., 2007, pp. 433–451; Frączek, 2014, pp. 443–449; Rosicki, 2016, pp. 225–237). This assumption concerns the lack of ability to point to coherent sub-regions within the European Union which would carry specific diagnostic characteristics used in the research. This does not mean that one cannot point to specific ‘energy security cultures’ with regard to the existence of individual and specific diagnostic characteristics of energy security.

From the viewpoint of the possibilities of linking specific diagnostic characteristics with specific locations of countries, and by extension with the grouping of countries within clusters, and at the same time the concomitance of these countries within characteristic sub-regions in the European Union, one can point to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, that is the so-called new member states. The diagnostic characteristic

that can serve to distinguish the countries in this region is the way energy is converted in a given economy, which is illustrated with the index of energy intensity. One can point to the power of this diagnostic characteristic, for in the research concerned with an ‘energy culture’ itself the index of energy intensity was also instrumental in distinguishing the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Rosicki, 2016, pp. 225–237). Hence, it is to be assumed that there exists an ‘energy culture’ and an ‘energy security culture’ in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

The concomitance of characteristics, and the possibility of their being linked with geographic specificity can be exemplified by Malta and Cyprus. These two countries are characterised by a special geographical situation, both are small islands. On top of that, the lack of their own energy resources gives rise to a high import dependence, and thus the cluster is characterised by the mean value remaining at a high level for this index. In addition, the following aspects should be emphasised: (1) the mean value of the energy intensity index is at a low level, (2) the mean value of the Stirling index is at a low level, (3) the mean value of renewable energy use is at a low level, (4) the index of network losses is of a mean value.

It is important to note that if a change was made to the methodology as to the selection of indices, and thus as to the meaning of diagnostic characteristics, by allowing for a description of energy structures in individual member states, it would probably be possible to have coherent sub-regions within the European Union (cf. Tapio et al., 2007, pp. 433–451; Frączek, 2014, pp. 443–449; Frączek, Majka, 2015, pp. 215–223).

II. CONCLUSIONS

Given the recognition of the lack of deeper and more stable relationships between specific diagnostic characteristics and the specific locations of the countries, it is difficult to demonstrate the changes to ‘energy security cultures’ in the European Union. Still, it should be noted that the dynamics of changes in the values of individual indices of energy security give rise to changes in the results of grouping individual countries in clusters for 2012. One can point to many factors determining these changes, but it is worth emphasising the significance of the policies concerned with the energy industry and the natural environment in the European Union.

In the long term it should be assumed that the increase in the significance of renewable energy sources will affect the value of the index of renewable energy use, as well as the Stirling index. Still, the hardly definable processes with regard to the reduction of energy intensity and severance of the relationship between the increase in the demand for energy and economic growth make forecasting import dependency difficult. It is a well-known fact that the depletion of energy resources in the European Union member states will result in a rise in import dependency. The rise in dependence on imported resources may be limited by a significant development of renewable energy production and technology reducing the energy intensity of energy transformation processes.

The development of new technologies and their usefulness for the energy generating and transforming sector will be one of the main diagnostic characteristics of ‘energy cultures’ and ‘energy security cultures’ projected in long-term forecasts. The development of the technologies related to renewable energy sources and the technology reducing

energy intensity will affect the economic competitiveness of individual European Union member states. Besides, these technologies will determine the internal EU division into countries at the centre of the ‘energy revolution’ and countries on the ‘energy outskirts.’ In the long term, this may lead to a division into technologically backward countries that use traditional carriers, and the ones that have made electric energy their main carrier.

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Kultury bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w Unii Europejskiej

Streszczenie

Problemem badawczym, będącym przedmiotem analizy w tekście, są „kultury bezpieczeństwa energetycznego” Unii Europejskiej. Głównym celem prezentowanych badań jest dokonanie analizy porównawczej z już istniejącymi wybranymi opracowaniami w zakresie „kultur energetycznych”. W prezentowanej analizie uwagę zwrócono na badania, które wykorzystują metody ilościowe w oparciu o metody grupowania obiektów.

W związku z koniecznością uściślenia problemu badawczego w tekście przedstawiono następujące pytania badawcze: (1) *Czy zasadne jest twierdzenie, że w Unii Europejskiej mamy do czynienia ze specyficznymi „kulturami bezpieczeństwa energetycznego”?*, (2) *Czy w okresie 2008–2012, następują zmiany w obrębie, stwierdzonych wcześniej „kultur bezpieczeństwa energetycznego” w Unii Europejskiej?*

W celu dokonania analizy w zakresie istnienia, bądź też nie „kultur bezpieczeństwa energetycznego” w Unii Europejskiej, przyjęto następujące wskaźniki: (1) wskaźnik energochłonności gospodarki, (2) wskaźnik zależności energetycznej, (3) wskaźnik stirlinga, (4) wskaźnik strat sieciowych i (5) wskaźnik wykorzystania energii odnawialnej. Uznano, że tak dobrane wskaźniki stanowią swoisty definiens przyjętego terminu „kultury bezpieczeństwa energetycznego”.

Do weryfikacji założeń przyjętych w analizie posłużono się jedną z metod aglomeracyjnych (czyli *metodą Warda*) i jedną z metod optymalizacji danego grupowania obiektów (czyli *metodą k-średnich*).

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo energetyczne, wskaźniki bezpieczeństwa energetycznego, wskaźniki kultur bezpieczeństwa energetycznego, kultury energetyczne, kultury bezpieczeństwa energetycznego, metody wielowymiarowej analizy porównawczej, Unia Europejska

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Introduction to attention-based politics[1]

Abstract: This study introduces a new tendency in political communication that starts from the politicians' use of Twitter and Facebook. Representatives have to realize that they are in an environment where celebrities can attract, maximize, and direct the attention of followers. Politicians will do just the same. The communication techniques used set the focus of analysis on attention-based politics. The most visible part of Donald Trump's election campaign will be used as an example, in order to demonstrate this speciality of political communication. The main findings of the study support the idea that the new ICTs will not revolutionize political communication because what we are seeing is a 'spectacular' development, an adaption to the information environment, where the process is sometimes faster, at other times slower. This creates the feeling that what has functioned well in political communication in the past few years is now becoming obsolete.

Key words: political communication, attention-based politics, Donald Trump, US presidential election, populism

Introduction

This study introduces how politicians try to attract, maximize, and direct the attention of followers and journalists. The communication techniques used set the focus of analysis on attention-based politics and the phenomena around it (network logic, self-mediatization, popularization and populist political communication). One of the recent phenomena of this style is Donald Trump, who used his billionaire-celebrity status, as well as the weaknesses of the American presidential primary system and democratic processes, to take advantage and to forge political capital for himself. As a case study, Trump's US presidential campaign is used in this study to support the idea that the new ICTs will not revolutionize political communication because what we are seeing is a 'spectacular' development, an adaption to the information environment, where the process is sometimes faster, at other times slower. This leads to the feeling that what has functioned well in political communication in the past few years is now becoming obsolete. To prove this, and to show the importance of attention in political communication, as a starting point, it is important to investigate the phenomenon of attention in psychology and related social sciences.

Attention in the social sciences

According to an early conception, attention is familiar to everyone. The phenomenon is a clear and vivid form possessed by the mind, chosen from several options, objects

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or lines of thought present simultaneously. What matters is the point of view based on subjective experience (focalization), concentration and consciousness. This also means that the person disregards certain things in order to be able to handle the rest of them effectively. Attention is the opposite of a confused, dazed, scatter-brained or agitated state (James, 1891, pp. 403–404). The phenomenon encompasses consciousness, but what is in the center of attention can be influenced. The reasons for this are that attention is not always and without exception the gatekeeper of perception and knowledge (Mack, Clarke, 2012, p. 303), sometimes humans process information automatically (Cherry, 1953). Furthermore, attention is limited, humans can only pay attention to a very small number of things at the same time (see: Simons, Rensink, 2005), and unconscious or unintentional processes are at play in the meantime, which also affects the visual form of attention (Lamme, 2003). Finally, internal stimuli can also affect attention in the same way as external influences can direct it.

Based on the above, we can conclude that one of the most important features of attention is simultaneity. Kurt Lewin thought that simultaneity is a phenomenon that can be grasped in present time and space determined by the past and the future (Lewin, 1936, pp. 33–36). Thus attention is a resource limited by time and space. From the individual’s point of view, it cannot be seen as an orienting process, instead, it is characterized by arousal, as Colin Cherry concluded in his research on the cocktail party phenomenon (1953).

However, the introduction of attention to economic studies is important to see that we are living in an ‘information overload’ society where the last currency we own is our attention. Basically the popularity of a particular company or brand depends on the reach attention of the consumers. This would mean that, after the primacy of land, tools and information, we are living in a society where attention is most precious ‘possession’. The main problem with attention is that it is limited, which makes it even more important (see: Davenport, Beck, 2001; Lanham, 2006). Insofar as attention is limited by time and space, the concept can also be meaningful in the interpretation of political processes.

In the present study I distinguish political attention from attention-based politics, and I demonstrate and present a justification for the latter through citing several examples from Donald Trump’s US presidential campaign, mainly from his use of Twitter. I argue that Trump himself has become a meme in social media, which he could use to his advantage in grasping and maximizing the attention of the audience (voters).

Political attention

Political attention is about political agendas, that is, the way in which a topic reaches the attention of decision makers (policy agenda) and opinion influencers (media agenda), the way it becomes understandable and important to public opinion (public agenda), and the way decisions are made based on all this. The answer is given by the model of agenda setting (McCombs, Shaw, 1972). Among all the above, the policy agenda will be in the center of political attention, which implies that the attention of decision makers is finite, while numerous topics and issues are raised in the agenda of politics (John, Jennings, 2010, p. 564). Which topics will receive attention from officials in the limited world of

administration will become an important question (John, Jennings, 2010, pp. 563–564; Kingdon, 1984, p. 3).

Naturally, politicians can influence what comes to the focus of attention. Typical examples are political speeches, which have the function of directing attention in decision making (Hobolt, Klemmensen, 2008). However, we should not forget that information processing by decision makers is unbalanced, that is, it is episodic rather than continuous (sometimes the decisions will come slower, while at other times decisions will be made rapidly). It often stalls, and explosive activities hoist it out from stagnation. In this respect, it is no different from information processing in other organizations outside the realm of politics. Governments and organizations, just like individuals, have a limited capacity for concentration. The only method for addressing this phenomenon is to disregard events taking place around them simultaneously, and instead focus on running their attention quickly through the different currents of information affecting them. In the meantime, the government needs to set an action sequence which will affect the administration of topics and eventually their inclusion on the agenda. This situation can be improved in the world of politics by the division of powers (government, president, parliament, the judiciary). As a result, different actors can respond to different areas of political agendas in a specialized way (Jones, Baumgartner, 2005, pp. 20–21). Thus, in the world of politics the issue of political attention can address the making of specific decisions, and perhaps the behavior of decision makers (John, Jennings, 2010, p. 564). The phenomenon is further nuanced by the conflicts of party politics, which exert their effects in the short term.

Another thing we should remember is that policy agendas can also be effectively influenced by the media as well as the public. These actors will be important, but with regard to the literature on political attention, they can only be seen as playing a secondary role, as they can only have an effect on decisions and cannot make them. Referenda and elections are exceptions to this, the role of the public has increased value at these times, and political actors become influencers. Such events rarely entail specialized policy decisions (laws, decrees, etc.). Thus, the sources, directions and consequences of attention (or inclusion on the agenda) are analyzed along the lines of agenda setting (see: Kiousis, McCombs, 2004; Lopez-Escobar, Llamas, McCombs, Rey, 1998), but researchers rarely analyze the communicative characteristics of attention, and if they do, they stay within the scope of the literature of agenda (see: Hopmann, Elmelund-Præstekær, Vliegenthart, de Vreese, 2012). Based on all this, attention is barely different from thoroughly crafted thematization techniques. However, we do not find an answer to how political actors can direct attention to themselves or to their themes. Therefore the fight for attention during the communication of political actors holds some unanswered questions.

Attention-based politics

As opposed to political attention, the concept of attention-based politics means something different. While it bears a lot of similarity to agenda setting, it does not refer to the effect of political attention on decision making, or to the consequences of attention, or inclusion on the agenda. Writings in political sciences dealing with attention cover the

means by which ‘users’ make the wider public concerned with topics. Attention-based politics addresses the issue in a different way. It takes political actors to be communicators, who have to reach voters in competition with other, non-political actors (e.g. celebrities). Attention-based politics emphasizes this particularly communicative character of political participation (thus referring neither to the activist nor to the regulative aspects).

Political communication did not undergo a revolution with the emergence of new information and communication technologies, instead, politicians acquired a new tool that they can use during their everyday communications (Römmele, 2003; Wright, 2011). This process has culminated in the spectacularization of online political communication.

The Trump phenomenon

Based on the above, we can conclude that attention has always been part of politics. Attention-based politics refers to the situation where the nature of the struggle for the attention of voters changes. It starts at the point where a vast amount of information reaches ordinary people through different forums and in different ways. This information can be about celebrities, the entertainment industry in general, remote and nearby events, terrorism, sports, politics, etc. Only a small amount of this information can grab and hold people’s attention. In this communicative situation, politicians not only compete for attention with other politicians or parties, but also with other actors. In this sense, politicians compete for people’s attention with the Kardashians, Olympic athletes, Apple products, Brexit, ISIS, etc.

With the fragmentation of the public, more precisely its multilayered character (Dahlberg, 2007; Dahlgren, 2005), politicians also face challenges in grabbing attention. These challenges raise questions like what counts as mainstream media and what does not? How can social groups uninterested in politics be reached? By what segmentation can the widest audience be addressed (their attention grabbed) with the least financial investment?

Different answers have been given and are still given to the above questions in the practice of political communication. A typical, and also conspicuous example is connected to the campaign of American presidential candidate Donald Trump. The appearance of the billionaire businessman and reality show participant as an aspiring presidential candidate of the Republican Party was not taken seriously by his fellow politicians, journalists and even a lot of the voters. Trump’s campaign contained a mix of centrist elements (e.g. ones related to the LGBT community) and statements filled with hate (e.g. against immigrants). However, his communication was very sharp, and his populist statements helped him win over not only the centrist candidates of the Republican Party, but also those who are considered ultra conservative (see: Eiermann, 2016, p. 34). Trump created a communicative environment where it was impossible not to talk about him (McAllister, 2016, p. 1190). What the candidate did was, in fact, the speeding up of his communication. He made statements at his political meetings on a daily basis which he knew the traditional media would deal with, and on social media (typically on Twitter) he made statements in a coarse style about the party and media elite, opponents in the

Democratic Party, know-it-alls, basically anyone that he considered to be standing in his way towards winning the official candidacy, all of whom he presented as corrupt, sorry figures who had lost all credit. He realized that the operation of the parties, the primary system, and the media could not keep pace with the explosion of communication that took place over past decades. Democratic processes take time, and the controlling and critical functions of the media, opposing candidates and eventually the voters could not fulfill the roles expected from them in democracies, as Trump’s communication was working at a much higher rate (Lepore, 2016). By the calculations of the New York Times based on data from the mediaQuant and SMG Delta companies from February 2016, this tactic provided the candidate with media presence worth 1.9 billion dollars for free, while he purchased media appearances for 10 million dollars. By comparison, the Democratic Party candidate Hillary Clinton spent 28 million and got free presence worth 746 million (Confessore, Yourish, 2016). The attention gained in this way made Donald Trump the presidential candidate of the Republican Party and then President of the United States.

The campaign of presidential candidate Donald Trump was built around his own communications. The candidate himself turned into a digital element whose message or standpoint was consciously created with a view to the environment (political atmosphere) and with who was suitable for being shared. In this way, Trump’s Internet presence matches Limor Shifman’s definition of Internet memes (Shifman, 2014, p. 41). The issue here is not the kinds of visual and textual responses to his campaign from voters or from opponents, but the way the candidate rode the wave of memes in order for the media to be preoccupied with him. As a result, Trump’s Twitter account comes to the fore, and this is handled by the candidate himself (Holmes, 2016). In order of popularity, the messages sent on the Internet were the ones related to policies (public policy), the ones against Republican party opponent candidates, the ones about public opinion polls, the ones against Democratic party candidates, and the ones against women (except for Hillary Clinton, as she belongs to the former category) (for more details, see: Libresco, 2016). Naturally, the emphasis is continuously shifting, for example, Clinton appears more frequently and Republican party opponents appear significantly less frequently in tweets after winning the candidacy. The persons appearing in the messages typically do not appear in a positive light, and their names are often included in attributive combinations – dismissing political correctness: “Low energy Jeb Bush,” “Lyin’ Ted Cruz.” “Crooked Hillary Clinton.” For instance, “Low energy Jeb Bush just endorsed a man he truly hates, Lyin’ Ted Cruz. Honestly, I can’t blame Jeb in that I drove him into oblivion!” (Trump, 2016a), or “Bernie Sanders endorsing Crooked Hillary Clinton is like Occupy Wall Street endorsing Goldman Sachs” (Trump, 2016f). We find a similar situation around the use of the words “desperate,” “(so) unfair,” “disgrace(ful),” “(so) dishonest,” etc., which Trump used frequently in posts about different topics. Such posts include: “Shows how weak and desperate Lyin’ Ted is when he has to team up with a guy who openly can’t stand him and is only 1 win and 38 losses” (Trump, 2016c); “NOOOO! @CNN is so unfair to me!! They called Lyin’Ted the winner! DISASTER! Expect a lawsuit, @CNN! #WIPrimary” (Trump, 2016b); “The ‘dirty’ poll done by @ ABC @washingtonpost is a disgrace. Even they admit that many more Democrats were polled. Other polls were good” (Trump, 2016d); “The media is so dishonest. If I make

a statement, they twist it and turn it to make it sound bad or foolish. They think the public is stupid!” (Trump, 2016e). The use of such attributes guaranteed him to be referenced by journalists and followers. However, the adjective used was more interesting than the message itself, which fitted right into Trump’s tactic (McAllister, 2016, p. 1190).

It is also worth highlighting the use of exclamation points in Trump’s tweets. While Trump used this punctuation mark in more than 70% of his messages, sometimes several at a time, in Clinton’s case this proportion was below 10% (Libresco, 2016). Thus, Trump’s tweets were different from the posts we are used to from politicians, not just in the use of the attributives, but also in the punctuation marks, which also contributes to calling attention to himself. Eventually, in this campaign, it was the candidate himself who mattered, and the content of what he was saying was less important.

Trump’s messages tended to create their own lives, just like memes, and typify the presidential candidate. Actually, the Republican presidential candidate did nothing other than use the last currency of social network users: the attention. He directed attention to himself in a particular way, he maximized and directed it in a way that supported the result favorable to him. Based on the above, we can conclude that *attention- based politics describes the process in which politicians use their communication to draw the attention of the biggest possible crowd of the audience (voters) to themselves or to the themes they propose in the multitude of information or news flows*. In the meantime, this attention should not be confused with agenda setting, as it is not about policies but about the politicians, or the manifestations of political questions by politicians.

What processes are Trump’s Twitter communications built on?

Methods for drawing, maximizing and directing attention may vary. In the case of Trump’s Twitter messages, these are expressed through behaviorally based memes, which have a participation structure (a layer that supports emotional involvement and participative action), personal code (a unique communication style) and communicative (message transfer) function (see: Shifman, 2014, pp. 38–39, 40–41). Everything depends on the intensity with which the communicator uses the phenomena that support the process. In Trump’s campaign the exploitation of the following phenomena can be discovered: network logic, self-mediatization, popular politics and populist political communication.

Network logic

The theory of network logic is a direct outcome of the theory of media logic. Media logic describes the process where the media transfer and communicate information (Altheide, 1985; 2006; Altheide, Snow, 1979; 1988). In political communication, this same process refers to the use of media by political actors, that is, acquiring the regularities of the message transfer and communication functions of media and communicating using these.

By comparison, communication defined by political logic does not regard the regularities of the media (Brants, van Praag, 2006; Schrott, 2009; Strömbäck, 2008). Media logic used in political communication became obvious through the description of

the techniques used during the Italian elections of 1983, where politicians accepted the regularities of mediatized behavior, so the media (especially television) would be preoccupied with them (Mazzoleni, 1987, pp. 101–102). Network logic, on the other hand, takes into account the characteristics and workings found in the Internet era. Its starting point is that social media differ from traditional media. Content production, distribution and media use are organized by different principles in network logic than in media logic (Klinger, Svensson, 2015, pp. 1247–1251). Yet the transition between the two kinds of logic does not constitute the same kind of paradigm shift as that between party logic and media logic. New communication forums (blogs, microblogs, social sites, etc.) appear alongside the old ones, which also include communication in the traditional, increasingly polarized media (see: Szabó, Bene, 2015). Network logic often complements communication through traditional media, but it definitely entails the adaptation of communicators to the new technology (Bennett, Segerberg, 2013; van Dijck, Poell, 2013). This adaptation means that the communicator himself will be responsible for researching, writing and sharing the content, and editors (gatekeepers) cannot be expected to implement this process. Communication will be characterized as subjective (issue-driven), in Trump’s case strongly subjective, for even the selection of topics will reflect the personal interest or interest-driven taste of the communicator (Merkovity, 2016, p. 116). Finally, network logic is also manifested in the method by which the communicator desires to achieve attention directed to himself, which results in self-mediatization.

Self-mediatization

The concepts of media logic, mediatization (and mediation) are sometimes blurred in the literature on political communication (Hepp, 2011; Livingstone, 2009). Regardless of the contradictions found in the literature, the concepts refer to two distinct phenomena in this paper, which nonetheless have similar effects. Media logic – in the manner described above – refers to adaptation to the workings of the media, while mediatization refers to a political system that is largely affected by the media and is adjusted to the broadcasts of the media about politics (Asp, 1986, p. 359, quoted by Hjavard, 2008, p. 106). Others go as far as to claim that politics has lost its autonomy in the face of the media through mediatization, as it communicates to the audience according to the regularities of the media (Mazzoleni, Schulz, 1999). Still others consider the patterns of online communication to be determined by traditional media (Mátyus, 2010). In this communication, the influence of traditional media plays an important role. However, the situation is different on social sites, where different regularities prevail. Political actors are not only mediatized through the media, but they will also feel the need to attract the attention of their audience efficiently. This is how self-mediatization or reflexive mediatization becomes part of the picture (Marcinkowski, Steiner, 2009; Meyer, 2002): this is the process whereby political actors get traditional media to react to their own communication, in the way Trump did in his campaign.

In the process of self-mediatization, the emphasis stays on politicians drawing the attention of traditional media, but when applied in social media, this inevitably also turns into a fight for grabbing, as well as keeping up the attention of followers. Political actors

arrange the scene of communication through self-mediatization (Esser, 2013, p. 162), which they hope will help them transfer their messages in a climate that is favorable for them. This also means that politicians disregard the interactive nature of social sites, and instead they regard the unidirectional communication of traditional media to characterize social media as well (see: Aharony, 2012).

Popular politics

Among the consequences of self-mediatization, we should mention the changing character of the communication of political actors (which Jay Blumler discusses in more detail, see: Blumler, 2014, pp. 34–37). However, it is important to note that other processes that had been present previously are also amplified as a result of self-mediatization. One of these is spectacularization (Mazzoleni, 2008), which means that the world of politics is reduced to spectacle through media logic and mediatization, but in the same manner, network logic and self mediatization also reinforce this process, with elements of content becoming less important, and in such an environment it is the mediagenic politicians who will be able to direct attention to themselves.

The popularization of politics represents the process of directing attention, and its literature takes as its starting point the consideration that politics is ‘not popular’ in contemporary societies (Hay, 2007). The image of politicians struggling for popularity is not new, in 1987 Neil Postman wrote, in connection with politicians of the western world, that political actors may appear anywhere and can do anything without it seeming strange, arrogant or inappropriate in any other way. This means that following the general culture of television, politicians have become celebrities (Postman, 1987, p. 135). In the competition driven by the attitude of popularity, of being attended to, politicians exploit the fact that the media deals with them more than average, and so they can show what they think will draw the attention of the audience in the long term. The end result of popular politics is the ‘celebrity politician’, who (a) had already been a celebrity before and uses this when building his political career (see the careers of Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump, or Beppe Grillo in Europe), or (b) is a politician who appears with other celebrities to popularize himself (see the political career of Barack Obama). In both cases, the elements of popular culture appear in the political arena (Street, 2004, pp. 437–438). However, we must note that on the other side of popular politics are the non-political celebrities who sometimes have political manifestations (e.g. Bono, Angelina Jolie, Bob Geldof, etc. See: Street, 2004). Thus popular politics uses the traits of popular culture for drawing attention, so as to gain as many followers as possible (attention maximization).

Populist political communication

Popular politics partially overlaps with populist political communication, which aims to mobilize a new, or at least a larger mass of voters. As an ideology, populism does not belong among the great ideologies covering all areas of life in the political sciences (e.g. conservatism, liberalism, socialism). It can be defined as a set of ideas that address the

way the individual should relate to certain issues (to ‘foreigners’, to the elite, to the nation, etc.). Here populism will be referred to as a communication style. In populism, interpreted as a style, this is the way in which politicians express their closeness to people in their speeches, while they use symbols (e.g. dressing or language use) to transfer the message of being ‘one of them’, that is, ‘not a member of the elite’ (Jagers, Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). When the process is placed in the online space, “[…] in the meantime, the creation of media texts is also an opportunity for the manifestation of self-expressions, of linkage to group cultures (subcultures), and the creation of collective identity” (Mátyus, 2012, p. 387). Thus populist politics may not only originate from parties and their leaders whom we call populist (see: Mudde, 2013).

Populist parties were typically neglected actors in the national media. The so-called *cordon sanitaire* in mainstream media drove these politicians to look for alternative routes for communication, through which they could reach potential voters. Several empirical studies describe this process (e.g. Bos, van der Brug, de Vreese, 2010; Koopmans, Muis, 2009; Vliegenthart, 2012). To sum these up briefly, populist politicians needed to call attention to themselves, then they had to maximize attention, in order to break through the resistance of traditional media at a given point. Such politicians are familiar with the workings of social media and know how attention can be sustained. They acquired these techniques during political agitation, gaining an advantage over politicians who registered on social sites because of the challenge of social media (and populism). As a celebrity, Donald Trump was profoundly familiar with these techniques, so he had an edge over the other challengers. In sum, populist political communication reflects on the inner (political) challenges of the fight for attention.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s use of Twitter is different from the posts we are used to from politicians on social sites (see: Merkovity, 2016) and it matches the main characteristics of memes. It transfers cultural phenomena mostly in textual form and it also has humorous characteristics. The cultural phenomena shared by him as a candidate are mostly related to politics, but breaking with political correctness, he writes divisive tweets, and several of them a day (Eiermann, 2016; McAllister, 2016). Traditionally, politicians (and journalists) are not ready for any of their manifestations to turn into a meme (Zittrain, 2014, p. 393). Donald Trump, on the other hand, was betting on just that. His posts were shared by thousands and tens of thousands by his followers, and these posts often also appeared in the broadcast media. Trump followed a unique path of attention-based politics. He used his billionaire celebrity status to forge political capital. While doing this, he exploited the phenomena of network logic, self-mediatization, popularization and populism known from political communication and the field of communication and media science. Naturally, the weakness of the American primary system was also necessary for the success of Trump’s tactic. An important question from the point of view of research is, which elements and how much of Trump’s style will be adopted by politicians in the mainstream. Another question will be related to other manifestations of attention-based politics that can be studied in political communication.

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Wprowadzenie do polityki opartej na uwadze

Streszczenie

W badaniu przedstawiono nowy trend komunikacji politycznej, zapoczątkowany przez polityków korzystających z Twittera i Facebooka. Przedstawiciele tego trendu muszą zdać sobie sprawę, że funkcjonują w środowisku, w którym celebryci mogą przyciągać, maksymalizować i kierować uwagę obserwatorów. To samo dotyczy również polityków. Zastosowane techniki komunikacyjne stanowią główny przedmiot analizy polityki opartej na przyciąganiu uwagi (attention-based politics). Posługując się przykładem najbardziej widocznej części kampanii wyborczej Donalda Trumpa przedstawiono wyjątkowy charakter tego rodzaju komunikacji politycznej. Główne wnioski z badania potwierdzają pogląd, że nowe technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne nie zrewolucjonizują komunikacji politycznej, ponieważ widzimy jedynie – czasem szybszy, innym razem wolniejszy – „spektakularny” rozwój i adaptację do środowiska informacyjnego. Stwarza to poczucie, że to, co dobrze funkcjonowało w komunikacji politycznej w ciągu ostatnich kilku lat, staje się przestarzałe.

Słowa kluczowe: komunikacja polityczna, polityka skoncentrowana na przyciąganiu uwagi, Donald Trump, wybory prezydenckie w USA, populizm

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Challenges of i-voting – practices, rules and perspectives. Examples from Estonia and Switzerland

Abstract: This paper discusses the experience related to selected European states implementing i-voting. Particular emphasis is given in the text to the issues of the definition of internet voting (as one of the forms of electronic voting); the analysis of experiences gathered by states with a history of the implementation of internet voting; and the procedures of vote casting via Internet. The main goal of this text is to answer the questions of the greatest risks and benefits of internet voting, the influence i-voting has on voter turnout and the future prospects of i-voting. The considerations presented here focus on the experiences of two states with apparently the greatest experience in the field of i-voting, namely Estonia and Switzerland.

Key words: i-voting, Internet voting, Estonia, Switzerland

The influence of ICT on political processes and state-citizen relations is described in such terms *as digital democracy*, *cyberdemocracy*, *virtual democracy* and the most frequent one – *electronic democracy*. Whatever the term applied and its definition, all these concepts share the conviction that new technologies (ensuring interactivity, faster information transfer and feedback) allow democratic mechanisms to be influenced. Members of academia, in particular representatives of political science, primarily focus on the influence ICT has on the operation of the democratic system. The growing role of the Internet (as the most vigorously changing ICT tool) in the broadly understood politics and its increasingly significant influence on society appear to be among the crucial arguments to undertake studies in this field.

This text is therefore about the influence the Internet has on modern democracies, in particular on electoral processes. Studies on the implementation of i-voting address the recent currents of studies on the evolution of political systems (including electoral systems) as a consequence of employing ICT.

This article refers to experience related to the implementation of i-voting in selected European countries. Particular emphasis is given to the issues of the definition of internet voting (as one of the forms of electronic voting); the analysis of experiences gathered by states with a history of the implementation of internet voting; and the procedures of vote casting via the Internet. The main goal of this text is to answer the questions of the greatest risks and benefits generated by internet voting, the influence i-voting has on voter turnout and future prospects of i-voting. The considerations presented here focus on the two states with apparently the greatest experience in the field of i-voting, namely Estonia and Switzerland.

Internet voting

Electronic voting (also referred to as *e-voting*) is one of the so-called alternative forms of voting and one of the tools of electronic democracy (Krimmer, 2010, pp. 148; Musiał-Karg, 2010, pp. 156–157). In the most straightforward terms, e-*voting* means “voting by electronic means” (Kaczmarczyk, Czajkowski, 2001, p. 50). Electronic technologies employed in the voting process include primarily the Internet, telephones, television and digital platforms (Nowina-Konopka).

As concerns the different systems applied, e-voting may be classified into four types:

a) *Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines* with or without the option of printing out confirmation of voting (VVPAT – *voter-verified paper audit trail*). DRE voting machines with the VVPAT option supply tangible evidence of having voted;
b) *Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) systems* are based on special scanning devices able to read the votes cast by voters on special ballots, enabling scanners to operate;
c) *Electronic ballot printers (EBPs)* resemble voting machines which print out special machine-readable ballots or markers of the choice made by voters. Such ballots are fed into scanners and automatically counted;
d) **Internet voting systems** allowing votes to be transferred via the Internet to a central server that counts the votes. Voting may be performed using public computers (voting machines), so-called voting kiosks, as well as using any computer with access to the Internet (*Introducing Electronic Voting* …, 2011, pp. 10–11).

The professional literature typically divides **internet voting** into two categories: ***internet voting at the polling place*** or ***remote internet voting***. In the former type, votes are

Figure 1. Types of internet voting



Source: *A Comparative Assessment of Electronic Voting*, http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/tech/ivote/comp&document=description&lang=e#fg1, 11.10.2017.

cast at specifically designed voting kiosks by means of the Internet. The latter involves either voting from a “voting kiosk,” located outside the polling station, or from any computer connected to the Internet. Figure 1 illustrates the advantages and drawbacks of each of the three types of internet voting: internet voting via voting machines in polling stations, via voting machines located outside a polling station and by means of remote voting online (using a computer or mobile phone).

Remote voting online by means of a computer or mobile phone appears to be less susceptible to various kinds of technical problems (at least on account of the small number of users – voting through computers and phones is likely to be performed by their respective owners). From the voters’ perspective, the act of voting can be performed from any location at any time (*A Comparative Assessment…*). It is worth mentioning that **remote internet voting** ensures a significantly lower degree of control, which may adversely affect the level of security (personal computers are at risk of hacking attacks).

Distinguishing between representative and direct democracy, internet voting can be applied to elections (i-elections) and electronic referenda (i-referenda). In terms of technology, the latter manner of voting seems less complicated to implement, mainly because there are typically only two possible responses (“Yes” and “No”) in referenda. In the case of elections, however, ballots tend to be more complex and extensive in terms of their content than those in referenda.

Considering the introduction of any form of e-voting (including **i-voting**) one has to bear in mind the fact that, depending on which form of voting is selected, it may be carried out either in a **controlled** or **uncontrolled environment**.

I-voting in a controlled environment means that votes are cast in a polling station, voting kiosk or another location monitored by the personnel representing the entity which is in charge of elections. This means that, to a large extent, an electoral administration can monitor electoral procedures, the conditions in which votes are cast and voting technologies as such. Internet voting in a controlled environment can therefore be considered to be equivalent to traditional voting on paper ballots cast in polling stations. Internet voting in an uncontrolled environment, in turn, means voting without any monitoring by the representatives of the electoral administration and without any control over the devices used to cast votes. Voters may vote using any computer or other mobile device (smartphone, tablet) with access to the Internet (*Introducing Electronic Voting*…, 2011, pp. 10–11).

The concerns related to voting in uncontrolled environments mainly refer to ensuring voting secrecy, casting votes for family members and buying votes. One of the arguments wielded by the opponents of such forms of voting is that the voting rituals are abandoned. Other arguments address such issues as the adverse impact of the digital divide on elections and the technical separation or voters’ identities from ballots.

I-voting can be introduced as the only voting channel available to voters, or as an additional voting option. **Voting via the Internet** is commonly introduced as an alternative channel, whereas voting machines are typically introduced as the only channel available to voters in polling stations.

Countries experienced in i-voting

According to data from the Competence Center for Electronic Voting and Participation (E-Voting.CC GmbH), there are only a few countries worldwide which employ (or are highly advanced in implementing) remote Internet voting. It should be stressed that in each of them i-voting is a supplementary form of participating in elections and referenda, as an alternative to traditional and postal voting.

E-stonia

Estonia is a global leader in terms of employing electronic voting in elections. Since 2005, the citizens of this small country have had the option of voting through the Internet (Musiał-Karg, 2011, pp. 98–111).

The deliberations on implementing electronic voting in Estonia started at governmental level in 2001. One year later, the Estonian parliament – the National Assembly (*Riigikogu*) – provided the legislative foundations for internet voting (Goodman, Pammett, DeBardeleben, Freeland, 2010, p. 33). In summer 2003, the Estonian National Electoral Committee set about the implementation of the e-voting system project (Maaten, 2004, p. 83). In January 2000, a new law came into force regarding new identity documents (*Identity Documents Act*) which made it obligatory for citizens to obtain an *eID-card*[1] from 2002 on. Such IDs, issued by Estonian government since 2002, have the double function of providing identification and confirming electronic identity.

In order to cast their votes via the Internet, Estonian voters need a new generation ID (*eID-card*) with valid certificates (which can be revalidated online), PIN codes (issued alongside eID cards) and a computer with a reader of eID cards (and relevant software – installer.id.ee/), connection to the Internet and an operation system of Windows, MacOS or Linux (Estonian National Electoral Committee). *Mobile-ID solutions* may also be authenticated, since 2011.

One of the crucial issues resolved when implementing the i-voting system concerned the fact that electronic voting has to resemble traditional voting as far as possible. Another prerequisite for implementing i-voting was that it complied with the law and electoral principles and was at least as secure as traditional voting (*E-Voting System. General Overview…*, 2005–2010, p. 7).

In compliance with Estonian electoral law,[2] i-voting is conducted from the 10th to 4th day before the elections. The length of this so-called *advanced voting* is necessary to ensure that double votes are eliminated by the day of voting. In order to ensure voters that they cast the vote they intended, they may change their electronic vote by means of repeated voting (before the election day) or by casting their votes in polling stations (also before elections).

[1] In 2005 there were ca. 900,000 owners of new eID cards; Estonian National Electoral Committee, http://www.vvk.ee/index.php?id=11178&tpl=1062, 10.10.2017.

[2] *Riigikogu Election Act, Local Government Council Election Act, Referendum Act and European Parliament Election Act* – all four contain similar e-voting regulations.

Figure 2. Double envelope method in Estonian i-voting



Source: T. Martens, *Internet Voting in Estonia*, National Electoral Committee, PowerPoint presentation, https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/eng/EH_Overiview_03-11.pdf, 11.10.2017.

The i-voting system in Estonia is based on the “double envelope method” otherwise typically used in postal voting (Figure 2).

As has already been mentioned, Estonia admits repeated electronic voting in elections. Over the *advanced voting* period, voters may cast their votes again and their previous vote is cancelled. The principle of assigning priority to traditional voting is of utmost significance in this context. If a voter who has cast electronic vote goes to the polling station on the day of the elections and casts his vote there, the electronic vote is cancelled.

The technical aspect of electronic (internet) voting in Estonia is required to be as simple as possible, and transparent enough to allow experts to verify its operations. According to the assumptions adopted in Estonia, the i-voting system must be repeatedly reusable, thereby allowing it to be used in successive elections without the need to design a new system employing electronic methods every time (*E-Voting System. General Overview…*, 2005–2010, p. 8).

It is worth reviewing the rationale behind the implementation of i-voting in Estonia. Crucial reasons include the following: providing a supplementary and convenient voting channel, thereby modernizing voting, and facilitating a more efficient use of the extant infrastructure (digital platforms and eID cards). In contrast to what is frequently stated, increasing voter turnout was not the purpose of i-voting in Estonia.

Nevertheless, numerous studies on i-voting emphasize its influence on the levels of voter turnout in elections.

Table 1

I-elections in Estonia – selected data

ELECTIONS	local Oct. 2005	parliamentary March 2007	Europan Parliamentary June 2009	local oct. 2009	parliamentary March 2011	local Oct. 2013	Europan Parliamentary May 2014	parliamentary March 2015
Turnout (%)	47.43	61.91	43.88	60.6	63.5	58.0	36.5	64.2
I-turnout (%) i-votes compared to the number of eligible voters in general	0.91	3.46	6.54	9.5	15.4	12.3	11.4	19.6
Proportion of i-votes compared to all votes cast (%)	1.85	5.44	14.68	15.74	24.3	21.2	31.3	30.5
I-votes distribution among all eligible voters before the election day (advanced voting)	7.2	17.6	45.4	44	56.4	50.5	59.2	59.6
I-votes cast abroad compared to all i-votes cast	n.d.	2% 51 countries	3% 66 countries	2.8% 82 countries	3.9% 105 countries	4.2% 105 countries	4.69% 89 countries	5.71% 116 countries
Duration of i-voting	3 days	3 days	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days

Source: Author’s compilation on the basis of data provided by the Estonian National Electoral Committee, http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics, 10.10.2017.

The results of successive elections conducted in Estonia (whether local, parliamentary or European Parliamentary elections) demonstrate that i-voting is on the rise and growing numbers of voters in successive elections opt for voting through the Internet, as evidenced by the data in Table 1.

The proportion of Estonians who take part in elections demonstrates that whereas voter turnout has considerably dropped in the European Parliamentary elections, it has been on the rise in local elections since 2005. Voter turnout in parliamentary elections went up by 2% in 2011 (compared to the first i-voting in 2007) and by 1% in 2015 (compared to 2011). Nevertheless, it would be unjustified to conclude unanimously that i-voting translates into increased turnout. The increased participation of citizens in local and parliamentary elections has indeed been recorded, but experts are cautious about drawing conclusions (Solvak, Vassil, 2016).

Concluding, it should be noted that the following factors have influenced the successful implementation and operation of i-voting in Estonia:

– political agreement on the implementation of i-voting;
– private and public sector collaboration on designing the system;
– extensive application of eID cards (including their safe authentication);
– reasonable costs: development and implementation over four years – EUR 400,000 (the costs of the implementation of i-voting compared to the entire electoral budget accounted for 20% in 2005 and 6% in 2007) (Vinkel).

Switzerland[3] – two steps forward and one step back

Switzerland exemplifies one of the first European states to start the process of implementing voting based on new technologies. The Swiss government set about the implementation of e-voting (or rather i-voting, to be more precise) in 1998 (Braendli, 2005, p. 2).

Three pilot projects were implemented in the Swiss Confederation by 2015: Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich.[4] The crucial feature is that the *Vote électronique* (as the entire project is officially named) was a joint project of the Confederation and individual cantons. The first tests of i-voting started in Geneva in 2003, which was followed by Neuchâtel and Zurich. In 2008, online voting was expanded to encompass Swiss citizens residing abroad, first in Geneva, then in the other locations (Musiał-Karg, 2012, pp. 188–228). By 2015, a total of 13 cantons (forming consortia) tested three Swiss systems. Shortly before the 2015 parliamentary elections the system in Zurich did not pass a security audit. The nine cantons which had selected the Zurich E-voting System dissolved their consortium and suspended further implementation work (Serdült, 2016).

The three Swiss systems of electronic (internet) voting, Zurich, Geneva and Neuchâtel, differed in terms of their respective structures, but the most crucial steps (stages) in voting were very much alike in all the three systems. Possessing a document authorizing voting (and containing the data required for electronic voting), a voter typed in his identification (user ID) or ballot number and chose the appropriate answer to the referendum question, then he typed in the PIN code featuring on his ballot and a password concealed by a scratch strip and sent his vote. The procedure ended with him receiving confirmation that the vote had been cast.

The primary goal of implementing e-voting in the Swiss Federation was to provide eligible voters with a supplementary platform to cast votes in referenda and elections, and, later on, to enable them to electronically sign motions related to people’s initiatives, referenda and submitting candidate lists before parliamentary elections. E-voting primarily targeted young people who use the Internet (who tended not to have voted before) and those voters who were unable to take part in voting (for instance, due to physical disability). Another crucial target group was Swiss citizens abroad.

After the Zurich canton faced security issues regarding i-voting, work on the Neuchâtel system was also suspended. Nevertheless, a decision was made on the level of the entire Federation to continue work on the Geneva system and a new e-voting system proposed by the Swiss Post (*Swiss Post’s e-voting solution*…).

At present i-voting is being tested in six cantons. Three offer e-voting only to Swiss voters residing abroad. The Geneva and Neuchâtel cantons make i-voting available also to some voters residing domestically. Since June 5, 2016, in the Basel-Stadt canton, i-voting has been available not only to Swiss citizens residing abroad but also to the disabled residing in this canton.

It can therefore be concluded that, over varying periods, so far 14 cantons have offered internet voting to Swiss citizens residing abroad. Three cantons (Neuchâtel, Geneva and

[3] For more on e-voting in Switzerland see: M. Musiał-Karg, 2012.

[4] The projects use modern technologies to varying degrees. They facilitate voting in elections and referenda via the Internet, among other things, but also via text message (SMS).

Basel-Stadt) launched electronic voting systems for Swiss residents. Statistics indicate that ca. 60% of citizens eligible for electronic voting have actually used this option.

Current regulations in Switzerland impose quantitative limitations on i-voting: a maximum of 10% of votes may be cast electronically in referenda and 30% in general votes on amendments to the Constitution. Currently, the Swiss Post and the Geneva canton are offering and testing internet voting systems that might be employed in Switzerland (*Swiss e-voting poised*…, 2017).

Voting via the Internet – arguments of supporters and opponents[5]

Considerations on the implementation of i-voting lead to the analysis of the reasons and potential benefits, as well as threats stemming from i-voting (Krimmer, 11.03.2010).

The most advantageous change that may brought by i-voting concerns increased voter mobility. This voting system enables them to cast votes from any place at any time (within the limits stipulated by legislation) even when they are away from their place of residence. Additionally, new technologies boost the convenience of voting, as voters are no longer required to leave their homes to go to polling stations (or to post offices in the case of postal voting). Internet voting is also beneficial for the disabled, who frequently find it difficult to reach polling stations.

From the administrative perspective, electronic voting can potentially accelerate vote counting and improve counting precision. In this context, the elimination of errors committed by electoral officers is emphasized, as is vote rigging in polling stations. Introducing an electronic voter register system may additionally eliminate the cases of multiple voting which happen occasionally; in countries that have not introduced e-voting yet (for instance RIV) a central electronic voter register could be the first stage on the path to introducing i-voting (Rakowska, Rulka, 2011, p. 14).

I-voting systems in countries with the central electronic voter registers can help slash the costs related to the organization of elections and referenda. This is justified by the fact that i-voting does not require huge numbers of electoral officers, who are indispensable in the case of traditional elections (in polling stations), to be employed in polling stations.

The introduction of the Internet into elections has triggered a debate on the weaknesses of i-voting. This is confirmed, among other things, by the fact that many countries have expressed their concern about electronic voting leading to mass electoral frauds.

Another essential problem concerns the identification of voters. On the one hand, a password and electronic signature should be considered helpful at the stage of voting. On the other hand, one needs to be aware that they may not necessarily be used by the voter but by third parties.

Moreover, internet voting systems are susceptible to many technical problems. They may be subjected to attacks, leading to considerable disruption of the voting process. Thus, the servers, systems, computers and voting kiosks should be sufficiently protected to prevent any hacks and infections with computer viruses.

[5] For more see: M. Musiał-Karg, 2012, pp. 173–176.

An analysis of the literature on electronic voting makes it possible to identify the most frequent strengths and weaknesses of i-voting mentioned there. Most of them are listed in the table concluding a part of the report drawn up by the Swedish International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, titled *Introducing Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations*.

Table 2

Strengths and weaknesses of electronic voting

Strengths of electronic voting	Weaknesses of electronic voting
• Faster vote count and tabulation. • More accurate results as human error is excluded. • Efficient handling of complicated electoral systems formulae that require laborious counting procedures. • Improved presentation of complicated ballot papers. • Increased convenience for voters. • Potentially increased participation and turnout, particularly with the use of Internet voting. • More attuned to the needs of an increasingly • mobile society. • Prevention of fraud in polling stations and during the transmission and tabulation of results by reducing human intervention. • Increased accessibility, for example by audio ballot papers for blind voters, with Internet voting as well for housebound voters and voters from abroad. • Possibility of multilingual user interfaces that can serve a multilingual electorate better than paper ballots • Reduction of spoilt ballot papers as voting systems can warn voters about any invalid votes (although consideration should be given to ensuring that voters are able to cast a blank vote should they so choose). • Potential long-term cost savings through savings in poll worker time, and reduced costs for the production and distribution of ballot papers. • Cost savings by using Internet voting: global reach with very little logistical overhead. No shipment costs, no delays in sending out material and receiving it back. • Compared to postal voting, Internet voting can reduce the incidence of vote-selling and family voting by allowing multiple voting where only the last vote counts and prevent manipulation with mail-in deadlines through direct control of voting	• Lack of transparency. • Limited openness and understanding of the system for non-experts. • Lack of agreed standards for e-voting systems. • System certification required, but no widely agreed standards for certification. • Potential violation of the secrecy of the vote, especially in systems that perform both voter authentication and vote casting. • Risk of manipulation by insiders with privileged access to the system or by hackers from outside. • Possibility of fraud through large-scale manipulation by a small group of insiders. • Increased costs for both purchasing and maintaining e-voting systems. • Increased infrastructure and environmental requirements, for example, with regard to power supply, communication technology, temperature, humidity. • Increased security requirements for protecting the voting system during and between elections including during transport, storage and maintenance. • Reduced level of control by the election administration because of high vendor- and/or technology-dependence. • Limited recount possibilities. • Need for additional voter education campaigns. • Possible conflict with the existing legal framework. • Possible lack of public trust in e-voting-based elections as a result of the weaknesses above.

Source: *Introducing Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Policy Paper, December 2011, pp. 8–9.

Conclusions

Voting via the Internet is becoming an increasingly debated/considered way of voting in elections and referenda. This is evidenced by the fact that many states have recently begun discussing the implementation of i-voting and conducting test and pilot votes to examine the operation of i-voting. The most frequently mentioned advantage of i-voting concerns increased convenience for voters who can cast their votes from a PC connected to the Internet at any place and any time as stipulated by the electoral committee. This is particularly significant for the disabled and for those who are abroad on voting day.

Estonia is a country that in 2005 successfully implemented internet voting in local, parliamentary and European Parliamentary elections. It is the only country across the globe giving access to i-voting to every eligible voter.

Switzerland is another state that has seriously tested and advanced internet voting. Having faced security issues related to the Zurich E-voting System Switzerland resolved to suspend further system tests and hand the task over to the Swiss Post. At present, the i-voting system in Switzerland is being implemented on the basis of the systems developed by the Geneva canton and Swiss Post.

I-voting procedures vary. Most systems resemble e-banking. Votes are cast via specifically designed online portals. Estonia requires an eID card or ID Mobile to be used in order to cast votes via the Internet. In the Swiss system of the Geneva canton it is necessary to have a ballot with proper codes allowing voters to be authenticated.

It is too early still to make conclusions on the influence i-voting has had on voter turnout. A certain, moderate influence is observed in the case of turnout in local elections and a minimal influence on the parliamentary elections in Estonia, but these results are difficult to be equivocally interpreted. As the number of elections involving i-voting grows, it is necessary to expand studies on the influence of i-voting on voter turnout. It should be stressed that practically no change has been recorded in Switzerland which has conducted a number of i-voting tests.

The most significant risks related to the implementation of i-voting in elections are related to technology. The argument that the opponents of internet voting wield most frequently concerns hacking attacks. There are also accusations that the level of the electoral administration’s control over i-voting is lower, which results from the fact that voting takes place in what are named uncontrolled environments.

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Wyzwania i-głosowania – praktyka, zasady funkcjonowania i perspektywy. Przykład Estonii i Szwajcarii

Streszczenie

Przedmiotem niniejszego tekstu są doświadczenia związane z wdrożeniem i-votingu w wybranych państwach Europy. W tekście zwrócono szczególną uwagę na zagadnienia związane z: definiowaniem głosowania internetowego (jako jednej z form głosowania elektronicznego); analizą doświadczeń państw, mających doświadczenia związane z wdrożeniem internetowego głosowania czy procedurom oddawania głosów za pośrednictwem głosowania internetowego. Głównym celem niniejszego tekstu jest odpowiedź na pytania o najważniejsze ryzyka i korzyści związane z głosowaniem przez Internet, o wpływ i-voting na frekwencję wyborczą, jak i o przyszłe perspektywy stosowania i-voting. Rozważania w niniejszym tekście koncentrują się na doświadczeniach dwóch państw z największym – jak się wydaje – doświadczaniem w obszarze i-voting, tj. Estonii oraz Szwajcarii.

Słowa kluczowe: i-voting, głosowanie przez Internet, Estonia, Szwajcaria

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Political implications of new social thinking: byproduct of the privatization of the kibbutzim

Abstract: In the 1980s the kibbutzim suffered a severe economic and demographic crisis, which endangered the continuation of their existence as cooperative communities. The solution was to adopt steps, taken from the ideas of the free market. Beyond the increase of economic efficiency, the rearrangement of the community under new rules was accompanied by political influence, as can be seen in the change of the voting pattern of the kibbutzim members to the Knesset.

The main argument is that the arrangement of kibbutz society under the new rules brought into the kibbutz a new social discourse that completely changed the way in which the individual defines himself in social and political terms. The political byproduct was that the Left parties that in the past served as a prototype for the socialist identity were perceived as not relevant to the new social identity, in favor of steadily increasing support for the center parties.

To track the change in the political identity, we chose to examine from up close three kibbutzim found at different stages of the change processes: Kibbutz Deganya A, Kibbutz Mizra, and Kibbutz Ein Dor. The objective was not only to identify which group in the kibbutz changed its political identity but primarily, to examine how the penetration of the new social knowledge contributed to this.

The findings revealed a large gap in the perception of reality primarily between two age groups in the kibbutz. Unlike the older generation, the younger employed neo-liberal social representations to define itself, the community, and the political system. The left parties, like the old kibbutz, were perceived as old, inefficient, and thus not relevant for it in the voting for the Knesset.

Key words: kibbutz, social representations, collective identity, political identity

Introduction

The kibbutzim[1] are Jewish socialist communes that developed at the beginning of the 20th century as a part of the process of the national revival of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. As cooperative communities, they were established from the ideological drive to realize in practice the socialist idea and through it to lead and reshape Jewish society (Lanir, 1990, p. 85; Near, 1992, p. 25; Shepher, 1977, p. 23; Yatziv, 1999, p. 69). The pioneers of the Second Immigration, who came from the roiling climate of Europe, carried with them revolutionary ideas that challenged the old social order. Their aspiration to merge Zionism as the Jewish national idea and socialist ideology, derived from the fundamental assumption that the problem of the Jewish people is not only a national political problem, but also includes social-economic aspects and thus the unique conditions in the Land of Israel, necessitated the creation of Zionist socialism (Bein, 1976, p. 28).

The workers were educated and had a strong ideological awareness, which was channeled into energetic political activism, even before the formation of a political system.

[1] Kibbutzim is the plural form of kibbutz.

Political activity was perceived by them as a decisive factor in the building of society and the realization of the national vision. The socialist doctrine that was brought by the pioneers of the Second Immigration was a pillar in the formation of the characters of the first worker communities. The pioneers’ perception of themselves, the coping with the difficulties of reality, or the vision of the future – all these derived from the socialist set of knowledge that provided for them a language, and a cognitive instrument for the interpretation of what was happening around them (Darin-Drabkin, 1961, p. 55; Gavron, 2000, p. 19; Shepher, 1977, p. 23; Shoshani, 1973, p. 10). Thus, already in 1905, lacking a different organizational framework, the first two workers’ parties were established, the Poalei Zion Party (Workers of Zion) and the HaPoel HaTsair Party (Young Worker) (Bein, 1976, p. 202; Horwitz, Lissak, 1977, p. 89). Beyond the supply of social services for the pioneers, the socialist parties gave the workers an identity and a context of belonging that were essential in the creation of the new social identity.

It is therefore not surprising that the kibbutz communities that were established from the same ideological drive maintained a close connection and commitment to the workers’ parties, which were perceived as faithfully representing the socialist identity. Even though the difference in the kibbutz movements was expressed also in the brand of the different workers’ parties,[2] it was still possible to say that the socialist idea was reflected in all of them. A look at the voting pattern to the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) on the part of the members of the kibbutzim over the years shows that for decades the workers’ parties[3] received unprecedented support of nearly 100%, despite and nearly without any connection to the dramatic events that accompanied society and the state. Beyond the political socialization that was conveyed through the educational institutions of the kibbutzim, and the social pressure that derived from the very fact of belonging to an intimate political community, this pattern of behavior proves the extent to which the socialist political identity was an inseparable part of the kibbutz identity, and that the political preference of the kibbutz member was derived from his belonging to the collective.

In the 1980s, the Israeli economy suffered a financial crisis that seriously harmed the kibbutzim and raised doubts about their ability to continue to exist as independent cooperative communities (Ben Rafael, Topel, 2009, p. 6). The loans that the kibbutzim took out from the banks, at high interest rates and under conditions of inflation, swelled to debts of billions of shekels, which were far beyond their ability to repay with the resources at their disposal (Hakim, 2009, p. 149). An especially deep shock was felt in 1986, with the disintegration of Kibbutz Beit Oren. A reality in which a kibbutz goes bankrupt and its members are left without guarantees, without savings, assets, or pen-

[2] The relationship between the kibbutz movements and the different workers’ parties is expressed in the representation of kibbutz members in the parties and in the voting patterns of the kibbutz members to the Knesset. The kibbutzim belonging to the Ichud HaKvutzot VeHaKibbutzim movement were characterized by voting for the MAPAI party and then for the Labour Party, the kibbutzim belonging to the HaKibbutz HaMeuchad movement were characterized by voting for the Achdut HaAvoda party and then for the Labour Party, and the kibbutzim of the HaKibbutz HaArtzi shel HaShomer HaTsair movement were characterized by voting for the MAPAM party and then for MERETZ.

[3] The use of the concept of workers’ parties pertains to the different socialist parties over the years, those that merged with the Labour Party or left it over the years, such as the Poalei Eretz Yisrael Party, the Poalim Meuchedet Party, the Achdut HaAvoda Party, the Poalei Yisrael list, HaMaArach, Labour Party, Yisrael Achat, Meretz, and HaMachaneh HaZioni.

sions, eroded the self-confidence of the kibbutzim and raised concerns about the ability of the kibbutz to ensure the existence of its members (Pavin, 1992, p. 10). The characteristics of the crisis in kibbutz society were not only economic but also exposed deeper fundamental problems about the way in which the community was managed. It appeared that the kibbutz had not succeeded in adjusting and adapting itself to the political and social reality of the State of Israel in the 1980s. The adherence of the kibbutz community to its unique lifestyles regardless of the changes that had occurred around it was the main reason for the gap that steadily grew between the reality and erroneous perception of it. The crisis in kibbutz society therefore was a deep crisis that can be called a ‘conceptual crisis’. The kibbutz language that had served the community for decades, through which social knowledge was built and the kibbutz identity was shaped, became irrelevant to the understanding of the crisis, or in its ability to propose ways of action (Lanir, 1990, p. 24; Leviatan, 2003, p. 10; Pavin, 1992, p. 11; Rozolio, 1999, p. 24).

One of the first steps towards escaping the crisis was to resolve the outside debts of the kibbutzim. In 1989, the Ministry of Finance under Shimon Peres promoted a recovery program (Ben-Rafael, Ya’ar, Socker, 2000, p. 88). Within this ‘Kibbutzim Arrangement’, the banks agreed to erase some of the debt, and the Ministry of Finance promised to transfer support grants of hundreds of millions of shekels to the kibbutzim (Hakim, 2009, p. 149). The condition that was set for this transfer of financial assistance was the repair of the internal failures of the kibbutz system, and the re-organization of the community in the spirit of the free market (Ben-Rafael, Topel, 2009, p. 7). On the part of the kibbutzim, the desire to increase efficiency was so strong that it overcame the values and principles perceived as formative elements in the kibbutz community. The privatization of services, differential salaries, or the distribution of the kibbutz assets to its members, increased economic efficiency, but totally changed the mutual relationship previously existing between the individual and the community. The new kibbutz model which was called the ‘Renewed Kibbutz’ (Ben-Rafael, Topel, 2011, p. 252; Ben-Rafael, Topel, 2009, p. 25; Russel, Hanneman, Getz, 2011, p. 109) introduced into the kibbutz a new social discourse and a set of values which for many years had been considered unacceptable.

Were the changes in the organization of the kibbutz community under the new rules accompanied by political implications? Figure 1 presents the voting for the Knesset of the kibbutzim members of the United Kibbutzim Movement (TAKAM)[4] in 1949–2015. It can be seen that the sweeping support of the workers’ parties that characterized the kibbutzim and which were perceived as a part of the collective identity weakened greatly, while voting for the center parties[5] increased. Are these two phenomena related? Did the political identity that was so identified with the kibbutz changed under the influence of the new social discourse? What is the cause of the decline in the support for left-wing

[4] Until 2000, the data for the United Kibbutz Movement are presented separately. From 2000, the voting data of all the secular kibbutz movements, which joined into one kibbutz movement, are presented together.

[5] The term center parties addresses the parties that position themselves at the center of the party system, between the Likud Party on the one hand and the Labour Party on the other, while they shun the traditional positions of these parties and strive to present national consensus. See: Yanai (2001) and Arian and Shamir (2001).

parties on the part of the kibbutzim members? This is the question that this paper addresses. Until now, most of the research studies on the renewed kibbutz have focused on the economic and social aspects of the community, while the political aspect was barely addressed. The contribution of this research study is that it broadens the scope of the understanding of the changes in the kibbutzim to the political dimension.

At the beginning of the article, the *social representations theory* (Moscovici, 1984), which served as the methodological pillar of the research study, will be presented. The search for a theoretical basis that connects language and social discourse on the one hand, and the understanding of reality on the other, led us to the use of this theory. Afterwards, the research structure, and the form of querying that shaped the database will be presented. The last part of this paper describes the quantitative and qualitative research findings, along with the discussion and conclusions. The main argument of this research study is that the economic reforms the kibbutzim experienced in recent years changed the social understanding, and has driven changes in the political identity.

Figure 1. Voting Patterns for the Knesset in the United Kibbutzim Movement, 1949–2015



Source for 1949–1999: Central Bureau Statistic – Elections Results.
Source for 2001–2015: Central Elections Committee Website – Elections Results.

Social Representations Theory

The social representations theory is a social psychological theory that enables the examination of the influence of social structures on the individual’s cognitive functioning. According to this theory, the array of knowledge found in the person’s brain is called social representations, through which societies and individuals succeed in understanding the physical and social reality. Since reality is complex and the understanding of it lies beyond a person’s limited ability, a person creates certain representations that simulate

reality. These representations are created in negotiations through social discourse in society, and they include images, perceptions, and feelings, along with action scenarios in a given social context (Carvalho, Andrade, 2013, p. 30; Doise, 1993, p. 158; Elcheroth, Doise, Reicher, 2001, p. 732; Farr, 1984, p. 130; Good, 1993, p. 171; Jasper, Fraser, 1984, p. 102; Moscovici, 1984, p. 6; Wagner, 2007, p. 207; Wagner et al., 1999, p. 95). Social representations can be verbal and visual, and they appear in different forms of social behavior, such as the individual’s manner of thinking, practices, and formal and informal communication in society (Bauer, Gaskell, 1999, p. 174).

The conclusion that arises from the theory is that a person is not truly free to choose how to understand the world, but his understanding of reality is derived from the same social representations created by the group to which he belongs. Social representations are incorporated in every social interaction, they supervise the transfer of information and are responsible for the attribution of meaning to the different phenomena to the point that the meaning they give to the individual is perceived as the sole meaning for him. The same array of knowledge created through social discourse is found simultaneously in the mind of the individual and in the minds of the other members in the group, and this trait is what gives the members of the group the ability to perceive reality and to attribute meaning to it in the same manner. Social identity, therefore, is the sense of belonging on the part of the individual to all those who are similar to him, in that they share the same constellation of social values, and this is what differentiates them from other groups that have different social values (Breakwell, Canter, 1993, p. 3; McKinlay, Potter, Wetherel, 1993, p. 136; Wagner et al., 1999, p. 96).

In times of social crisis, when a group is forced to cope with a threatening and unfamiliar reality, there is a process of ‘anchoring’. The group members attempt to anchor the new phenomenon to the existing social knowledge that they share, and thus attempt to control reality through the transformation of the unfamiliar to familiar (Moscovici, 1984, p. 40). However, in cases that deviate from the hitherto social understanding, an opening is created for the appearance of new social knowledge which until now was situated on the margins of social discourse, and hence the possibility of a new understanding of reality on the part of the group develops.

Research Structure

To follow the changes in the political identity of the kibbutzim members, we chose to examine three kibbutzim found in the Jezreel Valley up close: Kibbutz Degania Alef, Kibbutz Mizra, and Kibbutz Ein Dor. The three kibbutzim are considered senior ones, and they are situated in the geographic and ideological heart of the kibbutz movement. The three differ in their period of establishment and in the country of origin of their founders, so they provide a broad perspective for observation. Last, the three kibbutzim suffered from the economic and demographic crisis in the 1980s and today are found in different stages of the transition to the model of the ‘renewed kibbutz’. The process of the re-organization of the kibbutz communities provided an opportunity to follow the new discourse that accompanied the change, and enabled the identification of the new social knowledge that developed.

The research study conducted during the summer of 2015 integrated two research methods, the qualitative and the quantitative. Every resident of the kibbutz received an anonymous questionnaire that included 66 questions. The first part included questions that pertained to the resident’s demographic characteristics, and to the way in which he chooses to define himself. The goal was to identify how the respondent sees himself in the community. The second part of the questionnaire focused on the respondent’s attitudes relative to the ‘cooperative kibbutz’ and relative to the transition to the model of the ‘renewed kibbutz’. These questions were intended to reveal the way in which the respondent perceives the kibbutz lifestyle and the attitude he forms in relation to the changes in the community. The last part included a series of questions related to the Israeli party system. Here the goal was to examine whether there is a correlation between the way in which the member chooses to define himself and his attitude towards the kibbutz, versus his political identity.

Half of the questions were closed questions in which the respondent was required to note the degree of agreement with a series of statements on a scale of 1–5 (1=do not at all agree, 5=greatly agree). The other half was a series of open-ended questions in which the resident was free to give an image, association, or explanation in response to the question, and thus to reveal the social knowledge he uses. In addition, fourteen in-depth interviews were held with the residents of the kibbutzim and the main role-holders in the three communities. The emphasis in the interviews was placed on questions that seek explanations of reality. For example: What is the kibbutz? What is the reason that the crisis occurred? What is the most important value in the community? The purpose was to reveal the social understanding and the social representations used by kibbutz residents today. Since political reality is an outcome of the represented reality based on the social knowledge that the group creates, the changes in political preferences reflect changes in the patterns of thinking of the group, and these will be expressed in a new social discourse.

Research Findings

The total number of respondents from the three kibbutzim was 338 (168 from Kibbutz Ein Dor, 98 from Kibbutz Degania Aleph, and 72 from Kibbutz Mizra). The ratio between men and women was nearly equal, 49% men and 51% women. In contrast, the distribution of the respondents according to the age groups was not equal but reflected the contemporary composition in the kibbutzim: 10% young people aged 20–30, 32% aged 31–40, 17% aged 41–60, and the largest group was of older people, 41% aged 61 and above. The distribution of the respondents according to their status in the kibbutz also was commensurate with the current social structure of the renewed kibbutzim. 70% were kibbutz members, 12% were members of the kibbutz who were born there, and 18% were non-member residents who lived in the kibbutz.

The local identity, which in the past was a source of great pride, became marginal in the eyes of the kibbutz residents. Originally the kibbutz founders enjoyed high social prestige in Israeli society, which saw the members of the kibbutz as those who had taken upon themselves the task of building the nation. Today, kibbutz members do not see

this identity to be a social asset, and of the respondents only 8% defined themselves as a ‘kibbutz member’. Most of the respondents, like Israeli society, affiliated themselves with broader identity circles. 56% defined themselves according to their civil identity as Israelis, and 28% defined themselves according to their national identity as Jews.

Perception of the Kibbutz in the Eyes of Its Residents

A broad cross-examination of all the variables relating to the perceptions of the kibbutz indicated that there is a large and consistent gap primarily between the two age groups in the communities. In contrast to what was expected, significant differences were not found in the perception of the kibbutz between the kibbutz members and the non-member residents, and differences were not found between the three kibbutzim. The difference that recurred in all of the three communities was the intergenerational difference: the group of young people[6] aged 20–30, versus the group of older people aged 61 and above.

The differences were expressed in their perceptions of the kibbutz, in its values, and in the way in which it needs to act. Table 1 presents some of the means of the indices of the answers regarding the kibbutz.

Table 1

Differences in the Perception of the Kibbutz between the Young People and the Older People

Question	Older Respondents 61+	Young Respondents 20–30
I support the idea of “each according to his needs”	2.93	2.50
I support the transition to “renewed kibbutz”	3.57	4.33
I agree the idea of the kibbutz “died”	2.60	3.17
I think the kibbutz condition was improved by privatization	3.48	4.17
I participate in the collective decisions of the kibbutz	3.32	1.83

Source: Author’s study.

As the data show, the group of young people presented an attitude of reservations about the model of the cooperative kibbutz and its values, while the older people had reservations about the transition to the model of the renewed kibbutz. The young people concur that the idea of the kibbutz has failed, and they do not support the perception of essential equality that characterized the kibbutz. They support privatization and agree that the processes of change that the kibbutzim are experiencing have improved their economic situation. In contrast, the answers of the older people reflected the support for the traditional attitudes of the kibbutz. They largely support the idea of “every person according to his needs,” they display greater involvement in the community and in the making of decisions of the kibbutz, and they do not display sympathy for the process of privatization and the new kibbutz model. Despite the crisis that the community experi-

[6] The group of young people included for the most part, children of kibbutz members and kibbutz members.

enced and the processes of change, the older people do not agree that the kibbutz idea has failed. The comparison of the means of the two age groups using t-test confirmed that the differences between the two groups are statistically significant.

Social Thinking Regarding the Kibbutz

The perception of reality on the part of the individual and his evaluation of his social environment are derived from the social knowledge he carries. This social knowledge is the collection of social representations that were created by the group the individual belongs to and lies at the root of his behavior. Through the open-ended questions presented in the questionnaires and interviews, it was possible to reveal the social language and the array of knowledge available, and thus to present a cognitive map of the kibbutz community. The array of social representations is presented in Figure 2 in the form of a pie-chart. The two internal circles are the respondent’s circles of identity, and the outer rings describe the social representations arising from the answers to the open-ended questions. Each ring presents the respondents’ understanding regarding another question, for example: the first ring presents the associations and images that arose from the answers to the question: What is the kibbutz for you? The questions are attached at the bottom of the graph. In this way, it is possible to understand not only the positions of the age groups, but also to identify the social language behind the perception of the reality. The frequency of the concepts on the graph represents their frequency as arising from the open answers.

The meaning of the kibbutz for its residents, as well as its advantages and qualities, are perceived differently by the age groups, as reflected in the schema of the social representations. The older people and the young people use a different language and therefore perceive the reality on the kibbutz differently.

The group of people aged 61 and above retained the socialist and idealist language of the old kibbutz, and most of them still defined themselves as belonging to the ‘working class’. Two prominent characteristics arose in their language: the first is the extensive use of values, and the second is a strong longing for the past. According to the older people’s perception, the kibbutz is not just a place of residence, but a place of solidarity, justice, independent work, and collaboration. The good of the kibbutz is all that is derived from the life of a cooperative community, such as mutual assistance, guarantee, cultural life, and quality education. The bad of the kibbutz is perceived as the exploitation of the cooperative method and laziness on the part of some of the members. The cause of the crisis of the kibbutzim is perceived as a crisis of values, or in other words, a decline in the commitment to the original values of the community on the part of two groups. The first group is of urban spouses who married kibbutz members. In the interviews, the older people claimed that the spouses who were not born on the kibbutz but who moved to live there after they married a kibbutz member, brought with them outside values and were not fully committed to the idea of the cooperative community. The second group is the young members of the kibbutz, who were influenced by the outside set of values and did not follow the path of the generation of the founders.

If in the discourse of the older people the focus for the understanding of reality is found in the community, then in the language of the young people the focus is the indi-

vidual. As the respondents’ age decreased, the liberal discourse steadily strengthened. The kibbutz according to the young people is home in the functional sense of a residential place, without a unique self-perception. The advantages of the kibbutz are the material values it offers, such as grass, greenery, village, and quality of life.

The disadvantages of the kibbutz are all the traits of the community that harm the individual’s freedom or his economic efficiency, such as lack of privacy and harm to freedom. Sharp criticism was presented of unprofessional management, waste and the unemployment that characterized the cooperative kibbutz. The crisis in the kibbutzim is explained by the young people as an economic crisis that was caused because of the irresponsible and unprofessional management on the part of the kibbutz in the past. It is therefore not surprising that the young generation chose to define itself as belonging to the ‘middle class’.

Figure 2. Schema of the Social Representations of the Kibbutz Members Relative to the Kibbutz



1. When you think of kibbutz you think of…
2. What is bad in the kibbutz?
3. What caused the crisis in the kibbutz?

Perception of the Party System in the Eyes of Kibbutz Residents

The next stage in the research study was to examine the political identity of the residents of the kibbutzim and their attitude towards the party system in general. Here, too, significant differences were found in the political behavior between the two age groups on the kibbutz, the young people and the older people, and this is presented in Table 2.

Table 2

The Differences in the Political Identity between the Young People and the Older People

Question	Older Respondents 61+	Young Respondents 20–30
I belong to the ‘left camp’	70.9%	42.9%
I belong to the ‘center camp’	25.5%	42.9%
The vote in the last elections was the same as at my first elections	71.0%	43.0%
I decide my vote many months before the elections	61.8%	28.6%
I decide my vote less than a week before the elections	10.9%	42.9%

Source: Author’s study.

The findings indicate that most of the adults aged 61 and above continue to identify themselves as belonging to the ‘left camp’, while displaying party loyalty and adherence to their first political identity. The older people maintain stability in their voting and tend less to change their political preference from one election to the next. Their declaration of the formation of their vote many months before the elections proves that they have a stable and distinct political identity which is not influenced by events before the elections. Conversely, the behavior of the young people aged 20–30 reflects a new and unclear political identity. The belonging of the young people to the ‘left camp’ is not as dominant and obvious as it was among the older people, and nearly 43% of them declared that they belong to the ‘center camp’. A considerable number of the young people reported that they form their political preference less than a week from the elections. The volatility in the voting of the young people, the formation of their decision at the last moment, and their support of the new center parties, indicate a distance from the old political identity of the kibbutz and the search for a political camp that is perceived by them as more commensurate with the social reality in which they live. The comparison of the means of the responses of the two age groups through t-test confirms that the differences are statistically significant.

Social Thinking Regarding the Party System

Figure 3 presents the map of the social representations of the kibbutz residents regarding the party system and the political camps. This time the intention was to reveal the language the respondents used to describe the political camp to which they belong, and the images through which they perceive the rival political camps. The division of the groups in the graph this time is according to the declared political belonging of every respondent to the ‘right camp’, ‘left camp’, or ‘center camp’ respectively. The three

outside rings are the answers given by the respondents regarding the question: What is this political camp for you?

Figure 3. Schema of the Social Representations of the Kibbutz Residents Regarding the Political Camps



1. What is the left camp?
2. What is the right camp?
3. What is the center camp?

The group that defined itself as belonging to the ‘right camp’ was smallest, 6.6%. The social representation of this camp presents the view of reality only through one topic, the topic of security. The ‘left camp’ is perceived as weak, and as such retreats from the Arabs and surrenders the territories. The right is perceived by its supporters as the sole political alternative that preserves the security of the state and its Jewish character. Since the ‘center camp’ does not have a clear position on the topic of security, it is perceived by this camp as irrelevant to the voting or as a political perception related only to one thing: the economy.

The group that declared that they belong to the ‘left camp’ was the largest in the kibbutzim, 66.7%, and included primarily the older residents. The ‘left camp’ in the

kibbutz perceives itself in a value-based manner through socialist language. The image that appeared the greatest number of times in the description of the left camp is equality. Left means equality, justice, help for the weak, and concern for human dignity. The representations raised regarding the ‘right camp’ illustrate how much the kibbutz residents dislike the rival political identity. The right is everything the left is not: capitalist, religious, racist, and lacking in social sensitivity. A representative sample can be seen in the responses of some of the kibbutz member who chose to describe the right with the image “not me”. The political center is also presented by the attributes that differentiate it from the cooperative kibbutz: bourgeois, lacking in values, populist, and as such as representing Tel Aviv and the middle class.

Those who declared themselves as belonging to the ‘center camp’ constituted the second largest group in the kibbutzim, 26.7%, most from the younger age groups. The representations presented through this group were of a liberal perception. The perception of the ‘left camp’ was similar to that presented in the description of the old cooperative kibbutzim. The left means socialism, out of date, old and belonging to the past, is inefficient and naive. The ‘right camp’ is perceived in a negative and sharp manner, and here too there is a prominent reservation about its values and its voters. The right means religion, the Land of Israel, racism, and a mob. The political center is described through images that were very similar to the description of the renewed kibbutzim. The center means innovation, freshness, an efficient economy, and responsibility. Contrary to the perception of the leadership crisis of the left party, according to those belonging to this camp, the leadership of the center parties was presented as contemporary, young, and attentive to the public. The political center is the party expression of the renewed kibbutzim, a secular, liberal, and new alternative, in which the individual has greater opportunities.

Conclusions

At the core of this work is the assumption that the individual’s behavior can be explained through the group to which he belongs. The group gives the individual a language through which he thinks, values with which he judges, and images that help him evaluate reality. The group gives the individual support and a sense of belonging and constitutes a source of social identity. Hence, the changes that occur in the group certainly influence the individual and the way in which he perceives reality and chooses to act.

The homogeneous structure that characterized the cooperative kibbutz in the past was reflected not only in a similar population composition, but also primarily in the sharing of the same social representations. Over the years, the kibbutz community preserved a socialist discourse, while attempting to reduce the influence of compositing new social representations. For example, the kibbutz had an independent educational system through which socialist values were indoctrinated, the kibbutz members had a party newspaper that preserved the political language, most of the kibbutz members worked in the kibbutz, and an effort was undertaken to reduce the entry of hired workers from outside the community. In this manner, the kibbutz preserved the social discourse and ensured the collective identity. The party expression of the kibbutz identity was expressed in the unqualified support for socialist workers’ parties. As long as the social language of the

kibbutz was preserved, a similar understanding of reality on the part of its members was assured, and hence stable voting in the elections for the Knesset to the left camp.

The economic crisis of the 1980s shocked the kibbutzim and threatened the old social order. At first, the kibbutzim coped with the crisis through anchoring reality. They attempted to understand its causes and to resolve it through the familiar social knowledge of the community. An example of the phenomenon of anchoring can be found in the responses of the older members, who still display adherence to the socialist language. The kibbutz is perceived as unique because of its original values and its ability to assure equality and concern for another. Good in the kibbutz is derived from the realization of the kibbutz ideal, and the crisis derived from the lack of its full implementation. Even the evaluation of the present economic situation is given from the old constellation of representations. In some of the interviews held with the older kibbutz members, they presented the argument that the economic situation has become worse because of the process of privatization. Although, on the level of the individual, the person’s level of income has increased, the experience of the older people was that the level of their life has declined, as presented by one of the older people from Kibbutz Degania Aleph: “The members have more money, but the kibbutz has less.”

The scope of the crisis and the inability of the kibbutzim to understand the new reality forced them to adopt steps for the increase of efficiency that strengthened the individual at the expense of the community. The social fences that separated the kibbutz from its surroundings were lowered, and the homogeneity that characterized the community began to crack. The kibbutz members began to go and work outside the kibbutz, hired workers entered the kibbutz, the kibbutz began to sell services to the urban population and even allowed non-member residents to live in the kibbutz. The process of the loosening of social intimacy began even beforehand in the transition of the kibbutz from commune to ‘community’ (Talmon-Garber, 1970, p. 12), but this time the situation was different; not only the social relationships were weakened but also the social language. The weakening of the community enabled the penetration of new ideas, values and social representations which challenged the old discourse and changed the way in which the community understands reality. The new social representations were adopted primarily by the young people, who began to grow distant from the perceptions of the cooperative kibbutz, as indicated by the findings. Solidarity and mutual assistance gave way to efficiency and privacy. The value of equality, which held a sacred status in the past, gave way to the perception of freedom.

In one of the interviews conducted with a young woman from Kibbutz Ein Dor, the question of “What is equality in your opinion?” was presented. Her response was that “Equality is freedom”. This answer can illustrate the change that occurred in the kibbutz, and in its social language. The kibbutz identity that relied on the old set of values slowly became unattractive and irrelevant on the part of those who adopted the new discourse. Many of the young people supported the argument that the image of the kibbutz in Israeli society is negative. Therefore, it is not surprising that only 8% of the respondents defined themselves as *kibbutznik* (a kibbutz member).

Additional examples of the distance from the kibbutz identity on the part of young people can be found in their lack of willingness to be involved in the collective decisions of the kibbutz, or in the fact that they do not think that the kibbutz is a unique form of

residential community compared with other communities. Like other research studies on the weakening of the value-oriented commitment of the young people on the kibbutz (Shlasky, 1997, p. 51), it is possible to see in this research study too, the liberal utilitarian perception that examines the kibbutz only according to its material advantages. Accordingly, the new social identity that began to be built in parallel to the old identity is a liberal social identity that places the individual at the center. This new identity that connected to the ‘middle class’ also influenced the political preferences of the kibbutz members. The old workers’ parties began to be perceived as irrelevant by the young voters in the symbols they offer, in the declared values, or in the desired goals. The search for a political home that will express the new social identity is found at the basis of the volatility among the young people. The new center parties that have developed in recent years are those that began to be perceived as representing the new social identity of the young people of the kibbutz, as expressed in the research findings. The center parties offer a refreshing, new, and secular alternative that cares about the middle class that is identified with the young people of the kibbutz.

To summarize, regarding the question of “what caused the change in the voting patterns of the members of the kibbutzim in recent years?”, it can be argued that the new social language means a different understanding of reality, and this lies at the basis of the change in the political preferences of kibbutzim members.

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Polityczne implikacje nowego myślenia społecznego: produkt uboczny prywatyzacji kibuców

Streszczenie

W latach osiemdziesiątych dwudziestego wieku kibuce dotknął poważny kryzys gospodarczy i demograficzny, który zagroził ich dalszemu istnieniu w formie społeczności spółdzielczych. Rozwiązaniem było podjęcie kroków inspirowanych ideami wolnego rynku. Wzrostowi efektywności gospodarczej i przeorganizowaniu wspólnoty zgodnie z nowymi regułami towarzyszyły skutki w sferze politycznej, co widać w zmianie sposobu głosowania członków kibuców w wyborach do Knesetu.

Główna teza artykułu głosi, że zorganizowanie społeczności kibuców według nowych zasad wprowadziło do nich nowy dyskurs społeczny, który całkowicie zmienił sposób, w jaki jednostka określa się w kategoriach społecznych i politycznych. Politycznym produktem ubocznym było to, że partie lewicowe, które w przeszłości stanowiły prototyp tożsamości socjalistycznej, zaczęły być postrzegane jako nieadekwatne wobec nowej tożsamości społecznej, w której nastąpił stały wzrost poparcia dla partii centrowych.

W celu prześledzenia zmiany tożsamości politycznej, postanowiliśmy zbadać z bliska trzy kibuce znajdujące się na różnych etapach procesów zmian: kibuc Deganya A, kibuc Mizra i kibuc Ein Dor. Celem badań było nie tylko ustalenie, która grupa w kibucu zmieniła swoją tożsamość polityczną, ale przede wszystkim zbadanie, w jaki sposób przyczyniło się do tego zdobycie nowej wiedzy społecznej.

Wyniki ujawniły duży rozziew w postrzeganiu rzeczywistości, głównie między dwiema grupami wiekowymi w kibucu. W przeciwieństwie do starszych, młodsze pokolenie zastosowało neoliberalne reprezentacje społeczne do zdefiniowania siebie, społeczności i systemu politycznego. Partie lewicowe, podobnie jak dawne kibuce, zaczęto postrzegać jako przestarzałe, nieskuteczne, a zatem niemające znaczenia w głosowaniu w wyborach do Knesetu.

Słowa kluczowe: kibuc, reprezentacje społeczne, tożsamość zbiorowa, tożsamość polityczna

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Influence of political communication on the transformation of identity. Reflection in Ukrainian digital media discourse

Abstract: This article has been updated due to the new processes present in the Ukrainian digital media discourse. The texts that were published in the Ukrainian digital media from 2013–2015 actively covered the problem of the transformation in Ukrainian identity. The article aims to show the role of digital media in the transformation of the Ukrainian identity. To this end, an overview of modern interpretations in the media of Ukrainian identity is given; the catalyzing impact of digital media on the transformation of Ukrainian identity is shown; and it is demonstrated that the European integration dialogue within the Eastern Partnership is stimulating the transformation of Ukrainian identity (using texts from convergent media, such as the "Den" [Day] newspaper).

The theoretical basis of this article deals with the works of renowned scholars in the field of the impact of digital media on various social changes. This includes researchers such as Jim Hall on online journalism, Volodymyr Kulyk on the objectivity of digital media, Richard A. Lanham on the importance of the "electronic word" and Andrzej Mencwel on the tools of the multimedia communication revolution. Identity issues are raised in the article on the theoretical basis of Monserrat Guibernau, Yaroslav Hrytsak and Zenon E. Kohut.

The mobilizing impacts of digital media on society are reflected in the texts on the Ukrainian Euromaidan and Dignity Revolution period published in traditional media and distributed online. The authors of these digital media include historian, Timothy Snyder, writer, Oksana Zabuzhko, and online communications expert, Maksym Savanevsky.

The use of digital media in political communications has led to new demonstrations of Ukrainian identity and its adaptation to new political realities. Digital media were at the forefront of operational information about the events of the political life of the state. Political, social and state institutions have focused on communication with citizens over the Internet, including social media, blogs and columns in online media.

The high-quality digital media used in Ukraine have taken on an innovative position of pluralism, ultimately adapting to a European national identity, or at least cruising along a parallel trajectory with Europe. The European integration dialogue within the Eastern Partnership in the media has been stimulating the transformation of the Ukrainian identity.

Other new projects, which include publishing of books based on digital media texts, are also essential. The Ukrainian high-quality digital media, maintaining the traditions of free media, have reached a high level in analyzing the facts truthfully and adequately reflecting Ukraine's political processes and its involvement in international events.

Key words: communication, identity, information, digital media

Introduction

The relevance of this article stems from the fact that it was the Ukrainian digital mediad iscourse which activated the transformation of the Ukrainian identity. The Ukrainian researcher Volodymyr Kulyk argues that "the Internet is now a major factor in maintaining Ukrainian identity outside of Ukraine" (Kulyk, 2011).

The aim of this study is to show the role of digital media concerning Ukrainian identity. The study hopes to provide solutions to the following research questions: (1) to give an overview of modern interpretations in the media of Ukrainian identity problems; (2) to show the catalyzing impact of digital media on the transformation of Ukrainian identity; and (3) to show that the European integration dialogue within the Eastern Partnership is stimulating the transformation of Ukrainian identity (using texts from convergent media such as the “Den” [Day] newspaper).

The research subject is texts taken from digital media, and also the texts of such convergent media as the “Den” newspaper, the “Ukrainskiy Tyzhden” [Ukrainian Week] magazine, and the “Ukrayinska Pravda” [Ukrainian Truth] online service. The “Ukrainskiy Tyzhden” is a high quality Ukrainian magazine, which specializes mostly in current affairs and opinion articles. “Ukrayinska Pravda” is one of the oldest Ukrainian online media, together with its column, “Istorychna Pravda” [Historical Truth]. The “Den” newspaper and its new convergent media platforms, i.e. website, presence in social media, screencasts of actual debates, book publishing and glossy publishing are also quite innovative. Its output includes blogs, posts on social media, columns in online periodicals on the events of the Ukrainian Euromaidan, the Dignity Revolution, the Russian invasion and Crimea annexation and Russian military aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region. All of these express strong emotions using these new media. The authors of all these forms of digital media are journalists, and often participants in these momentous events. In articles, reports and comments, the authors position themselves as representatives and spokespeople of the Ukrainian nation.

A qualitative research methodology was chosen to study the topic of the article. The method of content analysis of the studied texts was applied. To answer the first question, the monitoring of the Ukrainian context of the transformation of national identity was made. This monitoring was based on the works of Oksana Zabuzhko, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Yevhen Holovakha and Iryna Bekeshkina, from a socio-cultural, communication and globalization processes background. The theoretical basis of Montserrat Guibernau’s work was used as an example of the constructivist approach to the issue of identity. Anthony D. Smith’s theoretical definition of the main features of identity was verified. To answer the second research question, a general academic method of the system analysis of digital and convergent media texts that catalyzed the transformation of the Ukrainian identity was used. To answer the third research question an interpretation of the “Den” newspaper texts concerning the transformation of Ukrainian identity against the background of the Eastern Partnership dialogue was conducted.

Literature Review

Questions of identity were brought forward in a new way in Ukrainian society as a result of the Dignity Revolution, and later through the annexation of Crimea and the Russian military aggression against Ukraine (in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine). These questions are raised in the article on the theoretical basis of Monserrat Guibernau, Yaroslav Hrytsak and Zenon E. Kohut.

The importance of this topic was closely considered in the theoretical works by Jim Hall on online journalism, by Richard A. Lanham on the importance of the “electronic word,” and by Andrzej Mencwel on the tools of the multimedia communication revolution.

The basic works that relate to a solution to the digital media challenge are the overviews by such Ukrainian and foreign academics as Richard A. Lanham *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts* (Lanham, 2005), Jim Hall *Online Journalism* (Hall, 2005), the anthology of studies by Polish academics *New media in modern society* (*Nowe media we współczesnym społeczeństwie*, 2011), Valeriy Ivanov *The main theories of mass communication and journalism* (Ivanov, 2010) and Borys Potiatynyk *Online journalism: the boundaries of the profession* (Potyatynyk, 2010).

For Richard A. Lanham it is important to analyze the “basic intellectual debate of our time” as “the revival of the old debate between the philosopher and the rhetorician.” In one of his essays, he demonstrates a variety of advantages of electronic text, and all the changes brought about by the electronic word in the world around us. His assertion that the interactive reader of the electronic word represents a critical reader and the borderline between the creator and the critic simply disappears (Lanham, 2005, p. 26) substantially reinforces another point, that the book-code (Richard A. Lanham’s expression), which had its special literary and cultural etiquette, is experiencing major changes in its electronic display. Similar changes also affect textbooks and teaching materials; learning through personalization, and textbooks for democratization will appear. Any kind of help to the reader, e.g. readable support, hypertext language comments and dynamically interactive bilingual texts will expand the opportunities of linguistic minorities in the world of literature. Electronic “textbooks” will democratize education in all the arts, just like the invention of printing increased the spread of Protestantism (Lanham, 2005, p. 31), Richard A. Lanham claims. His essay “Electronic Word: Literary Research and Digital Revolution” (Lanham, 2005, pp. 22–54) clearly shows a need to rethink literary studies, and think of them as something that can penetrate society through a literary rhetoric as the West always did, but with new technologies and through new administrative structures (Lanham, 2005, p. 52).

The general guideline on online journalism, according to its author, Jim Hall, is an attempt to “span the positions of extreme technological determinism, which underplays the cultural, ideological and economic context of the Internet, and the social constructivism, which insists that technology is no more than an effect of the tectonic forces which move and shape those contexts” (Hall, 2005, p. 9). Here the author is referring to the emergence of an unlimited number of information channels for the consumer, and the fact that the Internet has a significantly larger audience than earlier media and shows signs of a revisionism of traditional journalistic values, i.e. objectivity, responsibility, reliability and impartiality.

Noting the fact that “[t]he news media were the third global professional sector, after the military complex and higher education and research, to go online,” the author analyzes new practices and understandings of online journalism, the development of an information society, and the role of online journalists. The theoretical considerations of the author are based thoroughly on the clear facts of contemporary history on both sides of the ocean. Noting the interactivity and use of multimedia, as well as direct links to vari-

ous sources, he concludes that these Internet features “can promote a deep and irreversible change in ideas about news in general” (Hall, 2005, p. 55). Exploring such a change in ideas, he shows how individuals provide information about significant international events first-hand, using online Internet access.

His reference is characteristic of the role of information on new media during the war in Kosovo. In particular, Hall addresses a number of aspects of information warfare in the Balkans (Hall, 2005, p. 125), and observes the conduct of discussions in English (Hall, 2005, p. 127), i.e. their focus on distribution around the world. Of course, network information did not stop the bombing, but it became an additional source of propaganda-free publicity. Jim Hall’s study is by no means the only one to focus on the outcomes of the war in Kosovo, but his analysis draws attention to the devastating experience of war on people’s lives and the opportunity to vividly report the disaster. The Internet has truly become a means that finally de-mystifies the relations between war and information (Hall, 2005, p. 153). News about the hostilities in Kosovo was distributed quickly, and the governmental and international organizations concerned could not restrict it. Due to the network communications of the inhabitants of different countries, one of the fundamental strategies previously used to encourage nations to war, i.e. “demonisation of opposed populations and ethnic or religious groups” (Hall, 2005, p. 130) was successfully negated.

One can agree with Hall’s conclusion that the Internet has almost made it impossible to use certain manipulated informational strategies. Nowadays, incriminating materials are frequently placed on the Internet for manipulative purposes. Although Hall made a reservation with respect to hackers’ fraudulent activities, which is not the subject of his study, it cannot be avoided upon further development of these networks. The topic of censorship on the Internet focuses on examples of restrictions on the network used in China for various population groups, as well as placing controls over input data. However, the events of the 21st century indicate that democratic countries can censor justifying it with non-disclosure and safeguarding state secrets. It is still not possible to establish full legislative control over the Internet in any country. Another important issue explored by Hall is the preservation of privacy and copyright in online journalism, and ensuring individual rights for communication to all society.

The Polish researcher, Andrzej Mencwel, identifies three features of the Internet: hypertext, interactivity, and multimedia (Mencwel, 2012, p. 306). He recalls that hypertext is the invention of an academic, referring to Tim Berners-Lee, a CERN academic (Mencwel, 2012, pp. 308–309). The “Internet in its hypertext form is a medium of interaction” (Mencwel, 2012, p. 310). Considering the impact of technical innovations on interactivity, Andrzej Mencwel indicates that the “multifaceted, continuous dynamic – verbal, iconic and phonic at same time – is all about Internet interactivity. Each part of the Internet opens a series of decisions, and in this sense is an effective and, therefore, interactive act” (Mencwel, 2012, p. 311). Referring to the encyclopedic definition of multimedia, the researcher stops at the manifestations of the “public availability of the Internet (and its multimedia successor), and in this respect the differences are the same as the differences between the richest and the poorest of societies, i.e. almost incredible, but real” (Mencwel, 2012, p. 313). Having overcome geographical obstacles, the new media remain inaccessible for many poor societies. Their revolutionary changes are still dominated by evolutionary ones. The determination of the revolutionary changes brought by

the World Wide Web is also debated. In other words, not everything related to the new media is creation and creativity. Devastating effects accompanied by rapid implementation of innovative projects are possible. Nobody can obstruct an opponent from creating messages and content that can be false and destabilizing information. Examples can be seen in the narrative of info-war, trolling.

Andrzej Mencwel wrote about this in an extremely powerful way, appealing to the paradoxical nature of the world and the dual abilities of the tools of multimedia: “the tools of multimedia communication revolution carry the whole paradox of their dual capability, i.e. global solidarity in the service of values and the grand illusion of easy happiness. Basically, what they give us on a technical and global scale, they also take away from our personal and local areas. That is why it is so important to awaken one’s own creativity versus the game of tool, identity formation against playing of roles, creation of specific relations against the anonymous technology of globalization” (Mencwel, 2012, p. 341). It is not possible in this article to extend Andrzej Mencwel’s arguments in favor of the creation and formation of a personality in the real public contacts although such beliefs are supported. After all, this is correlated with an investigated topic, i.e. the dissemination of high-quality journalism on the Internet. It is difficult to outline the clear boundaries of online-journalism. Its positive features are multimedia, interactivity, hypertextuality and convergence. New media are criticized for factual, grammatical errors and for the use of secondary information, etc.

The search for a theoretical foundation for thinking about the Ukrainian new media led us to a collection of works of Polish academics who were able to consider a number of key aspects of the dependence between the phenomenon of the new media and society. Barbara Brodzińska-Mirowska, in her *Internet in Political Communication* article, writes about the arrival of the new media in politics and their impact on the “building of new political and communication strategies” (Brodzińska-Mirowska, 2011, p. 215). Using the examples from the political history of the United States and the European Parliament, the author writes about online inter-election political marketing. It shows the dialogue with voters and ability to discuss the most important social and political issues through the new media, i.e. chat rooms, blogs, forums, and e-surveys (Brodzińska-Mirowska, 2011, pp. 213–214). She also warns against the misuse of political advertising to the detriment of public dialogue and against the provocation of information chaos.

The Ukrainian researcher Larysa Masimova summarized the earlier theoretical conclusions of Borys Potiatynyk, Maryan Lozynskyy and Kateryna Serazhym regarding text pathogenicity in general, which applies to online media as well. A microbiological term is used to highlight the damaging effect of certain texts. According to Larysa Masimova, “[t]he basis of the pathogenic text is formed by a textual strategy wasting the real time of the reader. The formal feature of such a strategy is a violation of the space-time interaction (continuum) of the text, which results in deformation of the real image of the world” (Masimova, 2010, p. 152).

The creation and use of Ukrainian electronic books is considered in the studies by Vasyl Teremko. Describing the readers’ behavior in the environment of electronic books and the establishment of a new reading culture, he encourages publishers to take this phenomenon into account, since the “viewing (scanning) of screen texts” prevails in the reading practice of this generation of “so-called visuals.” In using the expressions “digi-

tal natives” and “digital immigrants” to define such readers, Vasyl Teremko believes that in searching for required information they “refer to Internet resources, largely and reasonably believing that it saves time, effort and money. This is a style of their cognitive behavior. The mercantile aspect (expectation to use the content for free) is characteristic of half of them” (Teremko, 2011, p. 13).

Ukrainian Identity and Political Communication: a New Comprehension in Communication

The topic of this article first requires we define Ukrainian identity, its origin, development and modern interpretation. It is necessary to examine each of these aspects. A new view of Ukrainian identity supported by Ukrainian and foreign academics, unbiased by Russian ideology and worship of Russian historiography is vital for Ukraine’s future.

As was rightly noted by the Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko, in 1989–1990 the identity of a considerable part of Ukrainian intellectuals experienced a change from the provincial to the European (Andrusyak, Zabuzhko, 2014, p. 96). Yet this change took place with the substantial presence of Soviet discourse in many regions. Another problem, which was also noted by Oksana Zabuzhko, was that “neither I nor my generation in Ukraine knew what the dialogue is and how to explain ‘yourself’ to another person, a different culture” (Andrusyak, Zabuzhko, 2014, p. 126). This lack of dialogue is still evident, after more than twenty four years of Ukraine’s independence. It slows down the acceleration of Ukrainian identity, generating a loss of faith on the part of Ukraine’s population, hampering the presentation and acknowledgement of everything Ukrainian to the world.

The events of 2013–2014 have forced a return to the deeper study of Ukrainian identity in its historical and political dimensions, as a discourse of the dynamics of the Ukrainian nation. Montserrat Guibernau stated that the defining criteria of identity is continuity in time and differentiation from the other (Guibernau, 2012, p. 19). It is crucial to see that early Ukrainian identity, its psychological and cultural outpourings were distinctive and authentic. The territory of Ukraine during the 16–18th centuries fell under the Commonwealth of Poland (*Rzeczpospolita Polska*), the Grand Duchy of Moscow (*Moscovia*) and the Ottoman Empire. The scholar of Ukrainian identity Zenon E. Kohut, in his book *Roots of Identity*, focused on the formation of Ukraine’s early nationhood in the form of the Cossack Hetmanate. He writes that the “Cossack State constantly had to balance between the conflicting interests of the great powers” (Kohut, 2004, p. 17).

Montserrat Guibernau’s theory defined national identity as “a collective sense, founded on a belief in belonging to a single nation and in a commonness of most attributes that make it different from other nations. National identity is a modern phenomenon that is fluid and dynamic.” It is impossible not to notice how digital media in political communications have accelerated the formation of the Ukrainian identity (Guibernau, 2012, p. 20).

The Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak expressed a modern view on identity formation in his works: “The survey data suggests that, despite the obvious split in Ukrainian society, throughout Ukraine and in every region there is a growing segment of the population who voluntarily and willingly: (1) identify themselves with the country in

which they live; (2) consider themselves Ukrainian; (3) support the political independence of Ukraine, and (4) link their interests with its future [...] Respectively, the number of antagonists of each of these four options in the Ukrainian society makes a significant minority” (Hrytsak, 2011, p. 171). That is, the number of those who answered these questions negatively has significantly decreased.

An analytical view of the problem suggests that the referendum on the independence of Ukraine in 1991 was the beginning of a new perception of identity in Ukrainian historiography. The referendum received a more than ninety percent vote for Ukraine to separate from the USSR. Returning to that historical reality today, one must pay attention to certain numbers from the past. During Ukraine’s independence vote in 1991, the results were scattered regionally. In the Donetsk region, 83.9% of the population voted for independence. The Luhansk region was 83.8% in favor, Crimea 54.1% and in Sevastopol it was 57.0%. These figures show that tackling the nation’s identity crisis was not unified across the entire country. Public administration experts noted that there was little activity in state institutions in terms of promoting a Ukrainian identity and patriotism in these areas during the years of Ukraine’s independence. This identity crisis was made more apparent in the Donbas region and the Crimean peninsula during the Russian aggression and annexation. The Russian Federation, using military means on Ukrainian territory, continues to “restore the Empire, begun before the collapse of the USSR. This military nature shows that sovereign Russia is restoring its old ways. This is evident in separatist formations in quasi-Georgia, quasi-Moldova and quasi-Ukraine. The real states have imposed an unreal sovereignty with flawed international legal standing” (Shusharin, 2014).

The continual struggle for national identity was made more obvious after the events of November 21 and December 11, 2013, on February 18 and 20, 2014 on Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kyiv. At that time, citizens protested against the decision to postpone the signing of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. According to Iryna Bekeshkina, sociologist and director of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “around 60% of those who took part in the Maidan believe that they had won but not fully” (Semenchenko, 2014, p. 6). Based on the results of the nationwide poll conducted by the Sociology Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (SINASU) in the summer of 2014, the level of cynicism and demoralization decreased compared to 2012. Yevhen Holovakha, a researcher from SINASU, believes that “the people felt a certain dignity, the rise of patriotic sentiment. The situation is extremely complicated, though, and the level of people’s anxiety is very high, even worse than in the 1990s. This is understandable, because there is a war” (Kryvtsun, 2014). As is evident, the themes of the Maidan, Crimea and Donbas have positively affected Ukraine’s identity. This was done in various ways, thanks to digital and conventional high-quality media.

During the 21st century, questions appeared about the harmonization of Ukrainian national identity with European identity. This has since formed a pluralistic identity. Ukrainian academics are studying the problem of creating reachable goals and implementing measures under which Ukrainian citizens will identify themselves with the national state and with the supranational structure of the EU. In Ukrainian society there are still strong outpourings of a Soviet pseudo identity with nostalgia for the USSR. This, in turn, adheres to ideas of the so-called “Russian world.” In Ukraine there is no consistent

societal process of de-sovietization. This Soviet historical narrative adversely affects the formation of a national identity.

A large part of Ukrainian society, aspiring to be in some manner associated with the EU, is based on an understanding of European identity that complements the Ukrainian national identity through a qualitative impact. This is not about reformatting Ukrainian identity but about a consensual coexistence with the EU. Europe as a security force, as a single, unique economic space, offering a guarantee of human rights and democratic values, gives an example of how to build a Ukraine so that its citizens can feel both Ukrainian and European.

Through Anthony D. Smith’s theory, one can see that digital media in political communications have intensified the political dimension of Ukrainian national identity. In particular, Anthony D. Smith has formulated the main features of national identity as: “the territorial boundedness of separate cultural populations in their own ‘homelands’; the shared nature of myths of origin and historical memories of the community; the common bond of mass, standardized culture; a common territorial division of labour, with mobility for all members and ownership of resources by all members in the homeland; the possession by all members of a unified system of common legal rights and duties under common laws and institutions” (Smith, 1992, p. 60). These features remain relevant to the modern transformational development of the Ukrainian national identity.

Ukrainian Digital Media Discourse as a Factor Stimulating Ukrainian Identity

The dynamic development of communication through the Internet in Ukraine has been confirmed through statistics. “The share of regular Internet users who visited a resource at least once a month in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the same period of the last year increased to 53.4% of the population of Ukraine. This has been confirmed by the press service of the Internet Association of Ukraine (IAU), referring to the study conducted by InMind” (*The Number of Internet Users is Increased in Ukraine*, 2014).

The communicative function of the Internet in its narrative aspect, i.e. telling life stories, has allowed the tracking of Ukraine’s most recent history. Volodymyr Kulyk has noted how quickly the Internet can transfer events to different parts of the world, bringing information consumers closer to these events. Internet users can choose texts freely, and the discussion of events and information on forums gives the impression of an “undistorted representation of the position of all interested individuals and groups” (Kulyk, 2010, p. 125).

While this article was being prepared it was reported that the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine had joined the social media (UNIAN News Agency, 2014).The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine even created its account on Twitter (https://twitter.com/rnbo_gov_ua). At the same time, the President of Ukraine created a Twitter account (https://twitter.com/poroshenko). However, subsequently, due to it being extremely busy, the President officially delegated the updating of his Twitter account to the press office.

These examples above show how relevant and important this topic has become in today’s world. This is partly due to the way in which Internet development stimulates

the emergence and development of new media and their strengthening the influence of communication in Ukrainian society, formatting a Ukrainian identity. Looking at the example of the multimedia platform of the “Den” newspaper, we can see a gradual development of the periodical, catering to the requirements at the time. In terms of citizens’ reactions to important national events, these can be a spontaneous instant post on Facebook, or a tweet on Twitter, an exchange of ideas on the development of tactics and on further actions.

The beginning of the active changes in digital media was instigated by the Ukrainian consultant for Internet communication projects, Maksym Savanevsky through his blog on the “Ukrayinska Pravda” website. The changes were related to the strengthening of activity in political communications after November 21, 2013. On this day, at about 3 pm it became known that the Ukrainian government had decided to suspend negotiations with the EU on the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. This was reported over the next half hour by the top-end online media. And, as Maksym Savanevsky writes, “closer to 4 pm there was a giant leap in people accessing the news media. November 21 and November 22 experienced the highest activity on Ukrainian online media in the whole history of observations. For example, the number of people accessing the ‘Ukrayinska Pravda’ almost doubled (according to liveinternet)” (Savanevsky, 2013).

The growing importance of the digital media in political communications is evidenced by the fact that a short appeal by journalist Mustafa Nayyem on Facebook: “Let’s meet at 10.30 pm at the Independence Monument” was quickly spread. Other journalists, civil society activists and pro-Ukrainian Members of Parliament also urged those who disagreed with the suspension of negotiations with the EU to come to Independence Square, the central square in Kyiv. Maksym Savanevsky rightly observes that, on social media, people trusted the opinions of those who they considered an authority, and who they considered their relative or friend. “That’s why the role of social media in critical social situations is crucial. It is not the call of Klitschko/Yatsenyuk/Tiahnybok/Lutsenko[1] which determines whether a person will come to a protest, but whether their friends or people whom they trust are ready to do this. Internet users have a large audience of followers and are themselves followers, spreading the word. Therefore when Mustafa Nayyem, Roman Shrayk, Andriy Shevchenko, Lesya Orobets[2] and hundreds of other people wrote that they would go to Maidan, thousands then came, for they trusted them” (Savanevsky, 2013).

Facebook gave way to Twitter. The events of November 21 developed quickly and their display was supported by the ability to give brief, instant information on Twitter: “From November 21 to November 28 #euromaidan (#євромайдан) was the most popular hash-tag in Ukraine. The intensity of publications using it reached 1,500 to 3,000 messages per hour” (Savanevsky, 2013).

According to different researchers, the Euromaidan and the Dignity Revolution events in 2013–2014 were covered online by TV and radio reporters who posted their screencasts on almost twenty different addresses. Besides watching the opposition “5th Channel” and “Channel 24,” one could watch what was unfolding also on YouTube,

[1] Ukrainian politicians.

[2] Ukrainian journalists and politicians.

“Hromadske TV,” “Espreso TV,” and other separate streamers that provided streaming broadcasts of the whole protest movement on Independence Square. According to the researcher Maksym Savanevsky, “the most impressive influence was made by a dangerous mix of the ‘Ukrayinska Pravda’ and ‘Radio Liberty’. The first provided an extremely popular arena and the second performed direct video broadcasting from the sites of the most intense events.” The journalists of the new digital media and social media users had become the catalyst for manifestations of Ukrainian identity. The people felt the mobilizing factor of the media. Due to all this activity, the rally on November 24, 2013 in Kyiv attracted one hundred thousand protesters. The traditional media that supported the European aspirations of the Ukrainian people also played a positive role. However, many researchers believe that the new digital and social media played a far greater role.

In September 2014, during a Publishers’ Forum in Lviv, the Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko, together with drafters and publishers, presented the book “Witnesses’ Chronicle. Nine Months of Ukrainian Resistance.” This project arose as a result of revisiting the messages on online media. The text of the compiler says that the second Ukrainian Maidan began through social media. “It was Facebook which provided the freshest information and helped to gather people and eventually funds for victims of the Maidan and for the army reactivated by Ukrainians themselves” (Zabuzhko, Teren, 2014, p. 4). This book is a living picture of the national historical memory, the actual history of changes in the psychology of people during the peaceful protests and the national liberation war. More than one hundred authors whose works are placed in the book participated in and witnessed these tragic events of modern Ukrainian history. Their stories, poems, comments, and information present a mosaic portrait of Ukrainian identity. This identity went beyond the theoretical standards. This identity had been born through national unity and through the high dignity of these patriots. “A new national infrastructure is formed,” writes one of the authors of the Euromaidan events (Zabuzhko, Teren, 2014, p. 32). The importance of this book project is that it made it possible to read the thoughts and feelings of many ordinary witnesses of extraordinary events in modern Ukrainian history. People can read them despite the availability or unavailability of access to online media. The project is important, for it documented living history. This living history can be forgotten or lost, as the book compilers explain, because of the specific configurations of social media, and through the efforts of administrators from neighboring states, which are designed “to block, erase, and rewrite our living history” (Zabuzhko, Teren, 2014, p. 4).

The living history “was and is eradicated” from online media due to the continuation of the Soviet politics that falsified all things Ukrainian while it was a part of the USSR. This is the influence of stereotyping. The Soviet imperial myth pushed the impossibility of Ukraine’s existence outside of the Russian reality. This was also maintained and further reinforced by military aggression. The Ukrainian identity is being created in such circumstances of political communication. Online media are a good tool in this process.

The contemporary Ukrainian writer and philosopher, Ivan Dziuba, says that the European nations have gone through a strengthening of their identity during two centuries, and now they only have to adjust its development. By contrast, “Ukraine needs to create a new identity, though not from scratch, but in a much more complex environment, in terms of global integration, in an infinite space of global challenges and imperatives” (Dziuba, 2011, p. 34).

The Ukrainian “otherness” was described in the comments on social media by the authors of the “Witnesses’ Chronicles.” They wrote it as their own confession on the markers of Ukrainian identity: “Can you imagine that the Russians, every hour of an endless protest, would sing a unifying song as we sing our anthem? They just do not have such an ode. Their anthem is an instruction to whom and under what circumstances they should obey” (Zabuzhko, Teren, 2014, p. 128). The Russian propaganda pressure in Ukrainian territories generates the opposite effect, i.e. strengthening of the national unity in the face of various threats. Under these conditions, the civil society continues to develop and the political nation is cemented. According to the researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center, Lilia Shevtsova, “the Kremlin’s policy ‘from enforcement to love’ facilitated the development of Ukrainian national identity and reinforced its aspiration for strengthening its sovereignty” (Shevtsova, 2013).

Continuing their studies of the qualitative transformations of Ukrainian society, the authors of blogs and posts on social media express concern about Ukraine’s future. Will Ukrainian society and its government avoid the mistakes that have previously hindered Ukraine becoming a truly independent sovereign state? Will this nation actually unite around its prescribed democratic values? The Euromaidan and the Dignity Revolution, as well as the anti-terrorist operation in Eastern Ukraine, demonstrated a Ukrainian patriotism, dignity, and the ability to defend the ideals of justice. However, thousands of lives were lost for this position. This was a high price to pay for the political challenge. The authors of the “Witnesses’ Chronicles” offer some persuasive words: “Ironically, it all started with our desire to be Europeans. Ironically, we were distinguished from Europeans (among other things) by such a non-European feature as forgetting. Failure to build a single line of historical memory, interruption and forgetting our experiences... Those who squander the chance to become Europeans have another chance from the history... This time the price of our ignorance was too high” (Zabuzhko, Teren, 2014, p. 133).

The objective of this study is to analyze digital media, showing their activity in political communications, stimulating the development of the Ukrainian identity to some extent. One of the oldest Ukrainian online media, “Ukrayinska Pravda,” began as an informative source. However, its topics eventually expanded, and now, this multidisciplinary resource is rich, in particular, in high-quality opinion journalism articles, and has such current columns as “Istorychna Pravda,” and “Yevropeyska Pravda” [European Truth].

The collection of video clips of “Istorychna Pravda:” “The Orange Revolution: 20 Memorable Videos” has attracted attention for the large number of views. The collection editors wrote that in 2004, when the Orange Revolution was going on, when the people stood for fair elections in Kyiv at Independence Square, “there was no YouTube or similar services. One had to post a video on certain servers in a particular format (.wmv, .mp4 etc.), and then pass the link for viewers to download and watch. Therefore those videos did not go viral. The situation was changed by the ‘5 Kanal’ [5th Channel],[3] which started posting the latest videos on its website. They were downloaded and discussed” (*The Orange Revolution: 20 remembered videos*, 2010). Many articles on the “Istorychna Pravda” column are consolidated by the idea of stories about the Ukrainian quality (nature), the fates of the prominent Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian identity. One

[3] The Ukrainian TV Channel.

of the publications is the Inaugural Speech of the leading American historian, professor of Yale University, Timothy Snyder, on the occasion of the new academic year at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv: “The historian does not possess the truth, is not necessarily sure to find it, but is searching for it.” This is a vivid manifestation of the integrative humanitarian project. This Yale University professor, one of the most respected experts on Eastern Europe, put much effort into the study of Ukraine’s newest history. The international conference “Ukraine: Thinking Together” organized by Timothy Snyder in May 2014 was widely shown on digital media, on the website of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the “Krytyka. The International Review of Books” [Critics] online magazine distributed it widely on Facebook. Timothy Snyder’s speech dealt with the Ukrainian nation as a European one, and therefore the Ukrainian future being a European future. “I talk about how the nature of the European challenge has changed and what, in my opinion, it is now,” Timothy Snyder said (Snyder, 2014, p. 39).

There is an important relationship between digital and paper media. In this case, it is in the form of a book. From December 2013 to August 2014, Timothy Snyder published several articles on Ukrainian events in the context of European history. His texts reached Ukrainian readers via different websites from European media. Now they, and the text of the lecture given at the International Conference have been compiled in the book “Ukrainian History, Russian Politics, European Future” (Snyder, 2014).

There is another aspect little explored by Ukrainian researchers and academics regarding the use of digital media in communications. The role of intellectual and pop culture leaders of the nation has also influenced Ukraine’s identity. For example, on August 24, 2014, on Ukraine’s Independence Day, a concert by one of the most popular Ukrainian rock bands Okean Elzy in Lviv, was broadcast live on “1+1” TV Channel.[4] However, the audience compiled the playlist for this concert. On the eve of the concert the website of “1+1” TV Channel arranged for online voting. The Internet users chose 23 songs that “Ukraine heard on its birthday.” The bandleader, Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, spoke eloquently about the unity of the people and the faith of the future of the state between songs. Over 40,000 attendees of this concert sang Ukraine’s national anthem during the concert (*Okean Elzy. Concert in Lviv. Anthem of Ukraine*, 2014). Earlier, on December 14, 2013, Okean Elzy gave a free concert at Euromaidan (Independence Square) in Kyiv. On the eve of the concert, the frontman Svyatoslav Vakarchuk wrote on his Twitter account: “The important things unite people.” The videos and photos from the concert, where roughly 200,000 people (according to unofficial estimates) gathered in the central square of the capital of Ukraine and sang the national anthem together, were reposted on social media (Anthem of Ukraine on Euromaidan) (*Okean Elzy*, 2013).

Videos and photos from the different events can be seen in the area of digital media. The video by “Radio Liberty” journalist, Andriy Dubchak, “Rally in #Euromaidan,” became a finalist in the international competition The Lovie Awards. The mission of the Lovie Awards is “to recognize the unique and resonant nature of the European Internet community – from Europe’s top web and creative networks and content publishers, to cultural and political organizations and bedroom bloggers” (*The Lovie Awards*, 2014).

[4] The Ukrainian TV Channel.

According to “Radio Liberty” and “Telekritika” [TVCritics] websites, this video was posted on Internet sites and broadcast by such world media as ABC News, CBN News, CNN, “The New York Times”, “The Washington Post”, etc. The video was shared on Facebook more than 10,000 times. On the “Radio Liberty” website, it was viewed over 100,000 times (*The video shot by Radio Liberty from the “Christmas tree” on the Maidan, has got into the final of the international competition*, 2014).

Research into media discourse discloses new approaches to analyzing the actual ideas that authors present in their works. Ewa M. Thompson, in her work “Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism” rightly took note that “literature is a very important building block to express the national identity” (Thompson, 2006, p. 31). In other words, the opinion journalism in the high-quality Ukrainian media plays the same crucial role in digital media.

Convergent Media: Ukrainian-Polish Dialogue as a Part of Identity Formation

It is not possible to consider digital media separately from the phenomenon of online platforms of traditional paper periodicals. The example of high-quality Ukrainian symbiosis between traditional and new, the convergence of both media, is the “Den” newspaper. It features Ukrainian, Russian and English versions in paper and online media. The books published by it also consist of articles in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and English. The newspaper website is maintained in three languages. The site has a news column, blogs, “Den-TV” posting live footage and studio conversations, photo reports, announcements of creative events of the “Den” newspaper, i.e. photo exhibitions, editor’s meetings with Ukrainian university students, presentations of books containing the journalistic articles of the newspaper, as well as reprints of works of the outstanding Ukrainian philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The topics of the “Den” newspaper website in some cases are wider than in the paper version. It focuses on humanitarian, international, historical, state, religious, economic and urban issues. The newspaper consistently highlights the various aspects of relations between Poland and Ukraine at different historical stages. Not claiming a consistent historical plan, the authors of journalistic studies create a mosaic picture of the events and facts which are the least studied by Ukrainian historians of the 20th century. A separate topic covers the journalistic articles by Oxana Pachlowska about whether the relations between Ukraine and Poland were within “new civilizational contexts” after the collapse of the communist regimes (Pachlowska, 2012, p. 524). Oxana Pachlowska sees the problems of a Ukrainian blurred with a “virtual” European integration state as follows: “If there is no European perspective in the cultural mentality of society and its elites, no convincing program of the European integration can appear at the subsequent institutional level” (Pachlowska, 2012, p. 527). This narrative, in fact, creates the topics of high-quality journalism articles, which are consistently and tirelessly defining the European perspective of society and presenting the Ukrainian identity as a process influenced by the Polish experience. Although such an axiological approach is taken by a small part of Ukrainian media, it is noticeable and significant from the point of view of communicative interaction between the author and the reader.

Several analytical articles in the “Den” newspaper were related to the activities of Symon Petliura and Józef Piłsudski. The Ukrainian academic arsenal contains rather a lot of works about these individuals, their contribution to the construction of their own independent states and the formation of nations. However, in their temporal and spatial perception, these historical figures appear ambiguous. For Poland and for Poles, Józef Piłsudski is a hero enjoying the appropriate respect in the society. In Ukraine, the issue of honoring Symon Petliura is still under discussion. These “differences” give food for thought to speculation and ambiguity in the emerging Ukrainian civil society. The authors of the “Den” newspaper try to find answers to the causes and consequences of the lost opportunities for Ukrainian statebuilding against the background of the development and progress of Poland.

The consideration of “understanding and reconciliation” problems in the “Den” newspaper contributed to the emergence of books on the subject, published and reprinted in Ukrainian and Polish. This rewarding experience found no great response from the Ukrainian media. As was noted by Andrzej Paczkowski, the academic discussions of Ukrainian and Polish historians have bigger audiences in Poland since they are broadcast on the main channels in Poland (Paczkowski, 2014, p. 151).

In Ukraine, where national identity is continuing to be formed, it is important that the convergent media, such as the “Den” newspaper, appeal to the topics of Ukrainian-Polish neighborhood, with a new reading of the historical memory of Ukrainians and Poles, and a pluralistic coordination of national identities within a European one.

The Ukrainian researchers presenting articles in the printed media, for example, explain the paradox of a Ukrainian understanding of the individual’s role in the development of the post-colonial and post-genocidal state of Ukrainian society through the lack of a sufficient number of members of the Ukrainian intellectual elite in public posts, the inertia of public organizations and right-wing political parties, geopolitical processes, a weakness of propaganda reasoning in the media, and a not fully formed identity, through linguistic, cultural and religious means.

These developments should not be rejected, but it is advisable to refer to the opinion of the Polish historian, Ewa Domanska: “The point is that, based on worldwide trends prevailing in contemporary humanities, and the use of selected theories as an interpretative framework, it enables a formulation of projects and initial research questions to seek the articulation of their own theoretical proposals which could enter the humanitarian and international circulation and contribute to building a diverse knowledge of the past and surrounding reality” (Domanska, 2012, p. 212).

The multidimensional interpretation of Ewa Domanska covers the general issues of contemporary humanities. The problems that we study represent a certain segment of the humanities. Therefore, it is right to consider the conclusion of this researcher and outline the search for new tools to address this issue. A useful tool that could measure up to these modern theoretical principles is the concept of the Europeanization of Ukrainian digital media as a strategy for high-quality media.

The concept of Europeanization finds a detailed examination in the paper by Rainer Eising, “Europeanization and Integration: EU Research Concepts” (Eising, 2007, pp. 255–274). It is difficult to agree with his conclusion that Europeanization “is not a fundamental innovative concept” (Eising, 2007, p. 272), since it is ill founded. Europeanization can only partly be seen as a consequence of European integration in relation to

legislative functions in a number of countries that joined the EU. The national development of the country is changing under the influence of the European integration process, and at some higher stage the signs of Europeanization appear. The European integration processes in the media, along with other aspects, form new communication features. The Europeanization motifs are qualitatively new topics in the development of the modern paradigm of the digital media.

Expanding the overall concept of Europeanization, one can state that Ukrainian authors’ articles demonstrate innovations in overcoming the temporal gaps in the treatment of the state-society-man triad and the ability to go beyond the stereotypes of the past in terms of a Ukrainian identity. The same applies to the interpretation of the past and present of Ukraine and Poland in the publications of the high-quality Ukrainian media.

The “Ukrainskiy Tyzhden” magazine, in addition to a paper version, also has an Internet site which is quite popular among readers. The topics of the Ukrainian identity formation under the influence of the European and historical compatibility of national circumstances and European standards prevail. The authors of columns and articles under “The World” heading often include Polish academics, foreign journalists, and politicians. Based on the modern definition of publications as texts on “all topics,” which “do not necessarily feature a political and ideological mode of formulation,” it is possible to reach conclusions about the impact of the studied texts on the public consciousness and public opinion in general, and to improve media communications (according to Natalia Klushina) (Klushina, 2008, p. 6).

On the webpage of the “Ukrainskyi tyzhden” magazine and in its paper edition are Edward Lucas’s columns. Well-grounded criticism of the crisis of European security and of the mistakes and weaknesses of the Western countries toward the Central and Eastern European countries can be found in his texts. Edward Lucas criticizes the indifference of Western politicians towards protecting the European values of Ukrainian people against the Russian military aggression that is being waged on the Eastern border of Ukraine.

It is viable then to state that the practical importance of topics raised by the “Den” newspaper is to study Ukrainian-Polish relations as an academic dialogue against the background of the reinforcement of Ukrainian identity in political communications using digital media tools and upgrading the traditional paper media. The Polish journalist and publisher, Adam Michnik, in the preface to the Polish language edition of the collection of articles of the “Den” newspaper *Wars and Peace. Ukrainians and Poles: Brothers/ Enemies, Neighbors*... (*Wojny a pokoj. Ukraińcy i Polacy: bracia/wrogowie, sąsiedzi*...) said the following on the matter: “Ukraine and Poland are two large countries situated between Russia and Germany. Our relationship determines many things. A conversation about this history is difficult but necessary. The task is to direct our minds to the future, to realize how many shared values and interests we have, and how much we can achieve together” (Michnik, 2004, p. 3).

Conclusions

Digital media have led to new demonstrations of Ukrainian identity and its new formation with new political realities. Digital media were at the forefront of operational

information about the events of the political life of the state. Political, social and state institutions have focused on communication with citizens over the Internet, including social media, blogs and columns in online media. The creation of political change in the country could be seen live thanks to video streams in real time, such as those we saw during the Euromaidan and the Dignity Revolution in Kyiv. During the occupation of Crimea, amateur video reports regularly and promptly appeared on YouTube as a manifestation of citizen journalism, as well as professional journalistic video reports that covered the events in more detail. All this created a catalyzing effect on positive changes in the Ukrainian identity.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion in the Donbas regions of Eastern Ukraine, there has been a grassroots volunteer movement to raise funds and resources to help the Ukrainian army, treat the wounded soldiers, support the families of fallen warriors and civilian casualties. Social media have intensified, especially through Facebook, aiding resettling refugees who have been affected by war, due to the Russian military aggression against Ukraine.

The political and social changes and challenges of 2013 and 2014 united Ukrainian citizens for a common purpose. The idea of unity through national identity has fended off the enemy and aggressor from doing further damage to Ukraine’s existence, thus allowing Ukraine’s independence to further succeed. The Internet, new media, and social media have become the most expeditious and convenient means of communication, through the dissemination of ideas and information. They have become partially an accessorial means of unifying a nation and of a strengthening of the Ukrainian identity.

As the hybrid war continues on the battlefield and within the information space of Ukraine, the same channels of digital media will disseminate false, fake or provocative information in order to sow discord among those who are united, and discredit the main ideas of the struggle and of Ukrainian identity, effectively trying to disconnect Ukraine’s national identity.

In conclusion, agreeing with the thesis of Montserrat Guibernau, Ukrainian identity at this stage features fluidity and dynamism. Based on the analysis of digital and convergent media, we can claim that there is currently no ground to speak about a crisis of Ukrainian identity. However, the information war led by Russia, aiming, among other things, at destroying Ukrainian national identity, has intensified in Russian political communication.

The high-quality digital media used in Ukraine have taken on an innovative position of pluralism, ultimately adapting to a European national identity, or at least cruising on a parallel trajectory with Europe. The European – Eastern Partnership dialogue in the media has stimulated a transformation of the Ukrainian identity. The issue of Ukraine’s reality of Europeanization and integrating into European processes is key to digital media. They are developing new strategies for the successful reinforcement of a Ukrainian identity. The dynamic development of the digital media is also aimed at strengthening the Ukrainian national identity in political communications. This is demonstrated by the website named Euromaidan. Launched in 2014, it has been liked by over 300,000 Facebook users. On August 24, 2014, the first Ukrainian private TV Channel Ukraine Today, began broadcasting. It strives to report events in Ukraine in English only. The *Likbez. Istorychniy front* [*Likbez. Historical front*] website http://likbez.org.ua/en/ has also been

created. It features Ukrainian historians debunking common Russian myths about Ukrainian history. In the spring of 2014, the Ukrainian journalistic community created a site http://www.stopfake.org/ (in Russian and English), where it debunks false information spread by the Russian media about events in Ukraine. This information war is truly a hard-fought battlefield. Other new projects, which include publishing of books based on the digital media texts, are also essential. The Ukrainian high-quality digital media, maintaining the traditions of free media, have reached a high level in analyzing the facts truthfully and adequately reflecting Ukraine’s political processes and its involvement in international events. With a wide array of topics mixed with a competitive and creative environment, Ukrainian digital media will ensure their popularity, as well as a rise in the number of their users.

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Wpływ komunikacji politycznej na transformację tożsamości: refleksja w ukraińskim dyskursie mediów cyfrowych

Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia nowe procesy obecne w ukraińskim dyskursie mediów cyfrowych. Teksty opublikowane w ukraińskich mediach cyfrowych w latach 2013–2015 aktywnie zajmowały się problemem transformacji ukraińskiej tożsamości, a celem artykułu jest ukazanie ich roli w tej transformacji. W tym celu przedstawiono przegląd współczesnych medialnych interpretacji ukraińskiej tożsamości, pokazano katalizujący wpływ mediów cyfrowych na jej transformację i pokazano, że dialog na temat integracji europejskiej w ramach Partnerstwa Wschodniego stymuluje transformację ukraińskiej tożsamości (z wykorzystaniem tekstów z mediów konwergentnych, takich jak gazeta „Den” [Dzień]).

Teoretyczne podstawy tego artykułu stanowią prace wybitnych uczonych w zakresie wpływu mediów cyfrowych na różne zmiany społeczne. Dotyczy to takich badaczy jak Jim Hall w dziedzinie dziennikarstwa internetowego, Wołodymyr Kulyk w dziedzinie obiektywizmu mediów cyfrowych, Richard A. Lanham zajmujący się tym jak ważne jest „słowo elektroniczne” i Andrzej Mencwel mówiący o narzędziach rewolucji komunikacji multimedialnej. Kwestie tożsamości zostały poruszone w artykule na podstawie teorii Monserrat Guibernau, Jarosława Hrytsaka i Zenona E. Kohuta.

Mobilizujący wpływ mediów cyfrowych na społeczeństwo znajduje odzwierciedlenie w tekstach ukazujących się w czasie trwania ukraińskiego Euromajdanu i „rewolucji godności” w mediach tradycyjnych i internetowych. Autorami tekstów publikowanych w mediach cyfrowych są historyk Timothy Snyder, pisarka Oksana Zabużko i ekspert w zakresie komunikacji internetowej, Maksym Savanevsky.

Wykorzystanie mediów cyfrowych w komunikacji politycznej wykształciło nowe przejawy tożsamości ukraińskiej i dostosowało ją do nowych realiów politycznych. Media cyfrowe znalazły się w czołówce mediów informujących o wydarzeniach z życia politycznego państwa. Instytucje polityczne, społeczne i państwowe koncentrują się na komunikacji z obywatelami za pośrednictwem Internetu, w tym mediów społecznościowych, blogów i kolumn w mediach internetowych.

Wysokiej jakości media cyfrowe wykorzystywane na Ukrainie zajęły innowacyjne stanowisko pluralistyczne, dostosowując się do europejskiej tożsamości narodowej lub przynajmniej idąc w tym samym co reszta Europy kierunku. Prowadzony w mediach dialog na temat integracji europejskiej w ramach Partnerstwa Wschodniego stymuluje transformację ukraińskiej tożsamości.

Istotne są również inne nowe projekty, w tym publikacja książek opartych na tekstach pochodzących z mediów cyfrowych. Ukraińskie media cyfrowe wysokiej jakości, podtrzymując tradycje wolnych mediów, osiągnęły wysoki poziom odpowiadającej prawdzie analizy faktów i adekwatnie odzwierciedlają procesy polityczne na Ukrainie i jej zaangażowanie w wydarzenia międzynarodowe.

Słowa kluczowe: komunikacja, tożsamość, informacja, media cyfrowe

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Media ownership regulation in Europe – a threat or opportunity for freedom of speech?

Abstract: This study analyses regulatory solutions at the level of the European Union, and Poland in particular. This issue is variously regulated in the national laws of many member states of the European Union. The fundamental objective of such restrictions should be the intention to ensure pluralism in the media. It is not the phenomenon of media concentration that poses a threat to freedom of expression but it is its scale.

Key words: media concentration, media ownership, freedom of speech, media freedom

Starting from the 1980s, it has been observed that in the doctrine of the European Union member countries there is an issue of the concentration of capital as a source of potential threat to freedom of expression in the media (Reville, 1991, pp. 78–82; Doyle, 1995, p. 38; Goban-Klas, 2001, p. 411). The formulated view states that one of the prerequisites for freedom of expression, thus freedom of the press, is ensuring mechanisms of fair competition in this market (Pope, 1999, p. 193). There are many reasons for concentration trends: competitive pressure, globalisation, development of expensive technologies, and limited access to resources such as good-quality programmes. Therefore, economic reasons are of the utmost importance in that case. In order to support this thesis, one should refer to a phenomenon called the spiral of circulation which means possessing much greater capital by the press concerns which when trying to increase the audience market offer more attractive products, what, in turn, results in an increase of audience and deprives competitors of audience. In this respect, the printed press market and the electronic media market look slightly different. The process of concentration on the market of newspapers and periodicals is caused by limited state intervention in the process of creating a new press outlet, whereas the process of concession on the television market contributes to that. Normally, state intervention is different on the broadcasting market and the television one in particular, than on the printed press market. In the first case, legal restrictions are introduced in the form of antitrust law, limits in terms of the amount of foreign capital, programme standards and the concession system, while in the second case, interference appears in an indirect form, through subsidies, soft loans and tax exemptions (Mrozowski, 2001, pp. 162–168). In fact, it is completely different in terms of the new media market where state intervention is either entirely eliminated or limited.

This study analyses regulatory solutions at the level of the European Union as well as selected countries, Poland in particular. This issue is variously regulated in the national laws of many member states of the European Union. The fundamental objective of such restrictions should be the intention to ensure pluralism in the media. It is not the

phenomenon of media concentration that poses a threat to freedom of expression but it is its scale.

The process of the concentration of capital in the media undertakings cannot be perceived as an entirely negative phenomenon (Flankowska, 2002, p. 124; Kreft, 2015, p. 74). On the one hand, this phenomenon can limit the tendency for diversifying the media offer also in terms of showing social differences, being open to various points of view on specific issues as well as possibilities of choice of subjects (Mrozowski, 2001, p. 164), and it can lead to limitation or even elimination of media pluralism (Doyle, 1995, p. 39). On the other hand, some positive aspects of the process can be also pointed out, including reduction of operational costs, better investment risk management, access to new capitals, enhancement of work efficiency and expenditure on developmental research, etc. (Miąsik, 2000, p. 92–93; Zielińska-Folcholc, 2003, pp. 52–53). First of all, the essence of the issue comes down to the extent of concentration. Paradoxically, the principles of the free market enable reaching such a position when, consequently, this entity reduces competition of others.

The term *pluralism of mass media* itself is disputable. Speaking of that term, one can mean its internal or external aspects. Generally, it is agreed that „pluralism of mass media consists in access to the media market and freedom of choice between programmes representing various socio-political and economic thoughts” (Miąsik, 2000, p. 94). However, this concept can be understood internally as a situation where the broadcaster (or the publisher) offers a programme or paper open to diverse views, and that is the key to building the content of the programme or paper. It is also possible to focus on the external aspect which is understood as enabling the possibility of the formation and functioning of multiple information channels, or newspapers presenting different options.

The term *concentration* can be also ambiguous. Therefore, it should be noted that there is a distinction between the so-called monomedia concentration also referred to as horizontal and multimedia concentration (inter-media or vertical). The first term describes the phenomenon of merging the media from the same sector. Whereas the latter one refers to a situation when media companies that operate in different sectors (dailies, magazines, terrestrial, satellite, cable television, Internet service providers, video service providers, film producers) are being merged. Sometimes, the term vertical concentration is understood as the process of combining media companies with entities cooperating with that market, e.g. distribution, advertising. There are also cases of cross-media (diagonal, conglomerate) concentration where media companies and institutions from other sectors of the economy (e.g. financial institutions) are merged. In that last case, one should also consider what type of concentration may be a threat to the freedom of expression in the digital age (Zielińska-Folcholc, 2003, p. 163; Doktorowicz, 2002, pp. 57–58).

In Europe, the issue of media concentration appeared at the beginning of the 1980s. At that time, as a result of deregulatory processes, especially visible in the broadcasting sector, public broadcasters lost their monopoly and commercial entities emerged (Hrvatin, Petković, 2005, p. 15; Pampanin, 1997, p. 44). The process has intensified over the last decades, especially when the so-called new media were being introduced to the market (Mik, 2007, pp. 39–51). Deregulation of the audiovisual sector paradoxically helps to achieve such a position by market players that they start to threaten the principles of

freedom of competition and the existence of other entities of this sector (Feintuck, Varney, 2006, pp. 20–30). The task of countries is to develop mechanisms to protect against limiting competition, and ensure pluralism in the media (Gibbons, 1992, pp. 220–229; Dragomir, Thompson, 2008, pp. 44–51).

In terms of the European regulations, special attention should be paid to the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to the Member States of the Council of Europe on media pluralism and diversity of media content adopted on 31 January 2007,[1] as threats from new content distribution platforms and practices by operators of EPG, CAS and API were identified. The phenomenon described above had aroused the EU’s interest even during the ‘pre-digital’ era[2] (Mik, 1999, p. 323; Skoczny, 2010, pp. 693–702; Papathanassopoulos, 2004, p. 110–124; Thoth, 2008, pp. 143–183, 234–235; Klimkiewicz, 2005, pp. 4–8). Here, the European Parliament resolution of 15 February 1990 on media takeovers and mergers[3] (Paraschos, 1998, pp. 181–183) is also worth mentioning. There was a demand directed to the European Commission to devise a *sui generis* regulation addressed to media undertakings. It was argued that applying general control principles of the concentration of capital is insufficient bearing in mind the specificity, role and tasks of the media in democratic European societies. As a result, on 23 December 1992, the Commission adopted the Green Paper entitled ‘Pluralism and media concentration in the internal market – an assessment of the need for community action’[4] (Doyle, 1995, p. 39; Mik, 1999, pp. 486–488), where a very conservative and irresolute position was presented. It resulted from various reasons. It was observed that adopting a *sui generis* regulation at the European level had been hindered due to legislative differences in particular countries. Secondly, the EU was often accused of lack of competence in this respect. Then, on 20 January 1994, the European Parliament adopted the resolution on pluralism and media concentration in which a thesis was included emphasising the necessity of establishing independent authorities for media-related matters and issuing a document harmonizing national law in this respect Ainsworth. The consultation process ended with the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee of 1995 including the report from the mentioned debates. It can be concluded from the document that it is necessary to set the upper limit at the level of 30% of the market share in terms of monomedia concentration and 10% for multimedia concentration. Therefore, the restriction would be based on the criterion of channel audience. The geographical market of reference would be an area where channels of given stations are received. Such a premise would stem from the conviction that in order to ensure pluralism, it is necessary to create conditions for the functioning of at least 4 entities in a given market sector, and in the case of the general market – 10 broadcasters. In 1997, reservations were expressed that these limits should

[1] Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states *on media pluralism and diversity of media content, adopted by Committee of Monisters on 31 January 2007 at the 985th meeting of the Ministers` Deputies*, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1089699.

[2] The institution of control of concentration of undertakings is one of several institutions (such as prohibition of collusion, of abuse of a dominant position, of state support) making up EU competition law.

[3] OJ 1990, C 068 19.03.1990, pp. 137–138.

[4] *Pluralism And Media Concentration In The Internal Market – An assessment of the need for Community action*, COM (1992) 480 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1992:0480:FIN:NL:PDF. See more G. Doyle, 1995, p. 39; Mik, 1999, pp. 486–488.

not be applicable to broadcasters exceeding limits in just one country. However, it has not been decided yet to adopt a separate regulation on the discussed issue. (Zielińska-Folcholc, p. 57).

On 18 November 2002, the European Parliament adopted the resolution on media concentration obliging the European Commission to take action with regard to media capital concentration in the digital era. It was emphasised there that “the development of new technology and of new communications and information services should respect and guarantee the maintenance of media pluralism, cultural diversity and democratic values” (Waniek, p. 208). Whereas, in the Communication on the future of European regulatory audiovisual policy[5] adopted in December 2003, it was stated again that, on the one hand, protection of pluralism is a task that the member states are responsible for, but, on the other hand, it is possible to apply European regulations on preventing the concentration of capital. The thesis was deemed legitimate, although the Community’s standards mainly refer to ensuring prerequisites for competition on the economic markets (Waniek, p. 209). On 16 January 2007, the European Commission adopted a working document entitled “Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union.”[6] Thus, this way it was informed that the plan to be executed in three stages was adopted. Firstly, the intention was to devise a report concerning the media market in the EU, secondly, to verify media pluralism and, thirdly, to develop guidelines for states, which according to the above criteria, would not comply with the standards (Waniek, p. 218–219). It should be noted that the general declaration of media pluralism was included in Article 11.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[7] (Hrvatin, Petković, p. 14). Due to no detailed regulations regarding the media sector, the legal basis for its control was Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[8] and, in particular, the Regulation of the Council of the European Communities No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings[9] (Skoczny, p. 747–763; Goldberg, Prosser, Verhulst, p 89; Mik, pp. 476–488). In the doctrine of the European Union competition law, the view is formulated that “the operation of the concentration of capital is incompatible with the common market when it creates or enhances a dominant position leading to a considerable obstacle to effective competition on the common market or its significant part” (Mik, p. 476). From the

[5] *The future of European Regulatory Audiovisual Policy*, COM (2003) 784. See more S. Gorini, *European Commission: Communication on the Future of European Regulatory Audiovisual Policy*, IRIS Merlin, http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2004/1/article10.en.html.

[6] Commission staff working document, *Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union* (SEC/2007/32).

[7] The Chapter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012/C 326/02.

[8] Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Protocols – Annexes – Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 – Tables of equivalences, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001-0390 art. 101 (to dawny 81 TWE) i art. 102 (dawny 82 TWE).

[9] Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 *on the control of concentrations between undertakings*, OJ 1990 C 2003/10; Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 *on the control of concentrations between undertakings*, OJ L 180, 9.7.1997, pp. 1–6.

point of view of the EU law, such a threat can be considered only when the phenomenon of the concentration of undertakings reaches the level and scale of the Community. Currently, the issue is regulated by the European Council Regulation No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.[10] The document defines that concentration occurs when there is a lasting change in the control of a given entity arising from merging two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings. An activity that will be also deemed such a change is taking direct or indirect, full or partial control of other undertakings by a person controlling at least one undertaking. Furthermore, the conditions for concentration are also met when a common undertaking that permanently serves all functions of an independent business entity is established.

Domestic regulations in the EU member states on the control of concentration focus on the economic aspect of the issue. The main element is the **market position** (the market share) of participants of concentration before and after the transaction as well as the possibility of a negative influence on remaining market participants and the state of competition. Generally, a premise that makes accepting concentration impossible is deemed to be a significant restriction of effective competition, what, in particular, can mean obtaining or strengthening a **dominant position** in the market. A dominant position in specific jurisdictions is variously defined, but, as a rule, it is understood as a capacity to prevent effective competition on the market and the possibility of operating regardless of competitors, contracting parties and consumers. Then, it is deemed that a formal indicator of a dominant position is a market share of over 40%. A crucial issue is to establish what elements should be decisive in defining the position of legal entities on the market (the market of content providers, audience, advertising, distribution platforms).

Nevertheless, the question of the „nationality” of the capital of media companies is a completely separate issue. As with the analysis of media concentration, today there is no reliable research, thus evidence, that this factor directly or indirectly influences the transmitted content, and certainly not the freedom and pluralism of the media. In this situation, this issue should be subject to in-depth research, however, it should be immediately recognized that, from the point of view of European Union law, measures restricting the investment rights of legal entities from EU member states would infringe one of the foundations of the Union, in particular, Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – which states that „within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited”. Such solutions could be possibly applicable to investors coming from non-EU countries (Piątek, Dziomdziora, Wojciechowski, 2014, pp. 375–376).

In Poland (Kowalski, 2002, p. 28; Szynol, 2008, p. 44; Jurczyk, 2015, pp. 139–140), Article 36.2.2 of the Broadcasting Act (however, ‘Polish press law’ completely omits the issue of concentration) (Klimkiewicz, 2005, p. 53) states that concession is not granted if broadcasting by a petitioner could result in his achieving a dominant position with respect to means of mass communication in a given area. On the other hand, pursuant to Article 38 of this Act, concession may be revoked if broadcasting causes a broadcaster to

[10] See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 *on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)*, O.J. 29.01.2004, L 24, pp. 1–61.

achieve a dominant position in a given area (Sobczak 2001, pp. 443–444 and 456–458; Nowińska, du Vall, 1997, pp. 47–53).

The term ‘dominant position’ is defined in Article 4.10 of the Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection[11] (Skoczny, 2010, pp. 15–20; Banasiński, 2009, p. 9). According to this provision, it is a position of an undertaking which allows it to prevent effective competition in a relevant market by creating possibilities to act in a considerable way regardless of competitors, contracting parties and consumers. It is assumed that an undertaking has a dominant position if its market share exceeds 40%. As it results from the above, existing regulations relate only to monomedia and multimedia concentration and completely omit the possibility of controlling the phenomenon of vertical and multi-sector concentration (Klimkiewicz, 2005, p. 52). From the point of view of new technologies on the Polish market, it is worth mentioning the decision of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection approving the establishment of the company Polski Operator Telewizyjny [Polish Television Operator] by TVN and Polsat stations which should offer services of digital transmission of programmes (Waniek, pp. 215–216.)

Technological progress brings about new challenges in this field. Media convergence, digitalisation and globalisation are phenomena creating favourable conditions for the concentration of capital and media management (Gruszecki, 2007, p. 58; Beliczyński, 2004, p. 38). It happens, for instance, because the adopted marketing models more frequently aim at offering services of various sectors, e.g. in triple play service (Tassel, pp. 484–503).

Concentration in the discussed sector can mean: concluding obligatory adhesion agreements for a long period, further bundling of programme offers, that is combining many services (e.g. telephone, television, radio, the Internet), using electronic programme guides to promote just one’s own offer (Popa, 2004, pp. 4–5; Nikoltchev, p. 15).

Current regulations, especially lack of separate regulations taking account of the specificity of the media and new media markets, are insufficient when faced with dramatic transformations arising from the development of digital technologies. Competition between the market participants in a new environment can lead to a situation where, if there are no applicable legal regulations, each operator of a given platform ensures completely different technical equipment standards (EPG, API and CA in particular). It will enable the reception of their offers but make free migration of audience through various contents impossible.

In 2017, the Polish ruling party Law and Justice proposed a public debate about that and announced a new regulation on that issue. However, there is a risk that it is just the pretext for re-polonization of the media in Poland, which could mean eliminating foreign media concerns from the Polish market. The presentation will also focus on details of new legislative proposals and their possible consequences as well as threats to freedom of expression.

It follows from the above that appropriate separate provisions on the regulation of capital concentration in the mass media seem necessary as the current general antitrust laws prove to be insufficient. Such solutions are available in many EU countries. It

[11] The Law on Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 February 2007 (Dz. U. No. 50, poz. 331).

should be stressed out, however, that the primary and only objective of such restrictions should be the willingness to ensure pluralism in the media. Therefore, despite lobbying of some interest groups, we should reiterate the thesis resulting from the debate that took place almost in the whole Europe stating that a defined scale of capital concentration in media companies can be a threat to the freedom of expression. The most problematic part of this issue is balancing and establishing an appropriate ratio between the intervention of legislators that restricts the possibility of merging business entities and the possibility of free development, especially of national broadcasters. Hence, any further draft law on this issue is so complex and delicate that it should be preceded by a broad debate on this subject, and preferably by reaching a consensus among major media market institutions and entities. There are different models and solutions available. However, the most important thing is that, by acting within an open social dialogue, not to lose the chance of reaching a consensus among all concerned parties. It is important to trust that the compromise, in the name of the constitutionally guaranteed principle of the freedom of expression, is still possible for all major media market entities.

What turns out to be problematic is specifying and determining the relevant markets on which the concentration scale assessment is being conducted. It is possible to analyse such elements as turnover, sales (circulation, audience, recipients, advertisers). From the point of view of media pluralism, the indicator of market for transferred ideas, and thus the impact on the audience, could be more important. However, there is a fundamental concern about how to measure this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, the question of the „nationality” of the capital of media companies is a completely separate issue. First of all, it is difficult to determine, in the international investment market, what the „nationality” of capital is as investors usually have international funds with a complex, and certainly multi-national, ownership structure. Moreover, it should be noted that from the point of view of European Union law, solutions that would restrict the investment rights of legal entities established in the EU would undermine one of the foundations of the Union, in particular, Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,[12] according to which all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries are prohibited. Possibly, such solutions could apply to investors coming from non-EU countries, what has already functioned in the current act on radio and television in Poland (Piątek, Dziomdziora, Wojciechowski, 2014, pp. 375–376). If similar solutions (for non-EU investors) were extended to other media markets (e.g. the press, the Internet), a question would arise as to what authority would be entitled to it and what measures it would be authorized to use. In the case of online transmissions, the introduction of such regulations and mechanisms would be a far more challenging task, given the global nature of the Internet and the current position of global players. According to the latest announcements from October 2017, the ruling party has suspended work on these regulations. But it did not cancel their work on them. Therefore, the issue will come back soon.

[12] Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Protocols – Annexes – Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 – Tables of equivalences, O.J. C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001-0390.

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Regulacja własności mediów w Europie – zagrożenie czy szansa na wolność słowa?

Streszczenie

Opracowanie dotyka kwestii pluralizmu, własności medialnej, koncentracji i struktury kapitałowej mediów, prezentując uregulowania dotyczące tego zagadnienia w UE.

Słowa kluczowe: pluralizm mediów, własność przedsiębiorstw medialnych, koncentracja kapitału medialnego, wolność mediów

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The evolution of the party systems of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic after the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Comparative analysis

Abstract: After the breaking the monopoly of the Communist Party's a formation of two independent systems – the Czech and Slovakian – has began in this still joint country.

The specificity of the party scene in the Czech Republic is reflected by the strength of the Communist Party. The specificity in Slovakia is support for extreme parties, especially among the youngest voters. In Slovakia a multi-party system has been established with one dominant party (HZDS, Smer later). In the Czech Republic former two-block system (1996–2013) was undergone fragmentation after the election in 2013.

Comparing the party systems of the two countries one should emphasize the roles played by the leaders of the different groups, in Slovakia shows clearly distinguishing features, as both V. Mečiar and R. Fico, in Czech Republic only V. Klaus.

Key words: Czech Republic, Slovakia, party system, desintegration of Czechoslovakia

The break-up of Czechoslovakia, and the emergence of two independent states: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, meant the need for the formation of the political systems of the new republics. The party systems constituted a consequential part of the new systems. The development of these political systems was characterized by both similarities and differences, primarily due to all the internal factors.

The author's hypothesis is that firstly, the existence of the Hungarian minority within the framework of the Slovak Republic significantly determined the development of the party system in the country, while the factors of this kind do not occur in the Czech Republic. Secondly, the party system in Slovakia revealed a noticeable readiness to support nationalist groups, which it is difficult to discern in the Czech system.[1]

1. The tradition of political parties and the party system at the time of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia

The tradition of the existence of political parties on the territories presently belonging to the Czech Republic is longer than in case of the Slovakian lands. The Czech parties were formed in the late 70s of the nineteenth century, whereas political formations seeking support among the Slovakian population could not function *de facto* until the inter-war period. At that time the most important role in the common state of Czechoslovakia was played by Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers Party,

[1] The article describes the situation of 1 May 2017.

Czechoslovak National Democracy Party and Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants. In Slovakia, the strongest party was Slovak People’s Party (Hlinka’s Party). In practice, a separate Slovakian party system began to take shape after the fall of the so-called First Republic and the proclamation of Slovakia’s autonomy in October 1938 (Bankowicz, 2010, pp. 56–57, 188–189). In March 1939 Slovakia declared its independence, which further promoted the process of foundation of a separate party system (Bankowicz, 1998, pp. 41–57).

During the communist period, in Czechoslovakia as in other socialist countries, a single-party system operated, even though, theoretically, apart from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Communist Party) there were other groups, thus legitimizing the so-called. people’s democracy. In the years 1945–1948 the Communist Party of Slovakia was formally independent. In Charter 77, the main opposition movement in this country, Slovaks were rare, the whole movement was perceived rather as the Czech (Skotnicki, 2000, p. 30; Bankowicz, 1998, pp. 90–93; Tomaszewski, 1997, p. 86; Kusý, 2002, p. 516).

The democratic system, characterised, among other things, by the existence of a competitive multiparty system, began to take shape after the fall of communism, which is associated with the so-called Velvet Revolution, initiated by the demonstrations in Prague on November 17, 1989. In consequence, Civic Forum (OF – Občanské forum) was established in the Czech Republic and Public Against Violence (VPN – Verejnosť proti násiliu) in Slovakia (Tomaszewski, 1997, pp. 248–249). They were not political parties in the classic sense of the word, but political movements representing the emanation of anti-communist opposition (Jičínský, 1996, pp. 64–65). There were some differences between them. OF was determined to take political responsibility for their actions, while VPN understood its role as a readiness to demonstrate, to organize the society, but not as an opportunity to seize power (Bajda, 2010, p. 29).

It was then that a significant decision was made which possibly – as noted by P. Bajda – determined that a uniform political elite never came into being, and probably also contributed greatly to the division of Czechoslovakia. OF and VPN remained separate movements and the founders of VPN “began to think in terms of us – the Slovaks, you – the Czechs” (Bajda, 2010, p. 32).

Breaking the monopoly of the Communist Party’s rule was a breakthrough, a turning point in the party system of the state. From that moment a formation of two independent systems – the Czech and Slovakian – has began in this still joint country (Fiala, Hloušek, 2003, pp. 17–19). The only connecting elements were the federal government and the parliament. There were not any groups that could function effectively throughout Czechoslovakia (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, p. 112).

The first democratic elections in Czechoslovakia (June 1990) resulted in the victory of the two opposition groups: OF in the Czech Republic (49.5%) and VPN in Slovakia (29.3%). However with time, the two movements underwent decomposition,[2] thus deepening the process of formation of separate parties and contributing to the independence of the party systems of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic which appeared on the political map of Europe on 1 January 1993.

[2] In the election of 1992 OF gained only 4,6% of the votes, VPN underwent decomposition.

2. The party system of the Czech Republic

In the emerging Czech party system the process of reactivation of “the historical parties” took place. An excellent example of this is the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD – Česká strana sociálně demokratická) which continued the traditions reaching back to the nineteenth century. Also the Christian Democratic Czechoslovak People’s Party (ČSL – Československá strana lidová) followed the old traditions. It eventually became the main driving force of the lasting coalition with the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU – Křesťanská a demokratická unie).

The Communist Party, undergoing transformations, became a perceptible element of the system. From it Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy) sprang up and has remained present in all the parliaments of the Republic after 1993. The party emphasizing Moravian regionalism was Movement for AutonomousDemocracy – Association for Moravian and Silesia (HSD-SMS – Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko) (Fiala, Hloušek, 2003, pp. 19–23; Tomaszewski, 1997, pp. 250–251).

There were also a lot of populist parties, even though they played a marginal role. In 1990 Association for the Republic/Republican Party (SPR – RSČ – Sdruzení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa) was established and won the seats in parliament after the elections of 1992 and 1996. Anti-communism was one of its main electoral slogans (Wojtas, 2011, pp. 169–170). Other, diverse groups, such as Green Party (SZ – Strana Zelených) or Democratic Union (DEU – Demokratická unie), did not play any important role (Skotnicki, 2000, pp. 32–33).

OF, mentioned above, with time was divided and replaced by a right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS – Občanská demokratická strana), becoming over the years one of the dominant parties, and Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA – Občanská demokratická aliance), which eventually disappeared from the political scene (Skotnicki, 2000, pp. 30–31).

In the middle of 1990 there were approx. 70 groups/partys registered in the Czech Republic, some of them quite “exotic”, with no chance to get into parliament, for example Friends of Beer Party (SPP – Strana Přatel Piva) (Koźbiał, 2016, p. 199). Currently, as of May 1, 2017, there are 263 political parties and movements registered in the Czech Republic (*Rejstřík...*, 01.05.2017).

In the first period of the Czech independence a strong and sometimes even dominant position of the two parties: ODS and ČSSD was noticeable. They received the strongest support: in 2006 these parties won a total of nearly 68% of the votes. ODS has been losing support, in the last election only less than 8% of voters voted for it. The loss of voters by the Social Democratic Party was not so painful and the party participated in governing coalitions (also now, as the winner of the last elections). Both parties sought to reduce the importance of the smaller parties. In 1998 ODS and ČSSD signed a coalition agreement which enabled the Social Democrats to create a minority government. At the same time it was the beginning of the changes in the electoral law, aimed at establishing an easier route to the emergence of a stable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The changes did not go this far because of the opposition of the Constitutional Court (Sokół, 2007, pp. 387–394).[3]

[3] The change of the electoral method from Hagenbach’s to d’Hondt’s was the reflection of these preferences.

Despite the high level of support, none of these parties could govern single-handedly (apart from the mentioned minority government). The Czech party system was also characterised by the isolation of the Communist Party and ruling out coalition talks with it. KSČM can be regarded as the third political force in the country, in 2002 it was supported by even more than 18.5% of the voters.

The dynamics of the party system, which resulted in the emergence of new groups, was revealed in the elections of the years 2010 and 2013. The Christian Democratic Party KDU was absent from parliament, but a new group appeared instead, the pro-European Tradition Responsibility Prosperity (TOP 09) obtaining the support of every sixth voter. In 2010 the electoral threshold was also exceeded by the (VV – Veči Veřejné) group, being a supporter of the decision-making process through the instruments of direct democracy. But it was an episodic party present in parliament only for one term. On the other hand, in the election of 2013 Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011 – Akce nespokojených občanů) gained significant support (over 18% of the votes) and even entered the government coalition,[4] as well as less significant group Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit).[5] ANO 2011 can be regarded as the party of social protest against the abuse of power, propagating in their electoral slogans, among other things, the need to combat corruption, and also as a group which gained significant support through catchy slogans and electoral consequences of a Europe-wide crisis noticeable also in the Czech Republic (Koźbiał 2014, pp. 135–136; Koźbiał, 2016, p. 208).[6]

The results of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Parliament of the Czech Republic, carried out after 1993, have been presented in Table 1.

Table 1

The results of the elections to the Czech Chamber of Deputies after 1993 (Support in %)[7]

Party	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
ODS	29.62	27.74	24.47	35.38	20.22	7.72
ČSSD	26.44	32.31	30.20	32.32	22.08	20.45
KDU-ČSL	8.08	9.00	14.27	7.22	–	6.78
KSČM	10.33	11.03	18.51	12.81	11.27	14.91
SPR-RSČ	8.01	–	–	–	–	–
ODA	6.36	–	–	–	–	–
US	–	8.60	–	–	–	–
SZ	–	–	–	6.29	–	–
VV	–	–	–	–	10.88	–
TOP 09	–	–	–	–	16.70	11.99
ANO 2011	–	–	–	–	–	18.65
Úsvit	–	–	–	–	–	6.88

Source: Own elaboration based on: www.volby.cz, „Týden”, nr 44/2013 z 29 października 2013 r., p. 11. In election 2002 KDU started in electoral coalition with US-DEU.

[4] The group was formed in 2011 by Andrej Babiš, a billionaire and businessman of the Slovakian origin with the Czech citizenship who controlled the Agrofert a.s. holding.

[5] The founder of this populist movement was Tomio Okamura. The formation demanded introduction of the direct democracy into the political system of the Republic.

[6] In the opinion poll conducted in November 2013 by CVVM (Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění) 17% of the respondents described the economic situation in the Czech Republic as very bad, 45% as bad, 28% as neither good nor bad and only 8% as good. See: *Občané o hospodářské situaci ČR a o zivotní úrovni svých domácností – listopad 2013*, http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7139/f3/ev131202.pdf, 12.11.2016.

[7] Only the groups that were represented in parliament in 1993 were taken into account.

Political scandals and affairs also had an impact on the perception of politics and the parties. One that should be mentioned took place in spring 2005 when Prime Minister Stanislav Gross resigned after having trouble to explain the origin of his private assets. In 2009 the public opinion was shaken by pictures of Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek in the company of naked women in a villa belonging to the head of the Italian government Silvio Berlusconi. A year later, accusations of corruption resulted in disappearance of the President of the Chamber of Deputies Miroslav Vlczek (Sieklucki, 2010, p. 80), and in 2013 the government of Petr Nečas resigned in consequence of the corruption scandal in which the persons from the immediate milieu of the Prime Minister were involved (*Skandal...,* 20.10.2013).

3. The party system of the Republic of Slovakia

The framework of the emerging party system can be tracked down to the spring of 1991 when a group of supporters of former prime minister Vladimir Mečiar founded the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko). The following year the movement won Slovakian parliamentary elections (within the federation) gaining over 37% of the vote and repeating the success of 1994. The decomposition of VPN occurred almost automatically. Formed in its place Democratic Party (DS – ODS – Demokratická strana – Občianska demokratická strana), later DS, already in 1992 found itself outside parliament (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, pp. 113–114).

Until 1998 the party scene was characterized by an overwhelming dominance of Mečiar’s group, which, however, never won a sufficient number of seats to be able to govern single-handedly. Christian Democratic Movement (KDH – Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie) became a stable component of the scene regularly acquiring the support of approx. 10%. Catholic circles were active already in the communist era, for a long time being even the main platform of oppositional activities (Bajda, 2010, p. 21).[8] In turn, the Communists transformed in Party of the Democratic Left (SDL’ – Strana demokratickej l’avice) – a party of social democratic orientation. During the election in 1992 the party managed to get nearly 15% of the votes, but in the parliament of independent Slovakia it was present once more from 1998 to 2002 and later never again. The orthodox Communists, on the other hand, as the successors of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, managed to be reborn as Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS – Komunistická strana Slovenska). The formation was isolated by other parties (Kopeček, 2003, p. 190).

Since 1994 two antagonist camps were formed in the Slovakian party system, defined by their attitude towards Mečiar’s ruling party. The dividing line of pro-Mečiar – anti-Mečiar dominated internal relations. The parties co-creating the government of the HZDS belonged to the camp supporting Mečiar. These were right-wing and nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS – Slovenská národná strana) and radical left-wing Union of the Workers of Slovakia (ZRS – Združenie robotníkov Slovenska)which was present in parliament only for one term. In the years 1994–1998 the polarization of the political scene of this period took the form violating the constitution of the young republic.

[8] It is worth adding that in the 80. of the 20th century the pilgrimages to the main sanctuary of the Slovakian land, Levoča, gathered even up to 150 thousand people.

Secret services were employed to attack persons inconvenient for the government (the kidnapping of the president’s son Michal Kováč). That is why the then state system was described as the hybrid regime which situated itself on a thin line between democracy and authoritarian rule (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, pp. 116–117).[9]

Before the elections in 1998 the reluctance towards HZDS triggered the formation of so called Blue Coalition by the right-wing groups: Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK – Slovenská demokratická koalícia). The coalition was headed by the future prime minister Mikuláš Dziurinda who soon became the leader of a new group called Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ – Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia). Despite the electoral victory of HZDS he failed to form a government and gave up the power.

The final defeat put an end to the activity of Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO – Aliancia nového občana) founded by the media magnate Pavol Rusko. ANO was present in the National Council in the years 2002–2006. In turn, Prime Minister Dziurinda’s group never managed to get the support exceeding 20% and disappeared from parliament after elections in 2016. This leads to the claim that the changes were of the short-term nature and the newly created parties have not become a permanent part of the system.

The formation of Direction (Smer) that took place in December 1999 should be assessed differently. It was headed by former SDL’s activist Robert Fico assuming the role of the opposition to Dziurinda’s government. In his declarations Fico stressed the need for a pragmatic policy, which was expected by the citizens, and at the same time distanced himself from the government. His rhetoric contained populist elements (e.g. distancing from the ideology, criticism of politicking, a general reluctance towards party favouritism, finally distancing from the establishment), and the mixture of the socialist slogans and the extreme right-wing antiziganist demands. From the very beginning it was difficult for the researchers of the Slovakian political life to classify the party (Bajda, 2010, pp. 145–146; Zenderowski, 2004, pp. 124–125).[10] Only in 2005 the formation adopted a program of defense of the welfare state and the social democratic profile (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, p. 125). In the 2002 elections Smer gained more than 13% of the vote, four years later, over 29%, which meant that Fico’s party became the strongest party in parliament and took over the power. Also next elections: in 2010, 2012 and 2016 resulted in its victory.[11] In 2012 Smer gained overall majority in the National Council. Thus, it is justified to emphasize that this group has become the most stable part of the Slovakian political life since the state gained independence.

The party system of the Slovak Republic is characterized by two more elements worth highlighting. The first is the constant presence in parliament of groups representing the Hungarian minority (it represents approx. 10% of the population of the country). In the first period the Hungarians were represented by Hungarian Coalition (MK – Magyar Koalíció – Maďarská koalícia) gaining in 1994 more than 10% of the votes. In the years 1998–2010 Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP – Strana maďarskej koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja) was present in parliament, and since 2010 the minority has been represented by Most-Híd. These groups should be classified as ethnic and right-wing par-

[9] The external symptom of V. Mečiar’s policy was the delay in Slovakia’s negotiations on the membership in the European Union and its abstaining from NATO in 1999.

[10] For some it was a typical populist party, deprived of ideology.

[11] Robert Fico was the prime minister in the years 2006-2010 and has been again since 2012.

ties, they have in mind first of all protection of the interests of the minority. Given the size of the minority, its participation in parliament will assuredly be noticeable in the future.

The second regular element of the system (except the parliamentary terms of 2002–2006 and 2012–2016) are right-wing or extreme right-wing groups. Initially, it was already mentioned SNS, temporarily being a member of the coalition government. Following the elections of March 2016 also People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS – L’udová strana Naše Slovensko) has been present in parliament. It advocates the need to renew national sovereignty and base it on three pillars: national, Christian and social (*O nas…*, 13.11.2016). It is led by Marian Kotleba, known for his controversial remarks.[12] In 2016 both nationalist groups won about 1/6 of the votes.

In recent years, four new groups have entered the political scene, but for now it is difficult to assess their importance and consistency of the support they are likely to gain. These include the right-wing Eurosceptic liberal party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS – Sloboda a Solidarita) in the National Council since 2010; Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL’aNO – Obyčajní l’udia a nezávislé osobnosti) – conservative party present in the parliament since 2012; considered as right-wing protest movement We Are Family (SME Rodina), and centre-right party of the former presidential candidate Radoslav Procházka #NETWORK (# SIEŤ).

According to the records of 15 November 2016 there are 151 political parties and movements registered in the Slovak Republic (*Register of...*, 01.05.2017). The results of the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic after 1993 are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

The results of the elections to the Slovak National Council after 1993. (Support in %)

Party	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016
HZDS	34.96	27.00	19.50	8.79	–	–	–
SV	10.41	–	–	–	–	–	–
MK	10.18	–	–	–	–	–	–
KDH	10.08	–	8.25	8.31	8.52	8.82	–
DU	8.5	–	–	–	–	–	–
ZRS	7.34	–	–	–	–	–	–
SNS	5.40	9.07	–	11.73	5.07	–	8.64
SDK	–	26.33	–	–	–	–	–
SDĽ	–	14.66	–	–	–	–	–
SMK-MKP	–	9.12	11.16	11.68	–	–	–
SOP	–	8.01	–	–	–	–	–
SDKÚ	–	–	15.09	18.35	15.42	6.09	–
SMER	–	–	13.46	29.14	34.79	44.41	28.28
KSS	–		6.32	–	–	–	–
ANO	–	–	8.01	–	–	–	–
MOST-HÍD	–	–	–	–	8.12	6.89	6.50
SaS	–	–	–	–	12.14	5.88	12.10
OĽaNO	–	–	–	–	–	8.55	11.02
SME Rodina	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.62
#SIEŤ	–	–	–	–	–	–	5.60
Ľ’S Naše Slovensko	–	–	–	–	–	–	8.04

Source: Own elaboration based on: http://volby.statistics.sk/, 01.05.2017.

[12] Kotleba made himself famous for his frequent antiziganist remarks in which he referred to this minority as parasites.

4. Comparison of the Czech and Slovakian party systems

The party systems of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic escape traditional classifications, both quantitative and qualitative. This is caused by the discernible changes in both systems and the permanent revolution.

Political competition in the Czech Republic was characterized by several main lines of conflicts and divisions. The division into communist and reformist parties (until the disintegration of OF) seemed to be irrelevant. Instead, the importance of socio-economic dividing line has been increasing. It has become dominant and has had an impact on the consolidation of the right and left side of the party scene. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the dividing line reflecting the attitude to European integration became visible. In addition, the conflict between supporters and opponents of the free market economy should be noticed. The latter were represented the KSČM. The Communists also participated in the conflict between the authoritarian regime and open democratic society, supporting the first option.

In Slovakia the conflict between the Communists and the reformers also did not play a noteworthy role. Initially, the main parties were formed along the main lines of the dispute as defined by Rokkan and Lipset,[13] above all along the socio-economic line (the attitude towards the transformation of the system, which should be done gradually or radically), the dispute between centre and periphery (however, Prague was treated as the centre, from there SNS evolved, and in time the attitude towards the Hungarian minority was placed at the periphery), church-state conflict (KDH built its position on the principles of Christian morality, in opposition to the VPN). The division of agriculture-industry (or town-village) was insignificant, because no important agrarian parties have developed. The polarization which occurred after the elections in 1994 proceeded along several lines of division, including centre-periphery, church-state, finally authoritarianism-democracy (Leška, 2013, pp. 72–79).

Comparing the party systems of the two countries one should emphasize the roles played by the leaders of the different groups. Slovakia shows clearly distinguishing features, as both V. Mečiar and R. Fico exerted a significant impact on the activities of HZDS and Smer. The figure of a charismatic leader has had an impact on the support among voters[14] who have identified the party with its boss. In the Czech Republic it is difficult to find this kind of relationship, possibly the only example was the influence of the prime minister, and later president, Vaclav Klaus on the actions of ODS in the 90s.

In Slovakia a high level of unpredictability of the electorate can be noticed. This is evident both in the growth and decline of support for individual parties (Smer and HZDS which virtually disappeared from the party scene) (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, p. 128) as well as readiness to vote for completely new groups (eg. in the elections of 2016). No doubt the party system of the Slovak Republic was for nearly a quarter-century of statehood more fragmented than that of the Czech Republic. Since regaining the independence in Slovakia representatives of as many as 21 groups have taken seats in parliament, while in the Czech Republic only 12.

[13] The lines outlined by these authors were not „clear”.

[14] Mečiar lost the presidential elections in 1999 and 2004 in the second round, likewise Fico, also in the second round, in 2014.

As the National Council consists of a great number of small parties there has been the need of forming broad governmental coalitions, made up of 4 or 5 parties. The Slovakian parties have been very flexible when it comes to the creation of ruling coalitions, which according to Kopeček and Spáč makes this country similar to a model of open competition described by P. Mair (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, p. 129).[15] In the Czech Republic only to form Klaus’s government, in the years 1992–1996, as many as 4 parties were needed. The number of groups in parliaments usually has been higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. This is shown in Chart 1.

Chart 1. Number of parties in Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic after 1993



Source: Own elaboration.

A. Antoszewski, analyzing the political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, draws attention to the low level of trust in political parties, which can be associated with already mentioned political affairs and scandals. In attempt to assign groups and movements to the main families of political parties he notes that both individual Czech and Slovakian parties can be classified as liberal, socialist (social democratic), conservative Christian-democratic and radical families. The only problem was unambiguous classification of the HZDS, described by the author as populist and personal at the same time (Antoszewski, 2006, pp. 111, 119–143).

On the other hand, R. Herbut described the Czech party system as dispersed, while the Slovakian as multi-party, which is the result of the aforementioned lack of groups strong enough to form the basis for a stable coalition (Herbut, 2006, p. 151). Smer was proceeding in this direction after the elections in 2012, but its influence has clearly weakened after the last election. Also in the Czech Republic there is currently no group that

[15] According to Mair’s concept government alternation is characterised by an open rivalry when the activities of the parties are unpredictable.

could have a chance to gain broad public support in the foreseeable future. The dispersal system is also indicated by the degree of support for the two largest groups.

According to Kopeček and Spáč the party system in Slovakia is unstable, closer to the Polish patterns than the Czech ones (Kopeček, Spáč, 2010, p. 128). With this statement, formulated in 2010, one could probably agree a few years ago. Currently, it seems debatable, and by no means due to the increased level of system stability in Slovakia.

Taking into account the typology proposed by Maurice Duverger, both in the Czech Republic and Slovakia we are dealing with the multi-party systems. There are at least 3 parties operating on the political scene that may gain power. Currently, no party in both systems is able to govern single-handedly (the only such case occurred in Slovakia in the period 2012–2016). Consequently, to form governments coalitions have been necessary.

Assuming as the basis for the classification G. Smith’s concept, one can speak both in case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia about the so-called dispersion system in which several groups operate, but none of them has a position strong enough to be identified as dominant.

Referring to the classification by G. Sartori, in both countries we are dealing with a multi-party system, extremely polarized, characterized by a large number of relevant parties (over 5) separated by a strong ideological distance, and at the same time the position of the extreme or even anti-system parties is relatively strong (Bankowicz, 1998, pp. 188–189). Before the election of 2013 the Czech party system could have been described as moderately polarized.

Therefore, the analysis and the attempt to classify party systems of the Polish southern neighbours require the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. Because of the processes of evolution this poses specific research problems.

5. Summary

Before the break-up of Czechoslovakia in both parts of the federation distinct party systems began to take shape. This process was reinforced when the two independent states came into existence in 1993. As a result multi-party systems with a particular specificity have been established. In the years 1996–2013 in the Czech Republic the two-block system was formed. After the elections in 2013 it has undergone fragmentation, because the predominance of the two largest parties over the rest is significantly weaker. In Slovakia a multi-party system has been established with one dominant party (HZDS, Smer later).

The specificity of the party scene in the Czech Republic is without doubt reflected by the strength of the Communist Party, which has not occurred in Slovakia. On the other hand, Slovakian system is characterised by strongly indicated presence of right-wing groups, even nationalistic (especially after the election of 2016). These types of parties have not appeared in the Czech Chamber of Deputies.

In an attempt to outline the prospects for the development of political systems of the two countries first of all the growing support for extreme parties in Slovakia should be emphasized, especially among the youngest voters. According to opinion polls in Sep-

tember 2016 among voters up to 39 years old LSNS enjoys the largest support (23.5%), 10.4% want to vote for SNS – a total of more than 1/3 of the voters (Kapitán, 2016). These results can be interpreted as a harbinger of possible changes in the party system in Slovakia towards the major role played by the radical right-wing parties. It is not excluded in a situation in which more than 40% of respondents in a poll carried out by the newspaper Sme would accept a strong leader to take the power, and 1/4 advocates even for the liquidation of the parliamentary system of governance (Cuprik, 2016). In the Czech Republic a much greater stability of the party scene is noticed, in consequence of which no party of this type is to be expected in parliament.

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Ewolucja systemów partyjnych w Czechach i na Słowacji po rozpadzie Czechosłowacji. Analiza porównawcza

Streszczenie

Odrębne systemy partyjne Czech i Słowacji zaczęły się kształtować jeszcze przed rozpadem wspólnego państwa czechosłowackiego. Początkowo oba systemy cechowała dominacja ugrupowań stanowiących opozycję wobec dawnego systemu komunistycznego.

Ewolucję obu systemów różniła się. W Czechach dominowały przez długi okres prawicowe ODA i socjaldemokratyczna ČSSD, na Słowacji doszło do dominacji pojedynczych ugrupowań: najpierw HZDS, następnie Smer, które de facto zdominowały scenę polityczną. Niemałą rolę w tym procesie odegrały wyraziste osobistości słowackiej sceny politycznej: V. Mečiar i R. Fico. W Czechach taką rolę odgrywał jedynie V. Klaus. Słowacki system partyjny był bardziej rozdrobniony, cechował się poza tym rosnącym znaczeniem ugrupowań nacjonalistycznych i stała obecnością ugrupowań mniejszości węgierskiej.

Obecnie na scenie partyjnej obu państw zauważalne są ugrupowania budujące swe poparcie na hasłach populistycznych (ANO 2011 w Czechach) bądź nacjonalistycznych (LSNS i SNS na Słowacji).

Słowa kluczowe: Czechy, Słowacja, system partyjny, rozpad Czechosłowacji

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When rationality meets political interest. Problems of education policy rationalization in Polish municipalities[1]

Abstract: The paper presents the results of the research on education policy rationalization in rural and urban-rural municipalities. The author focuses on the most radical rationalization solution, namely the liquidation of schools. This solution, albeit economically feasible, can be costly in the social dimension. In the article, the author verifies the hypothesis assuming that the postulated rationalization of the municipal education policy becomes fictitious when the municipal authorities (executive body) are motivated by their own interest, i.e. maintaining public support (a victory in subsequent elections) rather than economic rationality and public good.

The problem of rationalizing school networks in the municipalities has been analyzed by the author on the grounds of the rational choice theory. The article was based on the literature review, quantitative data and empirical research carried out in selected municipalities in the form of semi-structured interviews. The comparative method, elements of system analysis and qualitative methods were used in the research. In a two-stage process, the researcher has chosen the municipalities located in three provinces (Świętokrzyskie, Mazowieckie and Pomorskie), and then 60 respondents from among the following groups: municipal authorities (an executive body and representatives of a legislative body), teachers, school governing non-state entities, representatives of local communities and local leaders.

Key words: education policy, rationalization of education policy, rational choice theory, public policy, school liquidation

Introduction

Education policy rationalization has in recent years become the subject of both public and political debate, as well as an instrument for gaining and/or maintaining power. The term "education policy rationalization" is most commonly understood as nothing but a closure of the schools that place a significant financial burden on municipal budgets. On the one hand, such understanding of the term is emphasized by the media, influencing local communities and teachers (Starczewska, 2009), and on the other hand, by the local authorities, which are aware of the limited scope of action in this area (Kołacz, 2012).

In the face of increasing spending on educational activities and transferring further responsibilities in the scope of education to local governments, accompanied by a constant drop in the number of students, rationalization measures in the education system seem to be essential. Local governments throughout Poland have been struggling for

[1] The article was based on the research conducted within the framework of the project "Political interest and rationality in the public policy implementation. Political and social consequences of the schools network optimization", no. 2015/19/D/HS5/03153, funded by the National Science Center – Poland, SONATA 10 Program.

years with the problem of rising educational expenditures, which, as a matter of fact, they cannot fully control. The necessity of adopting rationalization measures in the most drastic form, i.e. school closures, particularly affects rural and urban-rural municipalities. While it seems reasonable to limit the public spending when the majority of the budget of a territorial unit is allocated to one of the municipal public policies only, the liquidation of educational institutions is never a simple task for the municipality.

When adopting rationalization measures, the municipal authorities are bound not only by applicable laws and municipal budget framework, but also some other important determinants of local education policy such as a local community, its attitude towards the authorities and the mutual relations between the inhabitants of the municipality, the presence of local leaders and opinion makers, a specific nature of a teaching community, which in rural communities is an opinion-forming group, as well as a non-educational role of the school in the local environment, including the history of school buildings and plans for their management after school closure.

The measures aimed at rationalizing educational expenditures are primarily the consequence of a cold calculation of decision-making units and weighing up particular interests. In the case of education policy rationalization, the interests and objectives of the three stakeholder groups, i.e. the municipal authorities, the teachers and the parents of the pupils, are in conflict. Their activity and involvement determine the course of the rationalization processes and their financial, social and political implications.

The theoretical basis for the analysis carried out in the article has been set down by the assumptions of rational choice theory. The research was conducted in accordance with the comparative method and the elements of system analysis. The article also presents the results of qualitative research carried out in the form of semi-structured interviews.

Rationality in public decision-making – theoretical framework

In recent years education policy issues have been narrowed down to high costs generated by education in municipalities. However, in practice it was not always high cost that was the immediate reason for closing down schools with a small number of pupils. The issues of children’s education standards, the conditions of pupils’ development (including the question of socialization in a peer group), the role of the school in the local environment, the specificity of the local community and the relationship between local stakeholders have been virtually overlooked in the course of the public debate. Thus rationality was narrowed down to economic dimension.

Rationality, according to R. Szarfenberg, is the best choice of courses of action made by a decision maker on the basis of weighing their negative and positive effects (Szarfenberg, 2002, p. 4). Such a choice, according to the researcher, entails several conditions. Firstly, in order to be able to make rational decisions, it is necessary to have knowledge about the subject matter of the decision-making process, as well as the effects of each of the considered options. Secondly, it is important to assess the impact of decisions made by the decision maker. On this basis, he or she can make the right choice. Creating decision options is possible on the assumption that these solutions are feasible. According to R. Szarfenberg, the issue of assessing the impact of different decision-making options

may be problematic. Impact assessment depends on a number of factors including values, their hierarchy or differences in interpretation (Szarfenberg, 2002, p. 4).

T. Kotarbiński can be cited here as the author of a division into material and methodological rationality. The former refers to a situation in which people have full (objective) knowledge about a particular situation and adapt their actions accordingly. However, as Kotarbiński stated, such a situation does not always take place, and then the decision-maker’s reaction is based on subjective knowledge, i.e. on the basis of the available information, which is likely to be true (Kotarbiński, 1975, pp. 123–124; Szarfenberg, 2002, p. 5).

H. Simon, the author of the concept of limited rationality, pointed out that practically all people are rational. They usually have specific reasons for doing things, which may not always seem rational to others, but it does not necessarily mean they are irrational whatsoever. In the first place, while assessing rationality or irrationality of one’s actions, the following should be taken into account: firstly, that the actual reasons for their actions are not always the reasons that people usually give; secondly, the reasons may be based on incorrect assumptions; thirdly, there may be other, much stronger, unstated reasons for not taking different actions (which may seem reasonable and legitimate from other people’s perspective); fourthly, they may hold different set of values (Simon, 1995, p. 46–47).

In turn, G. C. Homans in his rationality proposition pointed out that an individual (a decision maker) chooses between different courses of action, and while choosing one of the options he estimates the value that is available to him at any given time. Based on his beliefs, he chooses the best one, taking into account the probability of the expected outcome. So he evaluates not only a specific solution, but also the possibility of its occurrence (Homans, 1974). G. Homans, in his assumption of rationality, pointed out that in reality people are guided by two key factors, not just one, as suggested by other scholars of rationality. One of the factors is the set of values held by an individual (a decision maker) that motivates them to make specific choices and take decisions. But there is another factor that determines the actions of a decision makers. According to G. Homans, an individual will not carry out specific actions or take particular decisions if similar actions or decisions have been ineffective in the past (Homans, 1974). To put it in simple terms, the experience of an individual will be the element of rational choice. And although the decision maker is not sure whether this time a particular choice will bring unsatisfactory results again, he would rather make a different choice than risk another defeat.

The category of rationality is the basis for the concept of rational choice, which is still one of the most popular theoretical concepts in the social sciences, including political sciences. Although it is derived from economic sciences,[2] it may well be used to analyze the behavior of individuals in situations beyond the sphere of economic relations (Michalczyk, 2004, p. 276). The concept of rational choice has evolved over the decades, and has been complemented with new elements (see Frohlich, Oppenheimer, 2006, pp. 235–266; Oppenheimer, 2008; Hay, 2004, pp. 41–46).

The basis of rational choice concept is methodological individualism, assuming that complex social phenomena can be explained by means of decisions taken by individuals.

[2] Although originally used in economic sciences, the basis of the rational choice theory derives from behavioral psychology, formulated in 1961 by G. Homans (Scott, 2000, p. 127).

The essence of the rational choice theory has been aptly captured by J. Elster, pointing out that individual behaviors of people are a basic component of social life. All social institutions and social changes are the result of individual actions and interactions between individuals (Elster, 1989, pp. 13–21; Scott, 2000, pp. 126–138).

The rational choice theory (RCT) is based on three key elements, one of which is the aforementioned rationality. The first assumption of RCT is quite obvious, as it were implied by the name itself. An individual makes choices on the basis of his or her preferences, beliefs and viewpoints, according to which he or she chooses one option- a solution that is considered the most advantageous from his/her point of view and which ranks highest in the hierarchy of possible decisions. As pointed out by T. Michalczyk, the rationality of the decision maker, and even his/her preference hierarchy, do not allow us to judge the relationship with other individuals and the consequences of the decision for the decision-maker’s environment. Rationality in RCT refers only to the individual and his/her preferences. The convergence, coherence of objectives and the choices made pertain only to the decision-making individual. It is precisely in coherence, logical arrangement and consistent decision-making that the rational behavior of decision-makers is manifested (Michalczyk, 2004, p. 278; Becker, 1990, p. 266). The second assumption concerns the category of utility which is expected by an individual making the rational choice. This assumption is connected with G. Homans’ approach to making rational choices based on values and experience. The expected utility is associated with the risk of achieving the desired outcome. However, there is always a risk that the decision made (the choice made) will not produce the expected results. Consequently, a rational individual also estimates the probability of a given effect (Homans, 1961, pp. 61–62). The third assumption concerns decision maker’s own interest. It is the interest of an individual that determines all his actions. Thus, according to RCT, an individual remains egoistic, not taking into account the impact of his actions on the environment. Unless his impact on the environment can negatively affect the attainment of the objective pursued (Michalczyk, 2004, p. 278).

The theory of rational choice has also been criticized, above all for the lack of clarification of the relationship between the reasons/motives of the rational actors and the actions taken (Hodgson, 2012, pp. 94–96; Zey, 1998, pp. 55–70; Green, Shapiro, 1994). It assumes that individuals take actions according to their own preferences, which are considered to be rational from their point of view. The theory did not allow for conclusions about the reasons for making these rational decisions. This deficiency was complemented by F. Dietrich and Ch. List from the School of Economics by formulating a ”reason-based theory of rational choice”, i.e. the theory of rational choice based on reasons. The authors have criticized the traditional concept of rational choice for lack of clarification on how the preferences of rational actors are shaped, how they change and modify in the course of discussion, and how they are influenced by other motivations. The authors pointed out that in the course of the development of rational choice theory and focusing on the creation of formal decision models, the sources (motives) of decisions that influence the (rational) decision-making process have been overlooked. Paradoxically, the problem of motivation in decision-making has been addressed in the philosophy, but it has not been formalized as yet (Dietrich, List, 2013, pp. 104–105).

The concept of Dietrich and List is another voice of criticism against the theory of rational choice. The authors do not criticize the rationality of decision makers, but point

out the need to know the motives of their actions, and this element is neglected by the theory of rational choice. The basis of the concept proposed by F. Dietrich and Ch. List is the formulation of the preferences of the decision maker and their hierarchy depending on the motivation that drives them. The authors have introduced a category of “motivationally relevant” propositions, confronted with ”normatively relevant” reasons for action, which in practice limit a decision-maker’s choice (Dietrich, List, 2013, p. 105). They indicate how he should behave in accordance with the applicable legal, social and economic norms or a particular value system. Thus, they do not allow the decision maker to behave in a way he actually wants to behave.

The aforementioned element of the rational choice theory based on reasons, as well as the assumption of the possibility for changing decision makers preferences, basically correspond to the decision-making situation, in which the municipal authorities make decisions in the area of education policy. On the one hand, they are motivated by their own interests, and on the other, by a number of normative factors that are linked to the process of public policy rationalization. According to G. Rydlewski, outlining the conditions of public decision making process, a public space is complex and requires decisions to be made within highly diverse social groups, within formalized territorial organizations, as well as in the system of functional and institutional relations existing between the public spheres (Rydlewski, 2011, p. 27). Decisions taken in the public sphere are of a different nature than those in the private or even economic spheres. It should be remembered that, in the public sphere, decision-making entities should act within the framework of their legitimacy and therefore represent the interests of certain social groups (Rydlewski, 2011, p. 27). What is also characteristic of the public sphere is its constant dynamics, which enforces instant reaction to changes and making decisions in accordance with the ongoing transformations. (Rydlewski, 2011, p. 27; Rydlewski, 2012, p. 66; Sztompka, 2007, pp. 21–23). Adequate response to change and taking appropriate decisions is the essence of public governance, which consists in setting goals, creating opportunities for action and using resources, with due regard to the public interest (Kożuch, 2012, pp. 85–86).

Methodology of research

The issues connected with rationalizing education policy of municipalities (with particular regard to the perspective of the executive organs of municipalities) were presented on the basis of results of qualitative research conducted in 12 municipalities located in 3 provinces of Poland. In the first stage, local self-government units were selected, where school closures were noted in the period of 2006–2014. In the second stage, semi-structured interviews were conducted in a group of 60 respondents, including representatives of the authorities (executive and legislative bodies), representatives of the teaching community and the local community (including parents of pupils, residents of the villages or towns where schools were closed down, public officials such as village heads, as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations).

The aim of the analyzes was to verify the circumstances in which one can speak of the actual rationalization of the municipal education policy. Assuming that the ”ratio-

nalization of municipal education policy” is a range of measures taken by the municipal authorities, aimed at limiting the budgetary expenditures on education while at the same time providing pupils from the municipality with opportunities for development and adequate conditions for education, the author points to the factors which contributed to the fact that the declared rationalization is merely of a virtual nature.

During the course of the argument, the author verifies the hypothesis assuming that the postulated rationalization of the municipal education policy becomes fictitious when the municipal authorities (executive body) are motivated by their own interests, which is maintaining public support (victory in subsequent elections), rather than economic rationality and public good. The hypothesis will be verified by answering the following research questions: what rationalization measures were taken in the area of education policy by the authorities of the examined municipalities? in what cases can we speak of ”rationalization success”, i.e. the reduction of educational spending ratio in total budget expenditures? to what extend does the position of the executive body influence the process of schools rationalization, including their closures?

Rationalization of education policy – ”a wicked problem” of local self-governments in Poland?

The necessity of rationalizing educational policy affects all municipalities in Poland, especially as education places a heavy strain on the budgets of rural and urban-rural municipalities (Adamowicz, Kmieciński, 2017, p. 75). In some cases, spending on education accounted for more than 60% of budget expenditures (PAP, 2016). The biggest burden on local governments is created by the expenditure on salaries and their derivatives, which are not decreasing despite a declining number of students. On the contrary, the expenditures on salaries are rising, which is beyond control of local governments (Herbst, 2012, p. 92). In trying to counter the problem of rising expenditures, local governments are taking rationalizing measures to curb spending. The most radical form is the closure of schools,[3] especially the small ones, located in rural areas, which generate the largest expenditure due to a small number of students. It is true that local governments may gradually implement rationalization measures, such as reducing the organizational level of a school by merging classes or giving over the school to a non-public managing entity; however, the aforementioned measures do not ultimately solve the problem of high costs of education, though they can reduce the problem and partially relieve the budget of the municipality. In practice, however, the aforementioned measures are merely a temporary solution and an initial step towards complete closure of the facility. Each of these intermediate solutions has its own advantages and disadvantages, as demonstrated by the results of the research. What seems to be compelling in the context of the problem presented in this article is the behavior of municipal authorities (mayors/village heads) in the face of a school closure. This process is usually controversial and can be a cause

[3] In the article, the author analyzes only one form of rationalization, i.e. a school closure. However, the authorities may also adopt other measures aimed at expenditure reduction, including reducing the school’s organizational level, joining the classes or transferring/handing over the school to a non-public entity.

of resistance for residents and teachers. It also tends to be used in the political struggle at the local level.

The main reason for school closures has been recently declining number of pupils in primary schools. In 2006, 2,484,891 students were attending primary schools in Poland. In 2014 the number dropped to 2,306,102. The decrease in the number of pupils was particularly visible in rural areas (Kozińska-Baldyga, 2015, p. 8). The decrease in the number of pupils entailed a reduction in the number of schools. In 2006 there were 14,511 schools run by local governments. By 2014 their number had decreased by 6.7%, which is comparable to the change in the number of students.

The problem of school closures is varied territorially, both in the regional breakdown and in the division into rural and urban areas. A falling number of primary school pupils is the consequence of demographic decline and depopulation caused by national and foreign migration. The largest decrease in the number of students was recorded in Podlaskie province – it amounted to 16% in the period of 2006–2014, similarly in Świętokrzyskie province – 16%, and Podkarpackie and Lubelskie – 14%. The smallest decrease in the number of students was recorded in Pomorskie province (1%) and Dolnośląskie province (7%) (CSO, 2017). The decrease in the number of pupils, should theoretically entail a reduction in the number of schools. Despite the liquidation of a number of institutions, this process was not commensurate with the reduced number of students. And this is what explains the ever increasing costs of education (Sobotka, Herczyński, 2014, p. 88).

The biggest number of schools was closed in Świętokrzyskie (16% of schools), Podlaskie (17%) and Lubelskie province (14%). At the other end of the scale, the lowest number of school closures was noted in Pomorskie, Śląskie, Dolnośląskie or Lubuskie province. On the one hand, a slight decrease in the number of schools was due to a specific nature of these regions (industrial, urbanized), their locations, previous rationalization activities, but also the network of schools, which was to a great extend shaped historically (Sobotka, Herczyński, 2014, p. 22; Kuriański, 2008, pp. 199–200).

School closures as a form of rationalization of educational policy. The analysis of research results

The municipalities selected for the study – due to deliberate selection – should be treated as case studies rather than a representative sample. Nevertheless, the problem they all shared was the declining number of students, which calls for changes in the current model of local education policy. In some municipalities the problem of demographic decline was so severe that in the years 2006–2014 there was a decrease of students reaching almost 40%. In the majority of the municipalities the drop was ranging from a dozen to several dozen percent. Only in one of the studied municipalities did the number of pupils decrease by less than 10%. The average for municipalities was 23.5% (BDL, GUS, 2017).

Education was a heavy burden on budgets in all the studied municipalities. In 2006, it was an average of 40.89% of total budget expenditures of municipalities, which in case of some entities – in the respondents’ opinion – hindered their further functioning. The situation improved slightly after school closures and in 2014, 35.21% of the total budget expenditure was spent on education (Table 1).

Table 1

Expenditures on education in researched municipalities in 2006–2014

Entity	Overall expenditure on education		Share of education spending in budget expenditure in%		Increase / decrease in spending on education	Current expenditure on education as% of total current expenditure of the municipality	Current expenditure on education as% of total current expenditure of the municipality	Increase / decrease in current spending on education
	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006–2014	2008*	2014	2008–2014*
M_I	7,166,742.41	13,087,047.19	35	38	+3	43	43	0
M_II	7,751,893.41	7,928,424.83	43	36	–7	50	46	–4
M_III	7,936,895.32	10,244,597.25	45	39	–6	51	46	–5
M_IV	4,910,708.60	8,602,355.81	42	37	–5	48	43	–5
P_I	4,831,522.79	6,506,706.24	37	30	–7	41	36	–5
P_II	3,072,058.37	4,154,946.46	40	29	–11	39	33	–6
P_III	11,173,636.82	17,275,752.58	40	29	–11	40	36	–4
P_IV	12,865,418.78	17,317,494.32	43	35	–8	40	37	–3
S_I	7,546,314.25	9,378,927.01	45	37	–8	48	42	–6
S_II	8,797,196.04	10,474,387.11	43	39	–4	46	45	–1
S_III	5,017,050.65	5,751,515.27	39	34	–5	49	43	–6
S_IV	11,188,185.80	19,031,052.03	38	41	+3	48	44	–4

* No data on current expenditures in the studied municipalities in the period of 2006–2008.
Source: Own study based on the Bank Danych Loklanych, GUS.

Although the rationalization measures were implemented in all municipalities, they did not bring significant savings everywhere. The need for cost reduction was pointed out by all respondents. Moreover, in case of some municipalities, a slight increase in education expenditure can be observed, despite the closure of some small schools.

When analyzing the structure of expenditure on education, one can observe that the biggest burden to the budgets was created by teachers’ salaries, which amounted to 74% in 2008, and in 2014 – 72% of overall current expenditure on education (Table 2).

Table 2

Expenditures on teachers’ salaries in the researched municipalities in the years 2008–2014

Municipality	Share of teachers’ salaries* in current municipal expenditures on education		Share of teachers’ salaries* in total current expenditures of municipalities		Change
	2008**	2014	2008	2014	2008–2014
1	2	3	4	5	6
M_I	76	77	33	33	0
M_II	76	65	38	30	–8
M_III	78	76	40	35	–5
M_IV	78	77	37	33	–4
P_I	76	78	31	28	–3
P_II	66	78	26	26	0

1	2	3	4	5	6
P_III	73	75	29	27	–2
P_IV	70	74	28	27	–1
S_I	70	44	34	18	–15
S_II	74	78	34	35	1
S_III	74	62	36	25	–11
S_IV	77	81	37	36	–1

* Salaries including derivatives.
** No data on current expenditures in the period of 2006–2007.

Source: Own study based on the Bank Danych Loklanych, GUS.

The above table shows that despite the implemented rationalization measures, the reduction of expenditure on remuneration was insignificant. In the case of two municipalities, it virtually did not change. And in one municipality it increased by 1%. The biggest savings of up to 11% and 15% have been achieved in the municipalities where the authorities have decided to close down small schools and have not provided teachers with jobs in the only local school that the municipality was legally obliged to maintain. This solution is an example of the most radical approach among the authorities of the examined municipalities. Yet, the process of school closures in these municipalities, as well as its consequences were different. In the case of the S_I municipality, school closures did not cause social conflicts, as the problem with education was signaled much earlier by municipal authorities. They have prepared the inhabitants for such measures and have taken joint efforts to create local associations capable of taking over schools, as evidenced by the opinion of one of the village mayors:

> “We wanted to do it peacefully, I said: we would renovate something before leaving. We have clarified the situation in buildings, that is with Sanitary-Epidemiological Station or National Labor Inspectorate. We handed over the buildings in good condition. The council has adopted a resolution to lend buildings for 6 years. We even went to court with some of them to register, because they did not know how to go about it [...] For someone who is not working in school, setting up an association it is a big deal” (interview: S/I/W).

In the case of the municipality S_III, the generated savings resulted from the decision to close down the schools and not employ teachers. The lack of job offers for the employees of small schools intended to close has also proved to be a motivating factor for establishing the associations willing to run schools. In the case of this municipality, however, it is difficult to talk about a partnership, since the municipality authorities clearly distanced themselves from this solution. They have handed over the school buildings to new associations, albeit without any additional support. The lack of cooperation with teachers and the local community was the reason for the protests and social opposition. This is reflected by the opinion of the headmistress of the school run by the association (and the founder of the association willing to run the school):

> “First off indignation. And later ... just like people ... well, there was a hesitation for half a year. Will we manage? How to go about it? Shall we get down to it? Yes – we consulted with other associations. Although 6 years ago there were not so many of them [...]” (interview: S/III/R2/N/ST).

In both aforementioned cases, radical decisions were taken by the authorities enjoying wide social support, albeit fully aware of possible social consequences. This is reflected by responses of the village mayors to the question whether they were considering the consequences of school closures and feared the results of the next election:

> “At that moment, I would have no chance, I’d lose the elections. Definitely. The election was in 2 years, people saw that the associations were functioning, that nothing really worsened” (interview: S/I/W).

> “Yes, yes, yes. I was worried but I was concerned with the economy. Because it would knock my municipality down. I could not take the loan then. Only for investment and repayment of the loan, and earlier it was possible to take it for education, for the current ... And when there was no… then I could either close down, or it would mean the bankruptcy of the municipality...” (interview: S/III/W).

Most municipalities have opted for much softer solutions, which at the same time do not lead to a reduction in educational expenditures. Apart from the declared need for cost reduction, there were other issues that proved to be important, such as parents’ concerns about children’s transport, an integrative role of the school (building) in the rural community and the commitment to preserve it, as well as the role of teachers, who in some municipalities were trying to stand up for the schools intended for closure and mobilize residents to defend the facility, encouraging them to rebel against the authorities. The last argument turned out to be crucial. It was in the best interest of the teachers to maintain the existing *status quo*. They were neither convinced by rational arguments about the burden on the municipal budget, nor the teaching conditions or limited opportunities for children development in small groups. From the teachers’ point of view, it was rational to keep the jobs and the current employment conditions (Teachers’ Charter). Therefore, they did not agree to any changes – including maintenance of the school network in the present shape, but with a change of school authority into a non-public entity. Although such a solution would, on the one hand, significantly relieve the municipality budget, while at the same time ensuring jobs for teachers, in practice it was rarely accepted by this social group.

Teachers’ resistance in some municipalities has softened the position of the authorities and resulted in employing some teachers in the remaining municipal schools (on a full-time or part-time basis) or providing them with other posts in the municipality. In attempting to counter the resistance of teachers, the authorities of some municipalities went as far as to adopt ethically questionable solutions in order to break up the teaching community (employing some of them or offering a job to a headmaster) or to gain the favor of local community, e.g. by promising investment for the town or jobs for some residents. In some municipalities, however, the teachers and parents decided to set up associations to run schools, and the process of school liquidation itself proved to be an opportunity for social mobilization. This is evidenced by the opinion of one of the teachers of municipal school, then a co-founder of the association and now a headmaster of the association school:

> “So we were backed into a corner. That if we don’t do something, don’t set up the association, then ... there will be no work” (interview: M/II/DS/N/ST1).

In part of the studied municipalities, the authorities were not aiming at job cuts from the beginning, well aware of small savings associated with such a form of education pol-

icy rationalization. In these municipalities, it was more about rationalizing a school network and improving teaching conditions rather than cutting costs. The issue of teachers employment was also taken into consideration. The authorities of some municipalities emphasized that they were also the inhabitants of the municipality and that they could not be deprived of their work. The question of possible influence of teachers’ community on the decisions of other residents was taken into account, too. Therefore, the authorities of the municipalities, having decided to close down the schools, immediately declared employment security for teachers, thus securing support of the teaching community, who – assured of keeping their jobs – became the ambassadors of the authorities, trying to convince the local community that the decision to close down a small school was right. The following opinions confirm the above points. An opinion of the village mayor of one of the municipalities in Pomorskie province:

> “I must admit that I got prepared for it. After the experience of the previous liquidation,[4] I offered jobs to everyone, from the headmaster to the cleaner and the fireman” (interview: P/II/W).

Opinion of the mayor in one of the municipalities in Pomorskie province:

> “The teachers of the schools where the children were to come were my ambassadors [...] It was not buying teachers. This was the moment when I could provide people with jobs. We had always cared for jobs; if we’d put it off, there might not have been such opportunity later” (interview: P/III/W).

The processes of rationalizing education policy in municipalities cannot be perceived as one-dimensional phenomena and narrowed down to economic issues. Unquestionably high costs of carrying out educational tasks in rural and urban-rural municipalities have contributed to introducing changes. However, both the implemented rationalizing solutions and the relations with particular social groups, including the key group in the case of educational policy, i.e. teachers were determined by the authorities’ conviction about the scale of support, their position in the local community and further plans. However, it should be noted that the local authorities, particularly the executive bodies, which were fully responsible for decisions about school closures, overestimated the importance of the school in the local community, as well as the opinion-forming nature of the teachers. And they were unnecessarily apprehensive about the negative consequences of even the most radical decisions.[5] Despite the carried out closures – in the studied municipalities – none of the village heads/mayors lost their posts due to the liquidation of schools.

[4] The interviewed mayor, during the previous closure of schools in researched municipality, was the chairman of the council. He had the opportunity to observe the consequences of such a decision, which affected strongly the contemporary mayor. The loss of public support and ensued conflict between local authorities and community was not so much a result of the decision to liquidate the schools but the result of the way in which the liquidation has been done.

[5] The results of a research conducted in the Podkarpackie province in 2012 in rural and urban-rural municipalities indicate that executive bodies are apprehensive about the consequences of school closures. As many as 84.6% of the surveyed mayors said that the municipality was able to bear the high costs of education policy due to ”social considerations”. At the same time, 23% pointed out that school closedown was too difficult to implement. It can be assumed that it is about ”difficulties” in the social dimension, because it is not a complicated process formally. 7.7% of respondents indicated that school closedown was a ”political suicide” (Kotarba, 2014, pp. 53–71).

Only in two of the studied municipalities there have been replacements of village heads, though they were not related to school closures.[6]

Conclusions

The rationalization of education policy of the Polish municipalities was enforced by two, coupled factors – the demographic decline and high costs of educational tasks. The problem of intervention in this area affected particularly rural and urban-rural municipalities, where education was a heavy financial burden. For a few years, local governments have been trying to reduce costs by taking various measures to reorganize school system in their own area. The solution that brings about noticeable financial effects is the liquidation of some schools (with a small number of students) combined with the reduction in teachers’ posts. This solution, albeit easy to adapt in theory, is much more difficult to implement in practice due to the specificity of local communities and the main stakeholder that loses out most as a result, i.e. the teachers.

The authorities of the municipalities, aware of the teachers’ role in the local community and their impact on the local residents, rarely resort to radical solutions. On the one hand, their aim is not to aggravate the situation of one of the social groups that are, after all, a part of the local community. On the other hand, implementing “safe” solutions results from pursuing their own interests – the fear of losing public support, which is particularly important when planning a further political career. It seems rational from the perspective of the municipality to avoid social conflict and find a solution that satisfies others. This also explains the economically irrational solutions implemented in most of the studied municipalities. Although they did not bring financial savings, they proved to be socially beneficial from the perspective of the municipal authorities.

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[6] One of the mayors (municipality in Mazowieckie province) did not run in the following election on grounds of age. In another municipality, the mayor stood for the election, but did not win it. As he himself stated, the reason was probably not related to school closures, which is reflected in the following opinion: ”It is hard to say. Did it matter? To some extent it did. After all, the electoral district in Y (a village in Świętokrzyskie province, where the school was closed – the author’s note) is small. And it did not in fact contribute to my losing the election. Y is an electoral district with very few voters. I do not remember now. But they were really noisy. Especially the present mayor...” (interview: S/II/bW).

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Kiedy racjonalność spotyka się z interesem politycznym. Problemy racjonalizacji polityki edukacyjnej w polskich gminach

Streszczenie

W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań dotyczących racjonalizacji polityki oświatowej w gminach wiejskich i miejsko-wiejskich. Autorka koncentruje się na najbardziej radykalnym rozwiązaniu racjonalizatorskim, jakim jest likwidacja szkół. Rozwiązanie to choć zasadne pod względem ekonomicznym może okazać się kosztowne w wymiarze społecznym. W artykule autorka weryfikuje hipotezę zakładającą, że postulowana racjonalizacja polityki oświatowej gmin staje się fikcją w sytuacji, gdy władze gmin (organ wykonawczy) kierują się własnym interesem, którym jest utrzymanie poparcia społecznego (zwycięstwo w kolejnych wyborach), a nie racjonalnością ekonomiczną oraz dobrem publicznym.

Problem racjonalizacji sieci szkół w gminach autorka analizowała na gruncie teorii racjonalnego wyboru. Artykuł powstał na postawie badań literatury przedmiotu oraz danych ilościowych, jak również badań empirycznych przeprowadzonych w wybranych gminach w formie półustrukturyzowanych wywiadów. W badaniach korzystano z metody porównawczej, elementów analizy systemowej oraz metod jakościowych. W dwuetapowym procesie autorka badań dokonała wyboru gmin zlokalizowanych w trzech województwach (świętokrzyskim, mazowieckim i pomorskim), a następnie 60 respondentów sposób następujących grup: władze gmin (organ wykonawczy i przedstawiciele organu stanowiącego), nauczyciele, podmioty niepubliczne prowadzące szkoły, członkowie społeczności lokalnych i liderzy lokalni.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka oświatowa, racjonalizacja oświaty, teoria wyboru publicznego, polityka publiczna, likwidacja szkół

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A Civic Budget as a form of civil participation, or an institutional PR tool. The Civic Budget in the City of Poznań

Abstract: The paper discusses the Civic Budget of the City of Poznań (CBP). The analysis focuses on the nature of the CBP and the extent to which it is a participatory budget or rather a PR instrument. The hypothesis is proposed that participatory budgets in Poland are more of a PR instrument than participatory budgets in the strict sense. In order to verify this hypothesis the example of Poznań is analyzed, including the evaluation report of the CBP16. It is concluded that such civic budgets as the CBP can hardly be described as participatory budgets in the strict sense. They do not involve enough consultation, deliberation or actual co-deciding. Too few people are involved in the idea of civic budgets and a clear majority of those who do, only take part in the vote. There are only a few people involved on a long-term basis. All this makes the CBP more of a contest and plebiscite, rather than a participatory budget, which is confirmed by the comparison of the principles and practice of the CBP with the definitions of participatory budgets.

Key words: participatory budget, Civic Budget of the City of Poznań (CBP), public relations of local governments, city promotion

The first edition of the Civic Budget of the City of Poznań (hereinafter referred to as CBP) was launched in 2012. The initiative of the then President of Poznań, Ryszard Grobelny, and his officials appeared to have been well received by Poznanians. The incumbent President, elected in 2014, Jacek Jaśkowiak, has continued the project. Actually, in his election platform he promised to reinforce the instrument of CBP and increase the resources dedicated to the CBP up to PLN 30 mln (Lipoński, 2016). The CBP resources increased from PLN 10 to 15 mln in the fourth edition of the CBP16 project (*Poznański Budżet Obywatelski zwiększony...*), then to PLN 17.5 mln in the CBP17 (*Zasady Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego 2017*) and to PLN 18 mln in the current CBP18 edition (*160 projektów do...*). The CBP regulations have also changed. It can actually be stated that they were written from scratch within the CBP17 framework. The new principles were intended to facilitate the procedure of project submission and selection. They also took into account the conclusions from the evaluation of the CBP16 edition.

The instrument of civic budgets appears to have been firmly engraved in local governments at the municipal level in Poland. Poznań is an excellent example here. The analysis of successive CBP editions illustrates the principal difficulties encountered when implementing this instrument, as well as its advantages and drawbacks. An interesting research issue emerges in this context, namely the attempt to identify the nature of civic budgets in Poland. The question arises of how to classify them in their present form. There are opinions (or even accusations) by journalists, among others, that civic budgets, such as the CBP, are only an instrument (element) of public relations for the city

hall, or rather for the head of the municipality, the city’s mayor or president (*Jakie efekty konsultacji?*). It is therefore worth posing a research question of whether civic budgets in their present form, as exemplified by the CBP, are truly participatory budgets as their name suggests, or rather yet another instrument of local government PR, as has recently been pointed out. In answering this question, a hypothesis should be proposed that the civic budgets implemented in Poland (including the CBP) have the features of participatory budgets and exert an advantageous impact on civic activity of residents but, due to their campaign character and the involvement of city (municipal) halls in their promotion, they are more of a modern PR instrument.

In his definition of a participatory budget, Rachwał (2013, p. 174) indicates that it is a “bottom-up process in which budgetary priorities are identified and citizens indicate which investments and projects should be implemented in their locality.” In his opinion, the notion ‘civic budget’ used in Poland does not fully render the complexity of this process; therefore this scholar is of the opinion that the notion ‘participatory budget’ appears more appropriate to describe an extended process of citizens influencing the shape of their city’s budget. He says that a participatory budget is “an instrument of civil participation in the process of making decisions on public financial resources.” He remarks that, in order to talk about truly participatory budgets, specific minimal conditions have to be fulfilled for such a procedure of civil participation. Rachwał lists several principles here. First, the discussion should concern financial (budgetary) issues and the division of limited resources. Second, participatory budgets should be designed for a town/city or its districts, that is for an area with distinct administration and elective decision-making bodies. Third, it does not suffice to have a single meeting or referendum. Fourth, the procedure has to be cyclical. Fifth, participatory budgets should entail the element of public debates, held in the course of special sessions or fora. Sixth, the ideas approved during the meetings should be accounted for. Last but not least, the results of the procedure should be binding, which distinguishes participatory budgets from social consultation (Rachwał, 2013, p. 175).

It is worth emphasizing that some studies indicate that civic budgets have a considerable impact on the growth of social involvement and specific decisions made by city councils. In the surveys conducted among city councillors in the towns of Lublin and Rzeszów, Radzik-Maruszak and Pawłowska noted that when asked about the influence different forms of civic participation have in their opinion, the respondents pointed to civic budgets, coming second only to local elections. Councillors believe that this form has a strong influence on the decisions they make even though the municipal councils as such are barely involved in civic budgets, the researchers stress (Radzik-Maruszak, Pawłowska, 2017, pp. 90–91).

Paweł Głogowski’s analysis entitled “Poznański budżet obywatelski 2017 – rekomendacje” [Civic budget of Poznań 2017 – recommendations] observes that “every civic budget should encompass the following: decisions of city residents are binding for the authorities, the process of designing and managing a civic budget is transparent and open, it provides for discussions, facilitates involvement of residents, it is planned for several years and its amount is reasonable” (Głogowski, 2016). His definition of civic budgets is actually similar to that of participatory budgets, yet using the two notions synonymously seems to be an excessive simplification.

This is particularly true when the notion public relations is taken into account. Public relations (PR) are defined as an element of business management as concerns the communication between an institution and its surroundings (Akademia Predu). For instance, Scott M. Cutlip, Allen H. Center and Glen M. Broom define PR as this management function which establishes and maintains mutually beneficial relations between the institution and those groups in the audience that are decisive for its success or failure (newsline.pl). Olędzki stresses the fact that the original, classical approach to PR (the normative variant) is related to managing the image of an organization. In this context, PR is defined as the “ability to manage the image of an organization and shape this image while communicating with its internal and external environment” (Olędzki). He goes on to add that PR is “the name of the art of communication, interpersonal dialogue and avoiding conflicts” (Olędzki, 2006, p. 18).

In the analysis of the importance and role of civic budgets it is worth referring to Barber’s recent observations concerning participatory budgets. In his book *If Mayors Ruled the World* Barber writes that the “city is the only hope for democracy. The neighborhood, the town, and the city and thus the cosmopolis they compose also share the potential for strong democratic participation. […] participatory budgeting has become a notable urban instrument of both democratization and social justice. It opens the realm of democratic participation and community building […] at the municipal level, citizen participation is feasible […] debate among citizens can […] open the way to common ground. […] citizen democracy [has become] one of the most significant initiatives in the world in the domain of eDemocracy and eParticipation” (Barber, 2014, pp. 249–257). Interviewed by the “Rzeczpospolita” daily, he says that “the growing strength of cities and their independence from central authorities raises some hopes. Given the dysfunctional central governments, local governments are becoming the mainstay of normalness, progress, tolerance and even combating climate change. This is true about the USA and the rest of the world, including Poland […] Even if the central government in Warsaw attempts to introduce the wildest and most backwards changes, the authorities of such cities as Gdańsk, Wrocław, Katowice and Warsaw will ensure the survival of progressive values” (Barber, 2017).

It should be emphasized that local governments, in particular those in large regional cities, are increasing their outlays on local marketing and broadly understood promotion. Socha states in his article “PR za PRL” [PR in the Polish People’s Republic] that “promotion has become fashionable in local governments” and “the PR sector has unexpectedly discovered this client – a good client who is resistant to market turbulence.” He makes an interesting comparison of how many people are professionally involved in the promotion of selected cities. In 2012, he wrote that “36 people deal with PR, or – briefly speaking – with promotion, in Gdańsk City Hall, 24 in Poznań, 31 in Wrocław, and in Łódź and Kraków – 44–45 workers each.” Socha rightly notes that “the PR of local government frequently has the face and name of the local ruler. President of Zielona Góra, Janusz Kubicki, who ran for reelection in 2010, advertised the annual grape harvest with his own face featuring on several dozen enormous billboards. His employees told the media that ‘our campaign was preceded by a thorough analysis which showed that personalized advertising is more effective.’ Yet one year later, the ‘thorough analysis’ was forgotten and the invitation did not make use of the president’s portrait and was more moderate. Inhabitants of towns and cities are frequently irritated when local awards or

scholarships are referred to as the president’s or mayor’s awards, instead of the awards of their respective towns. They point to huge advertisements being purchased in the newspapers by local authorities to give the president an opportunity to wish the readers a happy holiday of this or that kind. The closer the elections, the greater the format of those wishes. Flickering through the publications issued by local authorities they count the pictures featuring the mayor or head of their municipality in the foreground and name it a feudal manner of self-promotion.” He concludes by yet another example: “Members of local authorities are ready to make different sacrifices. In late December of 2011, the town of Strzelce Opolskie was not so much excited about a new roofed swimming pool opened in the Strzelec Recreation and Sports Center but about their mayor, who was the first one to test the pool diving in fully clad in a suit and bow-tie. ‘It’s a good thing he took off his glasses and shoes’ journalists said” (Socha, 2012).

Such examples appear to confirm that, in the practical operations of local authorities, local marketing is combined with political marketing. The city’s promotional activities typically benefit its president (mayor). A skillfully implemented information strategy of the city hall should translate into the support city residents give to the city authorities, and ensure their positive assessment of the executive power – the president. It is difficult to believe it has been a coincidence that promotional activities have intensified after the electoral principles pertaining to county heads, mayors and presidents changed in 2002, when they started to be directly elected. The numbers of officers in charge of information and promotional activities have been on the rise along with the budgets allocated to them. The Supreme Audit Office (NIK) has reviewed cities’ promotional expenditures. NIK auditors have noted that “the analysis of reports by local governments performed by the Ministry of Finance over 2005–2010 has revealed that their promotion expenditures increased six times in this period (from PLN 109 mln to PLN 651 mln). The greatest increases were recorded in cities with county rights and in regions – by 654% and 781% respectively. Cities with county rights and municipalities spent the greatest share of their budgets on promotion, accounting for 46% and 39% respectively in 2010. In 2011–2013 the following cities with county rights had the greatest promotional expenditure: Warsaw (PLN 85.8 mln), Gdańsk (PLN 59.3 mln), Bydgoszcz (PLN 52.6 mln), Łódź (PLN 49.1 mln) and Gdynia (PLN 46.3 mln). High outlays on the promotional activities of the public administration, financed from public resources, attracted the attention of NIK as early as in 2011. An audit of local governments in regions, counties and municipalities revealed multiple faults (such as a lack of appropriate supervision of local authorities over the implementation of promotional services rendered, and failing to define the expected, measurable outcomes or benefits of marketing activities planned)” (*Działania promocyjne wybranych miast na prawach powiatu*).[1]

We should therefore consider the nature of civic budgets in Poland: are they more participatory budgets, or rather PR instruments employed by the authorities? Taking into consideration the above-quoted definitions of participatory budgets, civic budgets in Poland seem to lack participation which is replaced by communication. The CBP is an excellent example here. The principles of the CBP are presented on a website dedicated exclusively to it (https://budzet.um.poznan.pl). Poznań City Hall announces there that

[1] It was not the first such audit. Cf. *Działania promocyjne jednostek samorządu terytorialnego*, Informacja o wynikach kontroli, Nr Ewid. 25/2012/P/11/005/KAP.

the “civic budget is a process allowing the residents of a local community to make direct decisions on how to allocate a portion of public resources. It is therefore a tool facilitating the submission, discussion and implementation of projects for the benefit of your city and its residents. The civic budget means public money whose purpose is decided by city residents. It does not involve any additional resources, but specific amounts which are embedded in the overall city budget.”

In 2016, the whole city of Poznań had PLN 17.5 mln at its disposal, followed by a further 18 mln in 2017. Civic budgets offer a unique opportunity to city residents to truly and directly participate in deciding on how a portion of the city budget will be spent. Every resident of Poznań can take part in the Poznań Civic Budget. They can submit projects that pertain to any field of life: sports, leisure, education, culture, transportation, environmental protection, social aid, public space, urban greenery, and so on. “A proposal for a project to be implemented under the Civic Budget of Poznań may be submitted by any resident of Poznań – a natural person residing in the territory of the city” (budzet.um.poznan.pl).

The evaluation of the CBP16 by the above-mentioned Paweł Głogowski stresses that “discussing the Civic Budget of Poznań we primarily concentrate on numbers. We are electrified by the amount of the budget, the number of projects submitted and votes cast. So far, however, we have been lacking a serious discussion over the issue of what participatory budgets should be to the city and its dwellers. […] Failing to define the horizon and objective we want to pursue together, designing the CBP, makes it difficult to build an instrument that city residents will understand and trust” (Głogowski, 2016). Another important issue Głogowski stresses concerns the legal basis of the CBP. Analyzing the legal basis, it is worth bearing in mind that civic budgets should not be identified with social consultations which, by principle, are not binding for the authorities. The decrees the president has issued so far have in no way guaranteed that the projects submitted and selected by the inhabitants under the CBP procedure will be implemented. By this token, the current status of the CBP fails to meet one of the fundamental elements of participatory budgets, namely being legally binding” (Głogowski, 2016).

Yet it should be stressed that the instrument of civic or participatory budgets is absent from Polish legislation. From the formal point of view, the activities implemented by municipalities constitute social consultations since they are founded entirely on Article 5(a) of the law on municipal governments, which stipulates that, in the cases specified by the law and in other matters that are important for the municipality, consultations with its residents may be carried out. The principles and mode of consultations with the residents of the municipality are stipulated in a resolution of the municipal council (Ustawa *o samorządzie gminnym*). Therefore, in compliance with Polish legislation, civic budgets are not, and cannot be binding, the more so as the resources they allocate are part of the municipal budget.

Thus, it should be assumed that both the CBP and other civic budgets in Poland to a large extent are an element of the PR activities of city halls, including Poznań in this case. Taking into account how public relations are defined and perceived, this should not be viewed critically, however. When analyzing the differences, it should be stressed that if the CBP is a PR instrument of local authorities that Poznań City Hall addresses at the city residents, the best assessment of its effectiveness, including the quality of this tool, is expressed by the opinion of Poznań residents as the recipients of these activities. Therefore, the selected results of the evaluation made of the CBP16 are worth presenting.

The CBP16 is frequently considered to be the least successful of all. Rafał Janowicz, who was in charge of the first such comprehensive evaluation of the CBP, stresses in the report evaluating this edition of the city budget that “the implementation of social innovations (such as the CBP16) always poses a challenge, requires permanent monitoring and reviewing, thereby making it possible to pursue the goals set for such a civic budget. The evaluation of the CBP15 allowed us to identify which elements needed to be changed and draw up the recommendations for further editions. Some of them were included in the CBP16 whereas others still need to be considered before being introduced. The process of finding the right model for the CBP continues as both the city and its residents constantly change, which creates the need to adapt the model of the civic budget in Poznań to a changing reality and future challenges. The aim of the almost two month-long evaluation process […] was to provide the data allowing the civic budget of Poznań to be improved in the editions to follow, so that it addresses both social needs and the goals of such a budget” (*Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego* 2016).

The study was conducted in order to evaluate the Civic Budget of Poznań 2016 and develop an improved model for the next edition – CBP 2017. The study applied methodological triangulation, among other things, which is understood as “carrying out studies and analyses using mutually complementing methods and techniques adjusted to different



Graph 1. General evaluation of CBP16

Source: *Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego 2016*, Prezentacja głównych wyników badania ewaluacyjnego dla Gabinetu Prezydenta Miasta Poznania, Poznań, 8 kwietnia 2016 r.

stakeholder groups, budget capacities and the time allowed for the project.” The team from Brand Experience ran an evaluation study, comprising 251 online interviews, a representative telephone survey on a sample of 600 Poznanians and eight in-depth interviews with City Councillors. All this accounted for 1,000 stakeholders taking part by means of 851 online interviews, 149 interviews given during 12 evaluation meetings and 8 in-depth interviews. The study results clearly indicate that as many as 93% of respondents from Poznań (including 99% of voters for the CBP16 and 99% of the representatives of institutional stakeholders) believe that the CBP is definitely or quite a good idea. In the opinion of the respondents “the CBP is a good idea allowing the needs of city residents to be met, improve quality of life and create civil society, giving the sense of having influence and educating. Additionally, it builds social capital, offers an instrument for needs analysis, is a source of interesting ideas and a way to build the image of the city.”

The above graph demonstrates that as many as 70% of city residents know about the CBP. It can therefore be said that it is a familiar and recognizable ‘brand,’ which is a sufficient reason to continue it. At the same time, the respondents found it difficult to identify CBP objectives, which resulted in such general and imprecise replies as “to make dreams come true,” “to find ideas,” as well as “to build the image of the city,” “to identify the needs of residents and manage the city better.”



Graph 2. CBP16 evaluated by different groups

Source: *Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego* 2016, Prezentacja głównych wyników badania ewaluacyjnego dla Gabinetu Prezydenta Miasta Poznania, Poznań, 8 kwietnia 2016 r.

Graph 2 shows that the CBP is best evaluated by the residents who voted for it (77% of positive opinions). The evaluation of residents in general was slightly lower, which is the consequence of a high proportion of respondents who had no opinion (17% of replies: “difficult to say”). Thus, Poznanians appreciate the possibility of taking part in the vote. The greatest criticism was expressed by the respondents most involved in the CBP, who are aware of the organizational difficulties related to the whole procedure – city councillors, officers and applicants (57% of positive replies). It is worth emphasizing that there were no undecided respondents in this group – everybody had a clear opinion on this matter.



Graph 3. Assessment of successive stages of the CBP

Source: *Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego* 2016, Prezentacja głównych wyników badania ewaluacyjnego dla Gabinetu Prezydenta Miasta Poznania, Poznań, 8 kwietnia 2016 r.

Whereas the evaluation of the CBP as a whole was more or less unified and generally positive, the individual stages differed considerably in terms of their assessment. The respondents were definitely most appreciative of the submission (69% of positive opinions) and development stages, and most critical of the voting stage, counting of votes and announcing the results. There were also many negative opinions concerning the stage of project evaluation and review. A considerable proportion of respondents was not able or did not want to evaluate the last stage, namely project implementation (as many as 39% did not respond to this question). This may partly be explained by the fact

that, at the time of the evaluation study, a majority of the selected projects had not been implemented yet. Nevertheless, these results are quite a clear indication that whereas the evaluation of the CBP as such (or as an idea) is overall positive, its course and organization are definitely rated lower.



Graph 4. CBP16 greatest successes

Source: *Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego* 2016, Prezentacja głównych wyników badania ewaluacyjnego dla Gabinetu Prezydenta Miasta Poznania, Poznań, 8 kwietnia 2016 r.

Indicating the advantages of the CBP16, respondents primarily pointed to the amount which went up by PLN 5 mln, and the division of the CBP into projects addressing individual districts and general urban projects. The fact that the number of submitted projects increased from 207 (CBP15) to 272 (CBP16), and that the number of projects admitted for vote rose from 30 (CBP15) to 168 (CBP16) was also seen as a positive development, as was the number of voters, which went up from 54,000 to 73,000, and the implementation of as many as 38 projects, which was six times more than in the previous edition. It was noted that, regardless of organizational drawbacks, the CBP opened to residents to a larger extent, arousing higher interest levels, which translated into a higher participation of city residents in all stages of the process.



Graph 5. CBP16 greatest drawbacks

Source: *Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego* 2016, Prezentacja głównych wyników badania ewaluacyjnego dla Gabinetu Prezydenta Miasta Poznania, Poznań, 8 kwietnia 2016 r.

The greatest drawbacks of the CBP16 edition involved insufficient transparency and unclear rules and regulations of the CBP; the resulting changes of principles introduced during the CBP; according to many residents, an unfair division of resources between the districts;[2] non-transparent procedure of project evaluation; the controversies arising in the process of voting and counting of votes; and – perhaps most importantly – the lack of guarantees that the winning projects would actually be implemented. Due to negligence, the winning project turned out to be impossible to implement for formal reasons (such as the lack of a conservation officer’s permit) even though the City Hall had issued a positive opinion at the verification stage, stating that there were no formal barriers and admitting the project for vote. There can hardly be something worse for the city, or more discouraging for applicants, than the knowledge that the project that wins support from city residents will not be implemented through the fault of officials.

[2] Poznań is administratively divided into 42 estates, but in the CBP16, the city was divided into five parts corresponding to the historical city districts. Therefore, the winners were projects enjoying the support of people residing in multifamily buildings (in the city center and on cooperative housing estates).



Graph 6. Recommendations for the future (successive CBP editions)

Source: *Ewaluacja Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego* 2016, Prezentacja głównych wyników badania ewaluacyjnego dla Gabinetu Prezydenta Miasta Poznania, Poznań, 8 kwietnia 2016 r.

The evaluation brought the following principal conclusions which, to a large extent, were taken into consideration in the following edition of CBP17. First, in the opinion of the respondents, the CBPs should become a “common civil good” and an instrument for building civil society and social capital. These quite vague, yet highly ambitious objectives appear to respond to residents’ needs related to increasing the role of the CBP. The experience has additionally shown that the entire process should have been prepared with more care, the principles should have been described in more detail and the course of the CBP planned at every stage. In the opinion of the respondents, only then could the transparency of the process have been ensured. Additionally, a change to the timeline has been suggested, where successive stages should be accelerated, and residents’ involvement increased, among other things by means of introducing a stage of discussion over the projects. The evaluation study laid the foundations for a comprehensive review of the entire CBP procedure once more and facilitated the work on the CBP17 which was much better designed and, consequently carried out.

In conclusion, it can be said that civic budgets, such as the Civic Budget of Poznań, do not quite fall into the category of participatory budgets. They lack consultation, discus-

sion and the actual co-deciding practice. Too few people get involved in this idea, and a majority of them merely cast their votes. There are only a few long-term activists. For these reasons, the CBP is more of a contest, a kind of plebiscite rather than a participatory budget as confirmed by the comparison of the principles and practice of the CBP with the definitions of participatory budgets. The CBP is more reminiscent of urban contests for grants dedicated to city residents rather than to community councils and entities of the third sector (NGOs). It is a contest or a PR tool employed by the city hall and president of the city. The hypothesis posed at the beginning appears to be confirmed. This does not mean, however, that criticism of the idea of the CBP is justified. After all, the conclusions show that the CBP is a highly valuable, needed and appreciated initiative which deserves to be continued. In 1930, Arthur W. Page wrote that the first principle of PR is “tell the truth,” the second one is “prove it with action” and the third one says “listen to the customer” (Page). The CBP is a nearly pure example of PR. Yet if PR is about telling the truth (communicating data and facts), there is nothing wrong about it at all. The principles governing the CBP17 showed that a considerable portion of conclusions from the evaluation of the CBP16 were included. Thanks to this, the later edition was a definite improvement on the CBP16, maybe the best edition of the civic budget in Poznań ever. The only shortcoming was the lower turnout, which resulted from abandoning paper ballots and going only for online voting. On the other hand, this meant that nearly 100% of votes cast were valid, in contrast to earlier editions when even up to 20% of votes had to be invalidated.

As concerns the hypothesis proposed, the conclusion is that the initiative of the CBP has considerably more in common with the PR instruments of the City Hall than with the true and in-depth participation of city dwellers. Yet the conclusions drawn from the observations and studies raise hopes that the CBP as a PR instrument may conceivably transform into a participatory budget in the strict sense. The CBP continues to evolve towards increasing the involvement of city residents at every stage thereby making this scenario possible in the future. Maybe even after several years, the answer to the question asked in the title of this paper will be different than today. The CBP will transform from a PR tool of local government into a true participatory budget. On the other hand, once the CBP meets the criteria allowing it to be classified as a participatory budget, it should not lose its PR features. After all, definitions of PR demonstrate that the motto of this form of communication boils down to saying “do good and talk about it,” and PR as such is about “communicating the truth” (Goban-Klas, 1997, p. 19). Maybe a paper will be written in the future entitled “The evolution of the CBP – from being a PR tool (contest) to a strategy (dialogue with city dwellers).”

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Budżet obywatelski jako forma partycypacji mieszkańców czy narzędzie PR urzędu? Przykład Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego

Streszczenie

W artykule omówiono instytucję Poznańskiego Budżetu Obywatelskiego. Przeprowadzona analiza dotyczy istoty PBO – ile w nim z budżetów partycypacyjnych a ile z public relations. Postawiona hipoteza uznaje polskie budżety partycypacyjne w większym stopniu za narzędzie PR niż budżet partycypacyjny *sensu stricto*. Weryfikując hipotezę posłużono się przykładem poznańskim, w tym raportem z ewaluacji PBO16. W efekcie należy stwierdzić, że budżety obywatelskie takie jak PBO trudno zaliczyć do budżetów partycypacyjnych *sensu stricto*. Za mało w nich konsultacji, deliberacji, faktycznego

współdecydowania. Za mało ludzi angażuje się w tę ideę, a jeśli już to zdecydowana większość tylko podczas głosowania. Osób dłużej działających jest niewielu. Dlatego też PBO to w większym stopniu konkurs, rodzaj plebiscytu, niż budżet partycypacyjny, jeżeli zestawimy zasady i praktykę PBO z definicjami budżetów partycypacyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: budżet partycypacyjny, Poznański Budżet Obywatelski, samorządowe public relations, promocja miast

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How to measure political gnosis? Empirical evidence from Putin's Russia[1]

Abstract: The research applies a method of sources analysis that draws upon a qualitative comparative study of three speeches delivered by Russia's President Vladimir Putin during his annual news conferences. It aims to solve the problems: how was political gnosis changing in Putin's statements over the subsequent 2014–2016 meetings? And how was Putin triggering off a performative potential of presumably non-gnostic elements of discourse to enhance political gnosis? It identifies the drift from authoritarian to totalitarian and democratic gnosis and recognizes a moderate extent of the intensity of political gnosis. The article contributes to political sociology by creating and testing the empirical effectiveness of a research tool for measuring the types and intensity of political gnosis, and distinguishing between political diagnosis and gnosis.

Key words: political religion, epistemic apparatus, semantic structure, political regime, Putin's annual news conferences

Introduction and Methodological Assumptions for the Research

Recent works have revealed the limitations of Juan Linz's research tool for measuring ideology, mentality, and *Weltanschauung* as defining properties of totalitarianism and authoritarianism and studying variations between democratic and non-democratic political thinking (Miley, 2011). However, they have also introduced promising directions of its development. Linz's critics reflected no homogeneous criteria for a distinction between ideology and mentality, their incomparability arising from the absence of shared essential features that would take on various values depending on a type of a regime (Miley, 2015; Fagerholm, 2016), imprecisely determined semantic fields (Barceló, 2017), leaving aside democracy, normative assessment of totalitarianism as the worst system, and empirical ineffectiveness in comparative studies (Miley, 2011, p. 34). The article takes advantage of the criticism and employs a conceptual framework of a sociology of religion to devise an original model of political diagnosis and gnosis. Those terms are not value-laden but treated as theoretical categories. In contrast to the existing approaches (Bäcker, 2016, p. 14), the article argues that political gnosis is not a characteristic of totalitarianism, but there are totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic types of political gnosis. Additionally, the analysis does not strive for measuring political awareness because of uncharted differences between thinking and manifested thinking. Instead, it concentrates on oral expressions of political epistemic apparatuses and thereby omits

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a problem of an extent of the internalization of semantic structures. It defines political epistemic apparatuses as the sets of beliefs determining the interpretation of social reality and considered to be knowledge. The research distinguishes its two breeds: political diagnosis and gnosis. The latter vary in hard core political values which draw upon semantic resources of democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Although gnosis is not the only and sufficient feature to study regimes, it is their indicator as long as it presents semantic structures of the distributed understanding of political reality.

The objectives of the article are to formulate a research tool for measuring the types and intensity of political gnosis and distinguishing between political diagnosis and gnosis, apply it to examine to what extent political gnosis in Vladimir Putin’s statements was democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian and how intense it was. The study tests the empirical effectiveness of the device by assessing how well it performs its methodological function within an analysis.

Research problems are of how was political gnosis changing in Putin’s speeches over the subsequent annual news conferences? And how was Putin triggering off a performative potential of presumably non-gnostic elements of discourse to enhance political gnosis? The first hypothesis assumes the president might have reconfigured political gnosis in its essential features to the extent that it drifted from an authoritarian to totalitarian type, and its intensity and frequency might have increased. Configurations of values might have altered along with the repressiveness of Russian political regime. Second, Putin might have made use of a performative potential of supposedly non-gnostic elements of discourse by reshaping them into a value-based political gnosis. The politician might have fed political gnosis by outwardly non-gnostic discourse. The non-gnostic message might have been substantially different from pure political diagnosis. Also, Putin might have taken advantage of some types of political gnosis to produce another.

The research applies a method of sources analysis that draws on a qualitative comparative study of three speeches delivered by Putin during his annual news conferences between February 20, 2014, and March 26, 2017. The initial caesura is the beginning of Russian military intervention in Ukraine, the empowerment of a vested interest in perpetuating a total enemy of Russia, maintaining sharp divisions between “we” and “they” in public discourse, and determining politico-soteriological goals (Roberts, 2017; Sussex, 2017). The closing caesura is another substantial incentive to brace or change discursive strategies because of a massive wave of protests against current political elites and alleged corruption that might have contributed to a revolutionary situation (Motimele, 2017; Kolstø, 2016).

The conferences were staged for Russian and foreign journalists accredited in Russia. Putin answered questions from reporters, other people in the studio, and spectators from across the country. The Press Secretary for the President of Russia decided who asked and set an order of questions. In contrast to other Putin’s meetings (e.g., the so called *Priamaja linia*, the Q&A for Russians), conferences were not wholly centrally controlled. However, even if participants were not expected to table proposals for issues before a conference, their subject matter was highly predictable. The Q&A form of meetings gives the research the opportunity to observe how Putin produced political gnosis and how he took advantage from presumably non-gnostic elements of discourse to back the discursive structures of gnosis.

The relational content analysis uses original research tools to collect and elaborate data necessary and sufficient to solve the research problems. A categorization key to content analysis serves to abstract the political diagnosis and gnosis, including democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian elements of semantic resources from stenographic records of the conferences. Then, a theoretical framework of gnosis enables us to determine manifestations of political gnosis, intensity, and dissimilarities between its three types.

Conceptualizing, Operationalizing, and Measuring Political Gnosis

The article creates scales by the criteria of primary political values for regimes and values of the distinctive qualities of gnosis. The first allows us to identify the configuration of democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian components in political gnosis. The second applies to determine their intensity. Both indicate the configurations of diagnostic and gnostic epistemic apparatuses. The research adopts a concept-driven coding method to recognize in Putin’s speeches the oral utterances of a conceptual framework. Codes are of a theoretical and qualitative genre. Statements which do not have key hallmarks of political gnosis but fulfill essential parameters for political diagnosis are coded as the latter. The characteristics of political gnosis are splitting the political universe into the good internal world and the evil external world, fallacious immanentization of the eschaton, manifestations of presumed anomie among a populace, political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous knowledge, and strategies of survival on the historic battlefield. Each of them takes on values (qualitative quantities assigned to a feature) that contribute to the extent of the intensity of political gnosis. The most frequently represented values are dominant, and as such, they perform an indicating role to assess the intensity.

A wording is coded as democratic gnosis when satisfies the criteria for political gnosis and refers to democratic values (liberty, freedom, equalities, justice, human rights, civil rights) and institutions (universal franchise on a one-person, one-vote basis, regular and contested voting operating at two distinct levels of parliament and general elections, and majority rule) (Martin, 1997), totalitarian – the country, state, Russia, statehood, and authoritarian – the nation, Russian, and people. The words sharing semantic fields with the mentioned categories have a status of indicators equal to them (e.g., Russia and Russian Federation).

Types of Political Gnosis

During the conferences, Putin created a political universe remarkably consistent with those he disseminated in other communicational situations (Dyson, Parent, 2017, p. 6). The employment of the conceptual framework of democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian gnosis shows the distribution of oral manifestations that both met essential features of political gnosis and drew upon democratic institutions and values, nation or state. Though some utterances complied with the criteria for political gnosis, they were neither democratic nor non-democratic because Putin did not anchor them in the direct refer-

ences to the core political values of the regimes. As a result, Putin’s speeches embodied more expressions of general gnosis than democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian types in all. The general form, however, empowered the particular ones by supporting their narrative constructions. The elements of political diagnosis performed the same function but were in the minority. For the sake of clarity, their count was smaller than a number of individual components of political diagnosis because that part of the analysis addressed the holistic visions of reality. Despite the scope of images, they lent weight to the arguments for the immanentization of the Russian World.

Table 1

The configuration of the elements of political gnosis and diagnosis in Putin’s annual news conferences

A type of epistemic apparatus	A count of manifestations		
	2014	2015	2016
Democratic gnosis	3	0	12
Authoritarian gnosis	178	143	163
Totalitarian gnosis	103	84	118
Political diagnosis	62	43	28

Source: Own study.

In 2014, 82% of the references to a political universe was political gnosis, in 2015 – 84%, and in 2016 – 91% (Table 1). Whereas the frequency of gnostic manifestations increased, the rate of political diagnosis decreased. The configuration of gnostic and diagnostic elements in Putin’s speeches did not reflect changes in Russian domestic and foreign politics. Political events that were in the public eye in 2014, such as Russian military intervention in Ukraine, did not affect the oral construction of a political universe significantly.

In 2014, 1% of the elements of political gnosis were democratic, 63% – authoritarian, and 36% – totalitarian. In 2015, 63% – authoritarian and 37% – totalitarian. In 2016, 4% – democratic, 56% – authoritarian, and 40% – totalitarian. Not in the whole period, authoritarian political gnosis was dominant. Its frequency declined about 7 percentage points from 2014–2015 to 2016. The extent of totalitarianism and democracy in gnostic semantic structures mounted slightly.

In using democratic gnosis, in 2014, Putin referred twice to economic freedom for entrepreneurs and once to social justice. In 2015, no element of democratic gnosis entered Putin’s speech. In 2016, there were 12 references to equal rights of citizens, social, juvenile, and political justice (e.g., “About the prosecution bias in justice in Russia. You know, we have recently taken a lot of decisions aimed at humanising our legislation. This applies to criminal law, to administrative offenses, and additional measures are being taken now” (Putin, 2016)).

Much more frequently Putin exerted totalitarian gnosis. In 2014, 48% of the manifestations of totalitarian gnosis referred to Russia, 33% – the country, and 19% – the state. In 2015, 41% of the images of totalitarian gnosis concerned Russia, 36% – the country, and 23% – the state. In 2016, 47% of the articulations of totalitarian gnosis related to Russia, 33% – the country, and 20% – the state (e.g., “An aggressor is someone who can

attack the Russian Federation. We are stronger than any potential aggressor. I have no problem repeating it” (Putin, 2016)).

Authoritarian gnosis was dominant in 2014 and 2015. In 2014, 12% of the expressions of that type concerned the nation, 55% – the people, and 33% – things defined as Russian (e.g., “but for the benefit of the nation and people. This is the aim” (Putin, 2014)). In 2015, 13% of the articulations of authoritarian gnosis related to the nation, 63% – the people, and 24% – the predicate of Russian. In 2016, 13% of the elements of authoritarian gnosis referred to the nation, 49% – the people, and 38% – things called Russian.

Putin reconfigured political gnosis in its core political values, and thus it drifted from authoritarian to democratic and totalitarian types. From 2014 to 2015, authoritarian gnosis was the lead epistemic apparatus and, additionally, demonstrated a growing tendency in 2016. Totalitarianism dominated in 2016 but remained in a fixed configuration with strong, well-established, and frequent authoritarianism. Even though Putin ceaselessly benefited from political diagnosis, the frequency of the application of non-gnostic elements to support gnostic narration was declining.

Intensity of Political Gnosis

The first essential feature of political gnosis is a distinction between the good internal world and the evil external world, including things, people, and their political values. The differentiation of the elements of a political universe is a consequence of the semantic creation of the intrinsically either acceptable or unacceptable beings and phenomena. The analysis adopts a broadly inclusive approach toward the worlds by not introducing the subcategories of the elements. On the level of the distinction between the worlds, two homogeneous criteria of the positive valorization of the inside world and the negative valorization of the outside world let us recognize the extents of the intensity of political gnosis. The values of the distinction between the inner and outer worlds are: a maximum extent of political gnosis, sacralization of the internal world and devilization of the external world (3) is when the gnostic sanctifies the interior world so much so that it becomes the sacred, the greatest thing in a universe. An antinomic process focuses on the exterior world. The gnostic damns it so much so that it is to an extreme degree infernal evil. Superlative adjectives used to create the worlds in that way indicate the highest intensity of gnosis. A moderate extent, melioration of the internal world and pejorativization of the external world (2) is when the gnostic displays affectionate and frenetic allegiance to the worlds under valorizing, either positive or negative. The gnostic designs the worlds by exalted manifestations of worship or revulsion respectively. Comparative and positive adjectives serve as a means of oral construction. In a low extent, defensive relativization of the internal world and offensive relativization of the external world (1), the gnostic treats the elements of the internal world like not as wicked as others. The strategy utilizes comparisons to convince people that they are better against the background of others, just like the remaining elements of “their world.” Offensive relativization of the evil external world makes of the same mechanism. Positive components of the outer world are not as positive as others. The comparison of features depreciates that world. When an idea does not contain the division-based discursive creation and is relatively close to a political di-

agnosis of reality [0], no political gnosis emerges. Description of the features marks the range of political gnosis determined by the extents of its intensity with round brackets. A political diagnosis is marked with square brackets. The defining features of political gnosis and diagnosis mark out boundaries between the categories.

Table 2

Political reality in Putin’s annual news conferences

The intensity of political gnosis/lack of political gnosis	A count of manifestations		
	2014	2015	2016
Political gnosis			
Sacralization of the internal world and devilization of the external world	32	20	19
Melioration of the internal world and pejorativization of the external world	124	110	98
Defensive relativization of the internal world and offensive relativization of the external world	73	67	68
Political diagnosis			
Political diagnosis of reality	42	56	48

Source: Own study.

The configuration of gnostic and non-gnostic elements in Putin’s statements indicates that the former dominated in the whole period (Table 2). Putin kept political diagnosis down. In 2014, 15% of the manifestations concerning political reality were of diagnostic nature, in 2015 – 22%, and in 2016 – 21%. The moderate extent of political gnosis came first from among other values of the distinction between the internal and external worlds from 2014 to 2016. In 2014, 46% of the articulations drew upon melioration and pejorativization (e.g., “Let me remind you about the preparations for the 2014 Olympics, our inspiration and enthusiasm to organise a festive event not only for Russian sports fans, but for sports fans all over the world. However, and this is an evident truth, unprecedented and clearly orchestrated attempts were made to discredit our efforts to organise and host the Olympics. This is an undeniable fact!” (Putin, 2014)). Although in the next year fewer expressions had that value, it remained dominant. In 2015, 43% of the projections took on the average value, in 2016 – 42%. It reflects steadiness in the value’s share in the configurations of the semantic creations of a political universe. The mildly valorizing interpretation of politics showed sharp divisions between its actors and communicated promptitude. Simultaneously, it was a sign of feeling secure, being tough, driving, and having a sense of duty to protect the internal world from the specific components of the hostile forces.

Less numerous was defensive and offensive relativization. A fractional decrease in the use of that type of manifestations occurred between 2014 and 2016. In 2014, 27% of the images took on a low extent, in 2015 – 27%, and in 2016 – 29%. So, the value’s part in the configurations maintained (e.g., “Now about alcohol abuse. Yes, indeed, it is a problem. However, oddly enough, it may not be as bad as in some other countries, particularly, Northern Europe” (Putin, 2016)).

Sacralization and devilization were the least frequent distinguishing between the worlds (e.g., “after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia opened itself to our partners. What did we see? A direct and fully-fledges support of terrorism in

North Caucasus. They directly supported terrorism, you understand?” (Putin, 2014)). Also, it was not as numerous as a political diagnosis. In 2014, 12% of the wordings took on the highest value, in 2015 – 8%, in 2016 – 8%. The role of the extreme value slightly dropped over time but was invariant between 2015 and 2016. Its configuration with other values indicates that Putin perceived no political subject as fully capable of challenging the *status quo*, which reflects no fear of a revolutionary situation (Colgan, Lucas, 2017).

Whereas the first feature of political gnosis focuses on the existing reality, the next one approaches the design and performance of its future shape which is the eschaton. The gnostic fallaciously immanentizes the eschaton – here a vision of the Great Russia that is to appear “in the near future” (Putin, 2014) – by projecting a politico-eschatological idea of the world and implements a policy to actualize them (Voegelin, 1987, p. 166). Political gnosis is gradable by a variant of the immanentization which fills the gnostic’s life with sense. The distinction is a result of a semantic creation of what political reality should dawn and how to obtain the dreamful state. On the level of the fallacious immanentization, a homogeneous criterion of the feasibility of the eschaton enables us to distinguish four levels of the intensity of political gnosis.

The scale is founded on Voegelin’s variants of fallacious immanentization: active mysticism, utopianism, and progressivism (1987). However, it adds eutopianism to the set to enhance its empirical effectiveness. The feature takes on the following values: a maximum extent, active mysticism (4) is the performance of a fully unrealistic vision of the eschaton. The gnostic declares the use of available and inaccessible means to perform it. A high extent, utopianism (3) is when the gnostic frames a wholly unrealistic view of the eschaton and declares the deployment of available means to actualize it. A moderate extent, eutopianism (2) creates a realistic image of the eschaton and makes declarations of the actualization of the eschaton. The gnostic appeals for employing the available means. A low extent, progressivist immanentization (1) focuses on the realistic but not well-defined eschaton and a movement toward a goal. The progressivist gnostic avoids providing clarity about ultimate perfection, takes a selection of desirable factors as the standard, and interprets progress as a qualitative and quantitative rise of the present good-the “bigger and better.” Whereas the gnostic constitutes a heaven on earth, the diagnostic does not form unrealistic expectations. When an expression is not the eschaton-based discursive creation and is relatively close to a political diagnosis of prospective political reality [0], no political gnosis occurs.

Table 3

Fallacious immanentization of the eschaton in Putin’s annual news conferences

The intensity of political gnosis/lack of political gnosis	A count of manifestations		
	2014	2015	2016
Political gnosis			
Active mysticism	0	0	0
Utopianism	0	0	0
Eutopianism	96	84	82
Progressivism	142	138	130
Political diagnosis			
Political diagnosis of current efforts to develop a political community	48	67	65

Source: Own study.

The configuration of gnostic and non-gnostic elements in Putin’s statements points out that the former dominated during the whole period (Table 3). In 2014, 83% of the references to current efforts to develop political community were gnostic, in 2015 and 2016 – 77%. After 2014, the level of political gnosis decreased and kept pace. The absence of narration satisfying the criteria for active mysticism and utopianism indicates that Putin did not outline unrealistic pictures of the eschaton. The most frequent value was progressivism (e.g., “We must work, and the external conditions are forcing us to become more efficient and to shift to innovative development” (Putin, 2014)). In 2014, it characterized 50% of the references, in 2015 – 48%, and in 2016 – 47%. Though eutopianism was not as frequent as progressivism, it entered Putin’s speeches more often than political diagnosis (e.g. “So, it is not about Crimea but about us protecting our independence, our sovereignty and our right to exist” (Putin, 2014)). In 2014, 33% of the expressions took on that value, in 2015 – 29%, and in 2016 – 30%.

The configuration of political diagnosis, eutopianism, progressivism, and the preponderancy of the latter tell Russia is on course to become the Great Russia. Immanentization does not require searching for proselytes (e.g., “I do not take support for the Russian President among a large part of Republican voters as support for me personally, but rather see it in this case as an indication that a substantial part of the American people share similar views with us on the world’s organisation, what we ought to be doing, and the common threats and challenges we are facing. It is good that there are people who sympathise with our views on traditional values because this forms a good foundation on which to build relations between two such powerful countries as Russia and the United States” (Putin, 2016)). Putin avoided spelling any radical change that might have had socially unpredictable results.

The third feature of political gnosis is presumed anomie. The gnostic that creates and distributes political gnosis assumes that recipients feel anomie and refers to its suppositious features. Anomie derives from the absence of regulatory norm and evinces itself in the feelings of instability. The gnostic seeks to distribute political gnosis effectively to win political believers over and encourage them to redistribute political gnosis and thus makes provision for the properties of actual anomie to project a reflection of reality.

The scale to measure the intensity of the feature of political gnosis benefits from Arash Heydari, Iran Davoudi, and Ali Teymoori’s set of indicators of anomie (2011). The authors establish three primary groups of indicators: meaninglessness and distrust, powerlessness, and fetishism of money. Eight statements give voice to meaninglessness and distrust: “I can trust to the statements of high-ranking officials (authority),” “There is little use writing to public officials because often they aren’t really interested in the problems of average men,” “In spite of what some people say, a lot of average men is getting worse, not better,” “I believe most of the congress bills are toward the welfare of people,” “Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man,” “I often wonder what the meaning of life really is,” “It’s hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for future,” “Everything is relative, and there just aren’t any definite rules to live by.” Powerlessness expresses itself in seven statements: “I lead a trapped or frustrated life,” “Nobody knows what is expected of him or her life,” “I have no control over my destiny,” “The socioeconomic status of people determines their dignity and its inevitable,” “The world is changing so fast that it

is hard for me to understand what is going on,” “My whole world feels like it as falling apart,” “No matter how hard people try in life it doesn’t make any difference.” Fetishism of money enters five statements: “To make money, there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy ways and hard ways,” “A person is justified in doing almost anything if the reward is high enough,” “I am getting a college education so I can get a good job,” “I follow whatever rules I want to follow,” “Money is the most important thing in life” (Heydari, Davoudi, Teymoori, 2011, p. 1089). Images falling into the statement category are the element of political gnosis called presumed anomie.

On the level of the presumed anomie, two homogeneous criteria of the anomie indicators and statements enable us to distinguish three levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The presumed anomie takes on the following values: a maximum extent of political gnosis (3) is when the gnostic presumes anomie by extending to meaninglessness and distrust, powerlessness, and fetishism of money. At least 50% of the statements of each indicator is in use. Political gnosis achieves a moderate extent (2) when the gnostic takes advantage of two out of the three indicators and at least 50% of the statements of each one. A low extent (1) occurs when the gnostic refers to one from among the three indicators and at least 50% of its defining statements. When there is no anomie-based discursive creation of a response to the presumed anomie, and an utterance is relatively close to a political diagnosis of relative deprivations [0], no political gnosis makes an appearance.

Table 4

Presumed anomie in Putin’s annual news conferences

The intensity of political gnosis/lack of political gnosis	A count of manifestations		
	2014	2015	2016
Political gnosis			
Three types of the anomie indicators and at least 50% of the statements of each one	no	no	no
Two types of the anomie indicators and at least 50% of the statements of each one	no	no	no
One type of the anomie indicators and at least 50% of the statements of it	yes	yes	yes
Political diagnosis			
Political diagnosis of relative deprivations	0	0	0

Source: Own study.

Putin avoided employing political diagnosis to tell about relative deprivations (Table 4). Gnostic visions of presumed anomie had a low intensity because its expressions met the criteria for at least 50% of the statements of only one indicator. 100% of the statements of fetishism of money occurred in each year, in the form of 149 references in 2014, 119 – 2015, and 108 – 2016 (e.g., “If organisations that are not financial institutions at all, but money laundering vehicles, remain on the Russian market, it will do no good, and depositors will be the ones to suffer. It is for protecting the interests of individuals that the deposit insurance system was introduced” (Putin, 2016)).

In 2014–2016, 12,5% of the indicatory statements of the meaninglessness and distrust occurred, which was less than 50%. They all – in 2014 – 3 expressions, in 2015 – 2, and in 2016 – 3 – referred to the relationships between public officials and ordinary people (e.g., “Here is the answer to the question of whether we trust the so-called local personnel. We

do trust them, of course. An overwhelming majority of the Russian Federation regions are governed by people from those regions, an absolute majority. But there are occasions when the elite needs new blood. That is evident. To that matter, the regions’ population demand a certain replacement of the regional elites” (Putin, 2016)). Powerlessness did not emerge. The configuration of the values indicates Putin did not presume the state-driven anomie and avoided animating the extent of uncertainty among the potential redistributors of political gnosis, which means that the president omitted to produce a semantic universe characteristic of the obviating a revolutionary situation (Colgan, Lucas, 2017).

The fourth feature of political gnosis, obscurantism consists in purposeful withholding information from members of a populace. The gnostic imposes restrictions of disseminating knowledge to prevent the facts from becoming known. On the level of political obscurantism, one homogeneous criterion of a strategy of coping with non-gnostic knowledge lets us define three levels of the intensity of political gnosis. Non-gnostic knowledge is of dangerous nature because it potentially or genuinely precludes the immanentization of the eschaton, supports the external world, and menaces the internal world. Political obscurantism takes on the following values: a maximum extent of political gnosis (3) occurs when the gnostic displays overt hostility to dangerous knowledge and aims to destroy it due to its very nature. The call for fighting off non-gnostic knowledge is the exterminating attempt. A moderate extent (2) is when the gnostic presents non-gnostic knowledge as fake knowledge that misleads. The shift in the established meanings of information is the strategy of faking. A low extent (1) makes an appearance when the gnostic taboos non-gnostic knowledge by making things unmentionable. Wiping information counter to a gnostic perception is the tabooing. When a figment does not take the shape of the discursive eradication of dangerous knowledge, and it is relatively close to contributing to the discussion over diagnosed knowledge of the political meaning [0], no political gnosis appears.

Table 5

Political obscurantism in Putin’s annual news conferences

The intensity of political gnosis/lack of political gnosis	A count of manifestations		
	2014	2015	2016
Political gnosis			
Exterminating dangerous knowledge	0	0	0
Faking dangerous knowledge	8	14	18
tabooing dangerous knowledge	2	6	6
Political diagnosis			
Discussion over diagnosed knowledge of the political meaning	2	4	3

Source: Own study.

The configuration of gnostic and diagnostic elements points out that the former dominated in 2014–2016 (Table 5). Its frequency slightly increased over time. In 2014, 83% of the expressions were of gnostic nature, in 2015 – 83%, and in 2016 – 89%. No symptom of political gnosis took on the maximum value. Putin avoided pursuing the aggressive strategy of exterminating dangerous knowledge. The president considered no information as a dangerous obstacle on Russia’s political way. Oral obscurantization took on a moderate extent. Most of the manifestations consisted in altering information with their interpretation (e.g. “Are there any indications of some people going overboard, so

to speak, in what they do? Maybe there are. This happens always and everywhere. It is essential to look into this. If the media pay attention to it, this is the best method of fighting all sorts of excesses, including with regard to the opposition. You have mentioned some of these people. Everyone is entitled to have an opinion. Everyone has a right to state his position, but I repeat, within the bounds of the law, without rocking the country and monopolizing the right to tell the ultimate truth” (Putin, 2014)). Rare were attempts to abandon dealing with questions and taboo their subject matter (e.g., “Although that is what actually happens now: we solve some issues with the European Commission and others at the national level with individual European countries” (Putin, 2016)).

Political gnosis gives temporal solutions which stem from a desire of self-perpetuation. The gnostic introduces strategies of how to survive on the historic battlefield of the clash of good and evil powers by utilizing own and foreign cultural resources which are material and non-material elements of cultures. On the level of the strategies, two homogeneous criteria of responding to non-gnostic and treating gnostic cultural resources let us determine three levels of the intensity of political gnosis. The strategies take on the following values: a maximum extent of political gnosis, annihilating contra-acculturation and celebrating nativism (3) emerge if the gnostic calls for the destruction of non-gnostic cultural resources. Simultaneously, the gnostic celebrates own resources by making use of its valuable potential to survive. A moderate extent, isolating contra-acculturation and preserving nativism (2) make an appearance when the gnostic comes out in favor of isolation from non-gnostic cultural resources and perpetuates own cultural facilities. A low extent, escapist contra-acculturation and reviving nativism (1) occur if the gnostic escapes from being in any relationship with non-gnostic cultural resources and restores the weakened cultural base. When a blueprint for acting does not take the form of contra-acculturative and nativist approaches toward cultural resources, and it is relatively close to an intersubjective political diagnosis of the usage of cultural resources [0], no political gnosis shows up.

Table 6

Strategies of survival on the historic battlefield in Putin’s annual news conferences

The intensity of political gnosis/lack of political gnosis	A count of manifestations		
	2014	2015	2016
Political gnosis			
Annihilating contra-acculturation and celebrating nativism	3	17	19
Isolating contra-acculturation and preserving nativism	0	0	0
escapist contra-acculturation and reviving nativism	0	0	0
Political diagnosis			
Political diagnosis of how to use or avoid using cultural resources	12	14	18

Source: Own study.

In 2014, political gnosis entered 20% of the expressions concerning how to use or avoid using cultural resources, in 2015 – 55%, and in 2016 – 51% (Table 6). A rate of political diagnosis increased over time, but it dominated only in 2014. It took the form of the discussion on the role of culture in everyday life. A frequency of gnostic elements expanded as well, and their intensity maintained the highest value. Russian strategy on the historic battlefield drew upon annihilating contra-acculturation and celebrating nativism.

Putin called for fighting off terrorists and put forward physical annihilation as the only effective strategy to act (e.g., “The fight against terrorism, which we have not defeated yet but we have definitely broken its back – these are the results” (Putin, 2015)). Contra-acculturation co-occurred with celebrating nativism (e.g., “This is actually the price we have to pay for our natural aspiration to preserve ourselves as a nation, as a civilisation, as a state” (Putin, 2014)). Russian Federation needed constant perpetuation and development instead of a revival. Putin linked preservation with the glorification of Russia to offer a means of self-reproduction and abandoned isolation and escape as the strategies of negotiating the status of the state on the historic battlefield. An insubstantial use of nativism, contra-acculturation and the configuration of political diagnosis and gnosis revealed no fear of both the loss of own culture and the foreignness threat. However, the pivotal strategy was to make a great promise of decisive actions in case of necessity.

Conclusions

The research neither draws far-fetched conclusions nor argues that Russian political regime changed. Instead, it states that despite critical junctures in domestic and foreign politics, the system was steady on the level of an epistemic apparatus disseminated by its leader. The configurations of elements of political gnosis and diagnosis reflected the persistence of Putin’s gnostic semantic structures. The president reconfigured gnosis in its core political values over time. Whereas in 2014–2015, an authoritarian type dominated, in 2016, a totalitarian gnosis performed a lead role. The increase in the latter type co-occurred with the growth of democratic gnosis. As a result, however, the intensity and frequency of the types of political gnosis did not alter significantly. Gnostic but not political value-based expressions and political diagnosis supported the structure of the Great Russia. The rate of the usage of non-gnostic elements to strengthen gnostic narration was declining slightly. On the level of splitting the political universe, political gnosis was moderately intense, fallacious immanentization of the eschaton – low, manifestations of presumed anomie – low, political obscurantism – moderately, and strategies of survival on the historic battlefield – eminently. Putin consistently and widely exerted mild political gnosis to disseminate its semantic structures and did not confine the scope of recipients to Russians. The variety of the 2016 contentious politics failed to trigger off a reaction characteristic of obviating a revolutionary situation. Putin’s image of the political universe was to convince us that political elites felt secure and there was no revolution threat.

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Jak zmierzyć gnozę polityczną? Przykłady empiryczne z Rosji Putina

Streszczenie

Badanie wykorzystuje metodę analizy źródeł opierającą się na jakościowej analizie komparatystycznej wystąpień prezydenta Rosji Władimira Putina podczas dorocznych konferencji prasowych. Jego celem jest rozwiązanie problemów badawczych: jak zmieniała się gnoza polityczna w przemówieniach Putina w latach 2014–2016 podczas kolejnych konferencji? Jak Putin wyzwalał potencjał performatywny z niegnostycznych elementów dyskursu po to, żeby wzmocnić gnozę polityczną? W wyniku analizy określono jakościową zmianę polegającą na przejściu od autorytarnej do totalitarnej i demokratycznej gnozy politycznej, a także ustalono wystąpienie umiarkowanego stopnia nasilenia elementów gnostycznych. Artykuł formułuje narzędzia do pomiaru typów i natężenia gnozy politycznej oraz rozróżniania diagnozy politycznej od gnozy, które są ważne dla badań z zakresu socjologii polityki i testuje ich empiryczną efektywność.

Słowa kluczowe: religia polityczna, aparat epistemiczny, struktura semantyczna, reżim polityczny, doroczna konferencja prasowa Putina

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Russian smart power in Georgia

Abstract: Russia has always been active militarily; however, the current regime attempts to combine hard power with soft power tools. Russian-Georgian relations are wrought with tensions and clashes. The Western-oriented foreign policy of the latter causes worries in the Kremlin. Although the Russian federation has a strong standing in the Caucasus region, prominently due to its military presence there, the smart power policy is enacted to gain long lasting legitimacy. The mediums, such as pro-Russian non-governmental organizations, cultural intelligentsia and the Church clergy, promote the notion of a common culture and shared values. This promotion is usually accompanied by negative narratives directed towards the liberal West.

Key words: Russia, Georgia, Smart Power, Soft Power, Orthodox Church, Neo-Eurasianism

Introduction

In 1783, the King of the East Georgia (Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti), Erekle II, signed the Treaty of Georgievsk. Under the most important pillar of the treaty, Georgia declared loyalty to the Russian king. In exchange, Russia needed to guarantee security in the region and to provide necessary military assistance when requested. Before deciding on signing the document, King Erekle II needed to consider proposals from two competing powers: Muslim Persia, where he grew up and Orthodox Christian Russia. Both countries were attempting to obtain Georgian loyalty. The decision was made in favor of Russia due to the shared religious beliefs. Signing the treaty was a pure value decision.

The partnership was poor for Georgians. Russia never sent any military aid to help the declared partners in wars. On the contrary, after Erekle II's death, Russia initiated a long lasting military occupation. Georgians did not tolerate this situation; regular uprisings made the occupants consider alternative means of managing the region. To do so, Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov was appointed as a commander-in-chief and as viceroy of the Caucasus. Vorontsov knew that Georgia was a key to the entire Caucasus region. He changed the approach of rigid control by introducing new mechanisms for influencing the people.

Vorontsov ordered a re-launch of the theatre in Tbilisi, opened new libraries, and sent the children of the aristocracy to study in Russia. This new means of addressing the locals was very effective. Once the Georgian elite learned of the modern manner of living, began talking Russian and became familiar with the newest literature and salon life, most ceased opposing the Russian authorities. These two fragments from history describe two different theoretical notions of power usage. To persuade Erekle II into

friendship, Russia did not use military threats, economic sanctions, or bribes. Stressing common values was sufficient to achieve an agreement. Russia had utilized a soft power. In the second episode, Vorontsov was apparently using soft power tools as well. However, we should remember that the commander's activities were backed by rigid military power. The combination of military presence with the soft policies can be described as smart power.

The current state of Georgia-Russian relations is similar to the latter episode. The Russian federation continues the illegal military occupation of Georgian regions. Simultaneously, particular public clusters attempt to spread pro-Russian ideas by using cultural means. Non-governmental organizations, Church officials and other well-structured entities continue addressing value-sensitive issues to shift the sympathy of Georgian citizens from the liberal West to Neo-Eurasian Russia.

In this article, we attempt to present the main mediums of the Russian soft power in Georgia. However, as a starting point, we argue that, due to the presence of Russian troops in nearby Tbilisi, the Kremlin's influence can be analyzed solely in the context of *smart power*. We do not address the broadly researched issue of the military conflict; instead, we propose it as a background condition, which dictates the context of soft power usage as well.

The article is divided into sections. The first section provides a short introduction of the concepts: hard power, soft power, and smart power. The second section addresses the economic involvement of Russia in Georgia; it will be argued that economic dependencies may create vulnerable zones where Russian soft power can penetrate. The third section introduces the basic picture of the distribution of soft power mediums. The fourth and fifth section consequently addresses the main actors separately.

Power – Hard, Soft, Smart

"A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, p. 202). Power is a capacity to produce the intended effects (Russell, 2004, p. 23); however, power is also an activity, which can be exercised by different means. As Haugaard argues, "power covers a cluster of concepts and phenomena, which includes both domination and agency" (2010, p. 1051). As traditionally understood, states that have power over others are able to practice it by means of military action; however, recent developments have shown a significant shift from coercive deeds to persuasive actions. Joseph Nye coined the term *soft power* to demonstrate this shift. Soft power occurs when "one country gets other countries to want what it wants" (Nye, 1990, p. 166). Nye suggests that the Machiavellian advice: "It is better to be feared than loved," is no longer a perfect solution for agent-principal relations (Nye, 2004, p. 1). Those countries, which are able to obtain desired outcomes without military actions are more efficient than those who are not able to do so. Some states have intrinsic soft power capabilities (e.g., Western democracies are often considered as role models to follow by those who cherish democratic values), whereas others must work "to shape the preferences of others." A suitable example of the latter are Soviet attempts to attract comrades worldwide with the communist ideology (Nye, 1990, p. 167).

Figure 1. Power



Source: Nye, 2004, p. 8.

> “Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation-an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.” (Nye, 2004, p. 7)

Figure one shows the differences between soft and hard powers. In addition, it is argued that, for the practitioners of the soft power, legitimacy is a basic precondition, whereas hard power agents have no need to seek further legitimization (Armitage, Nye, 2007, p. 6). After its first appearance, the concept of soft power has been frequently used to describe the non-military activities of the states. Nevertheless, it is not often articulated how governments utilize soft power, or what are the conditions “under which soft power campaigns will be most likely to succeed” (Kroenig, McAdam, Weber, 2010, p. 412). Kroenig and others identify prerequisites that must be in place to use soft power as a foreign policy tool:

– States must be able to communicate to the intended target in something approximating a functioning marketplace of ideas;
– The attitudes of the relevant target must be subject to influence and change;
– The attitudes of the target must have causal impact on an outcome in international politics that promotes the interests of the state attempting to wield soft power (Kroenig et al., 2010, p. 414).

In 2003, Nye has proposed a new formulation of power: a smart power. The author proposed soft power to “to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye, 2009). Smart power is a combination of contextual soft and hard strategies. Smart power begins with exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the actor and provides case relevant direction to the actions. The combination of soft and hard approaches may be effective in the cases in which military interventions require justification or legitimacy. The strongest armies require a certain level of stability in the public of the target states. Modern interventions can not last forever in the form of rigid control. The military phase must be followed by peace building operations, otherwise

political and material costs can be very high. Smart power is a useful means to approach the problem, if the hard power capabilities are accompanied by some value-support in the target communities, for example, threatening the unwanted incumbents and supporting the opposition with shared political views.

Russian Soft Power

Russian influence worldwide nearly entirely depends on hard power resources. "Despite the attractiveness of traditional Russian culture," its global soft power capabilities are limited (Nye, 2010). Nye's argument is noted by the soft power index research. In the ranking of Institute of Government, Russia's persuasive capability was positioned at 26th place (McClory, 2010, p. 25). In the *Soft Power 30* index, Russia was not in the top twenty (Portland, 2017).

The disappearance of Russia's cultural charm is largely due to the foreign policy strategy the government has been pursuing for the past two decades. Sergey Karaganov argues that, in the domain of soft power, Russia could not compete with the West. Therefore, the Kremlin needed to compensate for this disadvantage with constant displays of hard power (Karaganov, 2009).

This strategy has an ideological dimension as well. Neo-Eurasianism is a primary set of ideas cherished by the Kremlin. The doctrine is promoted by the philosopher *Alexandr Dugin.* The core argument of the theory opposes the universalization of Western values (Anglo-Saxon). The approach supports cultural-ethnic pluralism, and accordingly, states that only those values, which have been produced in a traditional domestic context of an individual nation, should be appreciated and preserved. To safeguard the diversity of Eurasian people (against the West), *Dugin* has voiced a need to create the Eurasian Empire with Russian leadership. "The will of any people is sacred. The will of Russian people is sacred a hundredfold" (Shekhovtsov, 2009, p. 707). The pathos of this statement shows the whole idea behind the dominant political belief in Russia.

Alienation of the West as a value system intrinsically excludes the liberal space as a soft power target; nevertheless, Russia actively uses media propaganda tools to affect the public in Europe and the United States. These tools include not only well-funded media stations such as Russia Today, Sputnik and Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), but also a so-called "troll factory"; pro-Russian "comments, posts, pictures, videos" in social networks and forums are posted by hired workers, with false E-identities (Hermant, 2015). Nye argues, that "one of the paradoxes of soft power is that propaganda is often counterproductive, owing to its lack of credibility" (Nye, 2014).

Neo-Eurasian Empire covers the same space as the Soviet Union once did. Russian policy towards the post-Soviet countries has more soft power potential for several reasons: first, communist attempts to create a *homo sovieticus* have its cultural consequences. Post-soviet people relate to each other more than to others. Second, in most of the post-Soviet countries, people still have at least passive knowledge of the Russian language. Third, the largest former Soviet republics represent the Slavic culture; therefore, people may share the notion of ethnic unity. Fourth, the Russian state attempts to guide others to a new empire with the Orthodox Christian Ideology, to which some people strongly relate.

Russian Capital in Georgia

Georgian economic sector shows some dependencies on Russia. This dependence creates vulnerabilities in several areas. Authors often understand strong economy as the ultimate soft power resource. Nevertheless, this it is not entirely correct. Nye refers to Walter Russell Mead who argued that “economic power is sticky power; it seduces as much as it compels” (Nye, 2006). Russia can be an attractive economic partner for Georgia; however, experience has shown that the soft attraction can be easily converted to hard economic blackmail (Socor, 2006).[1]

According to the Institute of Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), the Russian shared capital in Georgian business is significant. The research shows that Russian investments in energy, the water supply, oil products and communication spheres are considerably high (IDFI, 2015b). The nature of doing business in Russia implies that major companies must behave according to the state dominated political views. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the possibility of Russian investors deploying Kremlin’s interests in Georgia is high.

The adjusted data (2011–2016), published by the National Statistics Office of Georgia, shows the unstable dynamics of the Foreign Direct Investments distribution (GeoStat, 2017):

Figure 2. FDI from Russia (USD Million)



Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia (GeoStat).

Of a total 1,117 million USD FDI in 2011, the Russian proportion was 55.4 million USD (5%), which positioned it in 6th place among major investors. Russian investments declined in 2012. In the second and third quarters of 2013, FDI from Russia became negative (minus –2.7 $ million and –11.2 $ million). Significant growth

[1] For instance, Russia banned Georgian wines and other products in 2006.

occurred in 2014, when, from the total FDI – 1,758 million USD, Russia invested 82.2 million (5%, 7th position). The investments were mainly directed at large industrial companies.

The disappearance of Russia from the major investors list in 2012–2013 could be explained by the political tensions (parliamentary election and change of the long served ruling party), embargo outcomes, and unfavorable economic conditions for investors. In reality, the withdrawal of the Russian FDI did not pose an overwhelming threat to Georgia. However, if Russia’s role increases dramatically and Western DFI inflows decrease, this could provide the Kremlin with a new degree of leverage to manipulate (Kapanadze, 2014, p. 2).

As the World Bank’s Chief Economics and Senior Vice President of Development Economics, *Kaushik Basu* states that migration and remittance play a major role in an economy’s take-off; however, they are also a source of political contention and for that very reason, they deserve unbiased analysis (WorldBank, 2013). The Economic Policy Research Center based in Tbilisi emphasizes the increase of the remittance proportion in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Georgia and concludes the high dependence of the state economy on the international money transfers by the migrants (EPRC, 2013). The most recent data by the National Bank of Georgia shows that from January 2017 to July 2017, 33.45% of the total money inflow to Georgia came from Russian Federation (NationalBank, 2017):

Figure 3. Total money inflow from Russian Federation to Georgia



Source: National Bank (2017), period January–July, Money Transfers by Countries 2010–2017.

The trade statistic shows that, after lifting the Russian embargo, Georgia’s export to Russia has quadrupled from 46,806.0 (2012) to 190,653.4 (2013) million USD (GeoStat, 2013).

Figure 4. Georgia’s Export to Russia (USD)



Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia, External Trade, Georgia’s Export by Countries.

In 2016, exports to Russia increased by 26% (206,366.40 USD million) compared to 2015, which is 9.765% of the total exports of Georgia (ibid. 2017).

Regardless of having open trade relations with the EU countries and the rest of the world, the expansion of exports to Russia may have made the Georgian economic sector insecure and vulnerable. In the energy sector, the Georgian companies with Russian citizens have been managing a large proportion of the state’s energy market. For instance, a company, “Inter Rao”, which is affiliated with Russian officials (members of the supervisory board), is the largest player in Georgia’s energy market; it holds shares in the energy distribution company “JSC Telasi” and the largest electro station “Engurhesi” in the Caucasus region (IDFI, 2015a). From October 2015, it has become known that the Georgian government has already participated in a second round of negotiations with the Russian-state company “Gazprom” to import an additional volume of gas. As Energy Minister states, the consumption of the energy resources increased by 35–38% during the last three years, and the partnership with Gazprom is essential to avoid an energy deficit. Currently, Georgia has had a reliable energy supplier, Azerbaijan, and it nearly completely meets Georgia’s the needs (Tsurkov, 2015). After the completion of the BP-led Shah Deniz Stage II project in late 2018, the capacity of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) will be upgraded and Georgia side will obtain 400–700 USD million FDI and 5% of the transported gas under the preferential price (Civil, 2013). Considering the EU’s energy diversification intentions, Georgia’s national security emphasis and its aspiration to Euro-Atlantic integration, there is no need to cooperate with Kremlin-run Gazprom. Due to the previous experience, Russia often uses energy resources for its geopolitics of expansion. In addition, the Russian capital is largely represented in the bank sector, mineral water, and special metals businesses in Georgia.

Market of ideas in Georgia

After the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has been actively moving towards the West. Although the state practices did not always correspond to Western liberal values, the official governmental rhetoric constantly attempted to portray the European Union and NATO as attractive political destinations for state development. The Soviet Union and its socio-cultural heritage were condemned. The dichotomy of enemy/friend became equal to Russia/West. The authoritarian practices were often justified with an urgent need to neutralize the Russian threats. Some opposition leaders were accused and arrested for conspiracy and cooperation with Russian intelligence agencies. The five-day war in 2008 sharpened the negative attitudes towards Russia. Russian news agencies and TV channels were suppressed. Listening to the Russian songs in public places was banned. The Georgian public could still have information regarding the attitudes of ideologists in Moscow. For example, *Alexandr Dugin's* famous exhort was frequently broadcasted, to illustrate the real intentions of Russian elites: "Tanks to Tbilisi!"– this is a voice of our national history'. Those, who do not second the "Tanks to Tbilisi!", are not Russians. [...] Tanks to Tbilisi!" – that's what should be written on every Russian's forehead" (Shekhovtsov, 2009, p. 698).

The recent polls on public attitudes in Georgia (INFRUSGEF, April, 2017) demonstrate that Russia has influence in determining Georgia's future. The frequency distribution shows that 45% of the respondents marked "a lot influence" and 27% highlighted "some influence" (CRRC, 2017b). Moreover, among the respondents who think that Russia has at least some influence on Georgia's future, 36% evaluated this influence as negative. 41% evaluates Russian influence on the national security (since 2012) as "negative impact" (RUIMPSEC) (CRRC, 2017c). And, 57% considers Russia as a major military threat to the neighbouring countries. Regarding the Russian propaganda, 47% agrees that there is a Russian propaganda in Georgia (CRRC, 2017a). 34% mentioned political parties and 14% marked civil society as channels of Russian propaganda (PROPPLPRT, PROPCVLST).

The world market intrinsically involves various actors who sell their products to the public. On the Georgian market of ideas, the EU and NATO have an official governmental endorsement to spread their ideas. Cultural projects with the EU include generous student exchanges schemes such as Erasmus Mundus (Erasmus plus), to promote the European values in the neighborhood. EM graduates have indicated in polls that the greatest impact of the project was an increase of their intercultural competences (Markozashvili, Al-Weshah, 2014, p. 117). NATO is in active military cooperation with Georgia. However, friendship with the alliance entirely depends on common values. A list of minimum requirements for membership starts with the statement: "New members must uphold democracy, including tolerating diversity" (BECA, 1997). Accordingly, integrating with NATO necessarily includes domesticizing common Western values.

In a given condition, Russia does not have a tangible chance to be more attractive than the West. However, it can effectively attempt to sharpen those problems, which may appear on Georgia's path towards European and North Atlantic integration. The United National Movement of Georgia[2] often accuses the current state Government to

[2] Former governmental party.

be pro-Kremlin. There is no real evidence of a shift in preferences in the foreign policy; however, since the *Georgian Dream Coalition* came to power in 2012, for the sake of the renewed political dialogue with Russia, the above-mentioned harsh restrictions on Russian-associated activities have been abolished.

Russian soft power activities can be observed in two main spheres: societal and cultural. The societal sphere includes organizations, which are connected to Russian funds, or are in some relations with Russian governmental officials. These organizations do not have direct public influence. Their openly *‘Putinist’* stance marginalizes their political positions as well. Studies have shown that interested parties are less likely to succeed in spreading the soft messages, than those who do not have a direct political interest (Kroenig et al., 2010, p. 415). Their niche on the market of ideas implies the negative campaigns against the liberal values. They can gain some relevance only if the public has major disappointments from the Western partners.

The cultural sphere is developed around the Georgian Orthodox Church. According to *Dugin, the* sole hope of Georgia’s Eurasianization lies in the orthodox culture of the state (Dugin, 2004). The role of the church will be addressed in detail in the next section. Here we need to note that a group of former Soviet Intelligentsia still maintains ties with their Russian colleagues. The theatres exchange performances on Russian and Georgian stages, writers participate in common workshops, and artists visit exhibitions across the borders. Those activities often obtain blessings from the patriarchates of both countries. If the value position was low for societal organizations, the Church and its affiliates in the cultural sphere enjoy a high level of public trust.

And finally, we need to mention the regions with large Russian-speaking minorities. Samtskhe-Javakheti with ethnic Armenian population is closely connected to Russia. Due to high rate of unemployment, the local labor seeks jobs in Russian Federation. For these people the Russian law on granting citizenship to those Russian-speaking citizens living within the borders of the former USSR is quite attractive. There were cases reported by the Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the mass distribution of the Russian passports to the population of Samtskhe-Javakheti (Eka Janashia, 2014). Although the problem has not taken more complicated forms, a Russian soft policy can find the means to attract people who live in poor social conditions and are less integrated into the Georgian community.

The Orthodox Church of Georgia

The extreme popularity of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is an outcome of developments held in the 90s. The corrupted government left people hopeless.[3] GOC was the only well-organized functioning institution, which could give the services it stood for. The attachment of the public to the church made them religiously active and politically passive. This condition was favorable for the government officials who preferred stagnant status quo with low public participation in political processes. The concordat signed between the state and the patriarchate gives the religious institution full freedom

[3] We mean the period of Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency.

and significant material benefits (Markozashvili, 2014, p. 197). As a result, it took less than twenty years to convert an atheistic Georgian society into a hardcore Christian one. Although politicians constantly delegitimized themselves, GOC clergy successfully adopted the roles of political preachers.

GOC is first on the list of most trusted institutions of the country (IRI, 2011, p. 34). Patriarch Ilia II accordingly, is the most trusted public figure. This situation dictates that one who obtains the patriarchate's endorsement receives a powerful tool to affect public opinion. It is a well-known fact that, under Soviet rule, the church and the state closely cooperated. In Russia, as many observers argue, patriarchate is a useful addition to the federal government (Bennetts, 2012). However, it is difficult to claim that Russian agencies have direct connections with GOC as well. As time passes, the discussions regarding the need for lustration law, which would unveil the priests who cooperated with former KGB, loses its relevance. However, without open cooperation with the FSB,[4] often the clergy of the GOC shares and promotes the values cherished by Russian officials. Vladimir Putin has voiced the role of the Russia as being the fortress of Orthodoxy in the world. It is not surprising that Georgian priests who participate in raids against LGBT activists sympathize with those who claim to be a defender of their cause (BBC, 2013).

Primarily less-educated clerics often serve Russian interests without acknowledging it. These clerics attack the European Union because of the "gay agenda" of Brussels. These clerics argue that westernization will necessarily cause the breakdown of the traditional value system. The clerical perception of reality is based on an ultra-conservative ideology, whereas everything, which supposedly is against the traditional understanding of morality, should be banned. We should remember that the process of European Integration does not yet provide significant material benefits to Georgians. Western allies failed to defend Ukraine in war, and NATO cannot decide whether to accept Georgia as a member. These are the problem that open the misleading question, is the political path to the West worth sacrificing values? Answering this question becomes more confusing if we follow the speeches and actions of the clergy.

In 2013, Patriarch Ilia II visited Russia and met President Putin. He stated that friendly ties among people should be maintained. Putin thanked the guest and emphasized his important role in maintaining "the human, spiritual and cultural ties between the two brotherly peoples" (DFWatch, 2013). **Ilia II has a special approach in relations with Russia; he often speaks regarding the importance of Georgian territorial unity and asks both Russian and Georgian authorities to negotiate peace. His confusing statements do not usually provide clear-cut reasons for the problems. The Patriarch stresses the mistakes committed by individuals on both sides. Misunderstandings among peoples for him are not consequences of the planned political processes but rather outcomes of miscommunication. His Holiness often makes interesting statements regarding the importance of Russia and the Russian church for the entire civilization. He calls president *Putin,* with whom he shares an admiration of Joseph Stalin, a wise man. The patriarch recalled the moment when he was a young man and cried for Stalin's death and praised him as a great leader:** "Stalin was an out-

[4] Federal Security Service.

standing person. Such people are quite rare. He understood the worldwide significance of Russia” (Kevorkova, 2013).

Pro-Russian Organizations

A recent research project prepared by the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) has indicated the main pro-Russian trends and actors in Georgian NGO and media sectors. The varieties of the activities are primarily organized around two key institutions based in Tbilisi. The Eurasian Institute (EI) and the Eurasian Choice (EC) report to be actively engaged with others to reconcile the Georgian and Russian public and re-develop the friendship among the people.

The founders of EI have unveiled themselves through the creation of an internet platform *Politforum*. A main task of the group was to put the blame for the war in 2008 on the Georgian government (Dzvelishvili, Kupreishvili, 2015, p. 6). The retrospective analysis shows that the majority of anti-Western organizations were established in a timely sequence after 2009, to diminish Russian aggression among people. Although there are an abundant number of Eurasianist organizations, the founders of those are often the same personalities. For instance, a founder of the EI-partner NGO *Historical Heritage* is also an owner of media agencies,[5] commonly known for their pro-Russian news coverage (ibid., pp. 11–15).

The Eurasian Institute has a large network of partners. Notably, many of these partners are registered in the Russian Federation. The background ideology of the network is the earlier noted Neo-Eurasianism. The apologists of the Eurasian model of development in Russia and Georgia focus on integrating the people who think alike. These people attempt to bring together scientists, artists and others, by increasing the face-to-face communications among them. The basic strategy of the Eurasian Institute is to maintain a negative campaign vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic structures. For example, the organization had performed the screening of a documentary to expose NATO’s unilateral bombing of Serbia. The session was followed by an anti-Western rally (DFWatch, 2014). To exhaust Georgian enthusiasm for joining NATO and the EU, the EI associates attempt to sharpen the problems connected with the process of integration. The EI emphasizes the importance of Russia in the Caucasus region. By appealing to the attractiveness of the northern market and the functional interconnections between the Georgian and Russian businesses, the EI attempts to show that political relations among the countries must be rejuvenated.

The discourse regarding political/economic relevance of Russia is enriched with the constant reminders regarding the shared Orthodox Christian values. According to the EI networks, in exchange for political integration, the liberal West demands that Georgians accept perverted lifestyles and forget traditional family values.[6] Most propagandist narratives are directed to promote the idea that Orthodox Russia is the sole defender of the Georgian culture (Eka Janashia, 2014).

The events organized by the *Eurasian Institute* involve a wide range of actors. They intend to describe their activities as grass root initiatives. For example, the project en-

[5] Georgia and the World, Saqinform.

[6] As we have mentioned earlier, this view is shared by the GOC.

titled, *People's Movement for the Russian & Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation,* was launched in 2013 (georus.org); this claims to represent a popular demand to find solutions for the Georgian-Russian conflict. The official statement published on the web page clarifies that the national interests of Georgia, its territorial integrity and economic growth are only achievable in close cooperation with Russia (Georus, 2013). Celebrating the day of Victory against Nazi Germany on May 9th is a chance for the EI and associates to emphasize how successful Georgians and Russians were in fighting wars against common enemies. The meetings devoted to this historical day often involve presentations, which admire the wisdom and courage of *Joseph Stalin* (Iverioni, 2015).

The Eurasian Institute and its partners have published several texts. Notably, the book presented by the *Historical Heritage* entitled *"Unknown Putin."* The volume combines the articles and other materials that describe the details of the President's political and private life (Saqinform, 2013). The edition is intended to portray *Putin* as a powerful political leader who had to make difficult choices to achieve greater goods.

The Maidan of Kiev: Lessons for the South Caucasus was the name of the conference organized by the *Historical Heritage.* The objective of the event was to use the Ukrainian revolution as an exemplary case to show the destructive influence of the West. The message was very clear: the EU and NATO encourage people to adopt their values and political practices; however, they do not care about the poor political consequences (GeWorld, 2014). The contributions of individuals who represent the EI network are acknowledged and honored by the Russian Federation. For instance, a public board member of the *Historical Heritage* received a personal award from *Vladimir Putin* for his tireless effort to deepen the cultural relations between the Russians and Georgians (PirveliRadio, 2014). For a similar contribution, a leader of *Eurasian Choice* received an honorary award from the high ranking Russian politicians, *Vladimir Zhirinovsky* and *Genady Ziuganov*.

The Eurasian Institute incorporates the youth organization with few active members. However, if we examine their general efforts, we may notice that the organizations are not very active in social media. The same is the case for the Eurasian Choice. This finding may mean that the groups focus on an older population.[7]

The Eurasian Choice (EC) was founded in 2013. As the name indicates, the movement obtains inspiration from Alexandr Dugin's views. The EC founder is not a new face in the pro-Russian spectrum. His activities date to 2008, when he proudly introduced a Society of *Erekle the Second* (SES)[8] (Dzvelishvili, Kupreishvili, 2015, p. 6). Since its launching, the SES has undertaken several important projects. Among those was a free Russian language course for Georgians. The initiative was supported by the foundation Russian World.

The SES publishes a bilingual newspaper (Georgian-Russian).[9] The edition is dedicated to mainstream pro-Russian narratives. Those narratives include demands for the political neutrality of Georgia. Several events were organized to argue against the coun-

[7] People who remember the Soviet Union may have some positive memories regarding living with Russians.

[8] Erekle II, the King of east Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti on July 24, 1783 signed a treaty with Russia known as treaty of Georgievsk (Georgievskiy traktat).

[9] "The Road of Erekle," Geo, *Erekles gza* – Rus, *puts iraklia*.

try’s involvement in military alliances with the West (SputnikGeorgia, 2015). The group of independent experts criticized the idea as futile and dangerous for the future development of Georgia (Lomtadze, 2015).

The Eurasian Choice has several important partners, including: Russian and Georgian People’s Unity, Russian Georgian Public Foundation, Sputnik Georgia. These organizations have close ties with the Russian Federation. For instance, The Russian-Georgian Public Foundation is a partner of the Gorchakov Fund, which was established by the decree of the former Russian president Medvedev (Dzvelishvili, Kupreishvili, 2015, p. 42). Among other activities, this network has organized several exchange tours for Georgian and Russian professionals, including the recent visit of Georgian journalists to Moscow (Reginfo, 2014).

There are no records that indicate the Kremlin’s direct involvement in NGO funding. However, members of the opposition often suggest that the Russian government is able to finance anti-Western political groups in Georgia (Giorgi Menabde, 2014). The activists of the Russia-backed NGOs frequently raise their voice regarding international politics. For instance, a small group of the EC organized street demonstrations regarding the takeover of Crimea and justified Russia’s action as wise and expedient (Kommersant, 2014). The activities of the Russia-backed organizations in Georgia are not consistent. The small numbers of followers include veterans, former members of the Communist party and those who share nostalgia for Soviet times.

Overall, the variety of pro-Russian organizations does not include influential public-backed actors. However, the larger NGOs such as EI and EC can certainly affect the processes via affiliated news agencies. People do not always check the credibility of the source from which they read the information. Although the people do so, it is difficult to argue against the non-refutable theories the neo-Eurasianists propose.

Conclusion

In this article, we present a basic picture of the distribution of Russian soft power in Georgia. We argue that the official policy of the Russian federation is based on a smart approach, which implies military-backed soft activities enacted via local mediums.

This work presents the basic pattern of economic dependencies, which may make Georgia vulnerable in relations with its northern neighbor. However, we observe that those dependencies are not of critical importance in, so far as the state maintains ties with other trade partners. The key argument of the work was developed around two dimensional distributions of Russian soft power in Georgia. Societal distribution, which includes organizations with a low level of popularity, focuses on creating a negative discourse on the West, whereas cultural actors such as GOC promote the notion of shared values among the people. We argue that the soft power capabilities of Russia are limited due to the negative political attitudes of the Georgian public. It was indicated that the Georgian government is not willing to change the path towards its integration with Western institutions. However, a high level of public trust in the Georgian Orthodox Church and the complex nature of relations with the West may cause shifts in the future.

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Rosyjska smart power w Gruzji

Streszczenie

Rosja zawsze była aktywna militarnie; jednak obecny reżim próbuje połączyć instrumenty siły twardej i miękkiej. Stosunki rosyjsko-gruzińskie charakteryzują napięcia i starcia. Prozachodnia polityka zagraniczna Gruzji powoduje zaniepokojenie Kremla. Pomimo że Federacja Rosyjska ma silną pozycję na Kaukazie, z uwagi na jej obecność wojskową w regionie, polityka stosowania siły inteligentnej uzyskała długotrwałą legitymizację. Takie środowiska jak pro-rosyjskie organizacje pozarządowe, inteligencja kulturowa i duchowieństwo promują pojęcia wspólnej kultury i wspólnych wartości. Podobne promowanie zazwyczaj towarzyszy negatywnej narracji skierowanej ku liberalnemu Zachodowi.

Słowa kluczowe: Rosja, Gruzja, smart power, siła miękka, Cerkiew prawosławna, neo-eurazjatyzm

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Demilitarization and neutralization – the case of the Åland Islands

Abstract: Demilitarization and neutralization are among the specific restrictions that apply to the exercise of territorial sovereignty. Although frequently employed in international practice, no generally accepted definitions are available for either of these concepts. The void has given rise to a host of interpretations, which vary particularly widely in the case of demilitarization.

The Åland Islands are a classic example of an area that has been both militarized and neutralized. Owing to its strategic location, it has repeatedly become the focal point of political clashes between European powers over the last two centuries. The Islands were seen as a key to pursuing Baltic Sea policies and balancing the strengths of European powers.

The conflicts that swept through the region in the 19th century led to the gradual improvement of methods to demilitarize and subsequently neutralize the archipelago. Its status was ultimately settled in 1921 by an international convention and recognized after the end of World War II. The international legal status granted to the archipelago at that time has persisted to this day and continues to serve as a model of effective demilitarization and neutralization.

Key words: demilitarization, neutralization, Åland Islands, Baltic Sea region

Demilitarization and neutralization are among the specific restrictions that apply to the exercise of territorial sovereignty. Although frequently employed in international practice, no generally accepted definitions are available for either of these concepts. The void has given rise to a host of interpretations, which vary particularly widely in the case of demilitarization.

The Åland Islands are a classic example of an area that has been both militarized and neutralized. Owing to its strategic location, it has repeatedly become the focal point of political clashes between European powers over the last two centuries. The islands were seen as a key to pursuing Baltic Sea policies and balancing the strengths of European powers. Depending on the country in its possession, the archipelago could pose a threat to the Swedish coast, and especially to Stockholm, or to the Finnish coast, and particularly the Turku region. However, having one's own fleet on the Islands was a way to control the local maritime traffic moving into the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia (Bonusiak, 2009, p. 24).

The conflicts that swept through the region in the 19th century led to the gradual improvement of methods to demilitarize and subsequently neutralize the archipelago. Its status was ultimately settled in 1921 by an international convention and recognized after the end of World War II. The international legal status granted to the archipelago at that time has persisted and continues to serve as a model of effective demilitarization and neutralization.

Demilitarization as a set of restrictions on the exercise of territorial sovereignty

Demilitarization and neutralization are the first commonly mentioned forms of restricting the exercise of territorial sovereignty. The two may either coincide or occur separately. In the most general sense of the term, spatial demilitarization[1] denotes a commitment to dismantle and prohibit any future construction of military equipment and facilities in a given territory, as well as a ban on maintaining arms or armed forces stipulated in an international agreement (that is either bilateral or multilateral). The classic international law textbook by the British lawyer L. Oppenheim written in the early 20th century defines demilitarization as “an agreement between two or more states to refrain from constructing fortifications or maintaining armed forces in a given area with a view to improving mutual security and preventing border incidents” (Oppenheim, 1905, 1906). The definitions of demilitarization can also be found in Annex XIII to the Treaty of Peace with Italy of February 10, 1947 and in Art. 60 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Bugajski, 2006a, p. 10).

Demilitarization may be either complete or partial. The former is a ban on stationing troops,[2] a prohibition on the raising and an order to destroy military equipment such as fortresses, airports, and barracks. The latter – i.e. partial demilitarization – refers to a reduction of a territory used for military purposes. A special form of partial demilitarization is denuclearization, in which nuclear weapons are prohibited in a specified area (Bugajski, 2010, p. 65).[3]

In international relations, demilitarization is relatively common device and one employed for centuries. The term is often defined broadly. As noted by Bugajski, the concept was used, for example, to curb the military capacities of states, as in the case of Germany, Austria and Japan, after World War II (Bugajski, 2010, p. 69). The term should not be seen as being synonymous with neutrality, including perpetual neutrality. The absence of an army does not automatically mean that a demilitarized zone has been established. Differences in approaches to demilitarization result mainly from the lack of a single commonly accepted definition (Stearns, 2013, p. 2). A very broad view of demilitarization has been proposed by the authors of the 1982 *Encyclopedia of International Public Law*. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between France and Spain of 1544 is an example of an early practical application of the concept. The Treaty provided for strategic fortifications to be torn down (*Encyclopedia*, 1982, p. 150). Similar provisions were found in the Peace of Westphalia treaty of 1648 and the Peace of Utrecht Treaty of 1713 (Stearns, 2013, p. 8). As the oldest historical example of demilitarization, Bugajski quotes the zone separating Gibraltar from Spain, established by the Treaty of Seville of 1729.

Some demilitarization concepts appeared in the final act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 applying to the Free City of Cracow, in the Treaty of Paris of 1815 with respect

[1] Another term used is territorial demilitarization. For an attempt to distinguish between spatial and humanitarian demilitarization, see Bugajski, 2010.

[2] It is nevertheless acceptable to keep police forces tasked with maintaining order in the zone.

[3] Bugajski recognizes one other special form of demilitarization – a buffer zone. He notes that such a zone evades easy classification and proposes that it be viewed as the middle ground between demilitarization and neutralization, cf. Bugajski, 2010, pp. 65–66.

to the French town of Huningue and in the Treaty of Aachen of 1816, which established Neutral Moresnet. The concept was also used as a means of building security and trust. An example is the process initiated by the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 between the United States and Great Britain concerning the partial demilitarization of the Great Lakes area. The solution was later extended to apply to the entire US-Canadian border. After World War I, demilitarization was employed in Rhineland and the island of Helgoland under the Treaty of Versailles. To demilitarize Rhineland, a prohibition was imposed on the deployment of German troops in left-bank Rhineland and along a 50-km strip along the right bank of the Rhine. A similar solution was employed in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1919 which ended the Greek-Turkish war. The treaty demilitarized the border between these countries as well as the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier. An additional convention was also signed that demilitarized the shores of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. Treaties of 1920 established demilitarized zones along the Russian-Estonian and Russian-Finnish borders (covering the islands and shores of the Gulf of Finland).

Demilitarization was also used to ensure the freedom of navigation. In the mid-19th century, demilitarized zones were established on the Black Sea, along the Danube, in the Strait of Magellan, the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and in the above-mentioned Strait of Gibraltar. The concept was widely applied on international maritime canals, i.e. man-made international waterways. Demilitarized zones were set up in the Suez Canal (1888), the Panama Canal (1850) and the Kiel Canal (1919) (*Encyclopedia*, 1982, p. 151). Changing military strategies and advances in war technology fueled an evolution in demilitarization itself. In the 20th century, demilitarization spread to unprecedented areas. In 1959, the demilitarized zone status was granted to the Antarctic (under the so-called Antarctic Treaty). In 1967, the same applied to outer space (the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies), and, three years later, the seabed (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof).

A special kind of a partially demilitarized zone is the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Currently, nuclear-weapons-free zones exist in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985), South-East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok, 1995), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996), and Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk, 2006)[4] (Lachowski, 2012, p. 80).

Sterns views such diversified approaches to demilitarization as both legitimate and confusing. Their legitimacy lies in the fact that all refer to “some form of reduction in military capabilities” (*Demilitarization*, 2013, p. 5). On the other hand, having such a multitude of approaches stands in the way of identifying the specific components of demilitarization. In examining the definition of the term, Bickford refers openly to “epistemological obscurity” (Bickford, 2013, p. 21).

The definitions of neutralization are considerably less contentious. Neutralization is an arbitrary prohibition to engage in warfare in a given territory and/or use the territory as a base of war operations. If the territory has not been additionally demilitarized, it may be used to harbor armed forces and military fortifications. Neutralization is commonly

[4] The dates given are those of the signing of the relevant treaties.

used across the world in strategically critical regions, especially in relation to maritime waterways. Neutralized status has been granted to the Strait of Magellan (1881), the Suez Canal (1888), the Panama Canal (1901) and the Antarctic, south of the 60th parallel (1959).

The conclusion, therefore, is that, unless agreed otherwise, demilitarization applies in peace or during a ceasefire, while neutralization is only used during an armed conflict to exclude a specific territory from ongoing operations (Bugajski, 2006b, p. 6).

Status of Åland Islands under international law

Åland Islands is an archipelago of some 6,700 islands and islets[5] located at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia on the Baltic Sea. The entire archipelago measures more than 13,000 km^2 in area, only 1,500 km^2 of which is land. The islands have a population of over 29,000 (*Statistical*, 2016, p. 23).

For more than six centuries, Finland and the Åland Islands were an integral part of Sweden, albeit with a special status owing to their location (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 359). In 1809, Sweden lost Finland, which – together with the archipelago – as the Grand Duchy of Finland, was incorporated into Russia by a personal union.

Faced with a revolution in Russia, Finland declared independence in December 1917. Slightly before that, a strong independence movement sprung up on the Islands. The goal of the Islanders was to break away from Finland and reunite with Sweden. Despite a concerted effort and support from the Swedes, the plan was foiled. As negotiations threatened to grind to a halt, Great Britain sought the help of the newly created League of Nations. In June 1921, the League of Nations produced two documents which pronounced Åland Islands an autonomous province of Finland and which demilitarized and neutralized the archipelago.

The Autonomy Act empowered the Islanders to form their own parliament (*Lagtinget*) and government (*Landskapsregeringen*). Their broad autonomy allows the regional parliament to pass laws that govern the region’s internal affairs and to manage its own budget. Finnish legislation applies to such strictly defined areas as foreign policy, most fields of civil and criminal law, the judicial system, customs and the national tax system. The existing Åland Islands Autonomy Act, which is chronologically the third to be adopted, has been in force since January 1, 1993.

The Åland Islands enjoy a unique status in the European Union. Although Finland’s foreign policy is formulated by the national government, the Islanders are left with a very important power. Any international treaty which applies to matters that fall under the remit of the regional parliament, even if ratified by the national government, may only become effective on the Åland Islands if approved by its local parliament. During the EU accession negotiations, the islanders drew up a protocol which became part of the Finnish accession treaty. The Protocol excluded the Åland Islands from the EU tax area (which is crucial for the Islands’ maritime economy, and especially maritime transport). In addition, the Protocol restricts the right to acquire real estate and set up businesses on

[5] More than 6,700 islands and islets have the area of more than 0.25 ha each. The archipelago additionally contains some 20,000 islets that are smaller than 0.25 ha.

the Islands and recognizes the special status of the Åland Islands under international law. On these terms, with the endorsement of two referenda held on the Islands, the regional parliament approved the Åland Islands’ membership of the European Union.

The demilitarization and neutralization of the Åland Islands is enshrined in the Autonomy Act, which exempts the holders of domicile rights[6] from military service duty (Article 12). As an alternative way of serving their country, prospective conscripts may opt for navigation duty, lighthouse duty or another form of civil service. However, the article does not apply to persons who have settled in the Åland Islands after having reached the age of twelve years. Furthermore, individuals domiciled on the Islands may also be required to serve within their territory (Article 30).

The peaceful and – as proven by history – lasting solution established for the Åland Islands in the 1920s successfully reconciled conflicting interests towards this strategically located archipelago.

Demilitarization and naturalization of Åland Islands

Owing to their strategic location and despite their small area and population, the Åland Islands have repeatedly become the focal point of political clashes between European powers. The reason was their perception as a key to implementing Baltic policies.

The history of the archipelago tied inextricably to that of Sweden. The islands have been Sweden’s autonomous province since as early as the age of the Vikings. In the 15th century, the archipelago became a unique Swedish administrative region, with the castle of Kastelholm serving as the seat of the ruler. With the passage of time, the islands’ location increasingly attracted the interest of Russia. In the early 19th century, having conquered the majority of Finland, the Russian army prepared to attack Sweden. To protect his country, King Gustav Adolf IV of Sweden ordered a transfer of 9,000 soldiers from southern Finland to Åland Islands. He nevertheless failed to defend and keep the archipelago. Under the Treaty of Fredrikshamn[7] of September, 17 1809, the Åland Islands passed over to Russia, which annexed them to the Grand Duchy of Finland, which was joined with Russia by a personal union (Kersten, 1973, p. 301). However, Sweden never gave Finland away to the Russians as a single political entity as no such entity existed at the time. Rather, Russia received six different regions, the Åland Islands and parts of Länsipohja (Jussila, Hentilä, 2005, p. 20). Interestingly, the Åland Islands ended up at the heart of the negotiation game. In a secret instruction to their commissioners, who were sent to negotiate peace, the Swedes stressed that “even if, in the worst case scenario, one concedes to hand Finland over to Russia, one must never let go of the Åland Islands; it is imperative that the boundary run to the east of the Åland Islands, to keep the Ålands in Swedish hands, as they have been since time immemorial” (*Official*, 1920, p. 16). However, convinced that the archipelago was strategically located, the Russians declared it was “not interested in the old borders of Sweden, but rather in the new bor-

[6] The Åland Autonomy Act contains specific provisions on domicile rights (Chapter II, Articles 6–12). Only the holders of such rights are considered to be “citizens of the Åland Islands” allowed to exercise their full entitlements, cf. Scarpulla, 2002, p. 28.

[7] Currently Hamina, hence the treaty is at times referred to as the Hamina Treaty.

ders of Russia” (Barros, 1968, p. 2).[8] Yet, having the archipelago in foreign hands posed a greater security threat than the Swedish capital was prepared to accept. That is why even that early, Sweden put up a political struggle to demilitarize the archipelago. Russia viewed Sweden’s demand as humiliating. Nevertheless, it appears that, since 1809, unable to recover the archipelago, Sweden sought to demilitarize the Åland Islands as a prime policy objective regarding this territory (Scarpulla, 2002, p. 7). The significance of this objective lied in the fact that immediately upon the conclusion of the peace talks with Russia, the idea was born to turn the strategically located archipelago into a fortress and a harbor for the Russian naval fleet. This would allow these islands in the western peripheries of Russia to serve as both a surveillance point over Finland and an operations base, ensuring control over the Gulf of Bothnia. Seeking to achieve this very objective in 1830, the Russians launched the construction of a mighty fortress on the island of Bomarsund. The fortifications were to safeguard access routes leading to Saint Petersburg, help control maritime traffic in the central and northern areas of the Baltic Sea and, equally importantly, hold the Swedish capital in check (Lindholm, 1973, p. 73).

Only three of the 14 defensive towers envisioned in the plan were built within the 25 years that followed. The fortress itself was never completed, its construction interrupted by the breakout of the Crimean War in 1853. France and Great Britain sided with Turkey against Russia. To relieve their southern ally, the two countries established a new frontline on the Baltic and a blockade of Russian ports. One of their primary targets was the Bomarsund fortress where the Russians quickly surrendered to overwhelmingly stronger British and French forces.

Once the hostilities ended, it became clear that the status of the Åland Islands had been central on the agenda of the forthcoming peace conference. Its importance was particularly evident in Sweden’s negotiating tactics. Sweden was represented by the leading Swedish diplomat, Baron Ludvig Manderström. His instructions were to focus exclusively on the Åland Islands, while foregoing any other demands when necessary. Sweden sought compensation for the loss of the archipelago and assurances that the Islands would become neutral and independent with security guarantees provided by France, Great Britain and Sweden. The proposal was welcomed by the British while eliciting fierce opposition from Russia. Without France’s support, Great Britain’s negotiating position was too weak (Barross, 1961, p. 8). The demands regarding the Åland Islands were therefore reduced to those of demilitarization and a ban on constructing fortifications on the Islands, which was granted by Russia.

At the 1856 peace conference held Paris to end the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II solemnly proclaimed that “by the will of the Emperor of France and the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, the Lord of All-Russia declares that the Åland Islands shall not be fortified nor that any military or marine fortifications shall be erected thereon” (Hoyt, 1959, p. 214). By virtue of the Åland Convention of March 30, 1856, whose Article 33 constituted an integral part of the Paris Treaty that ended the Crimean War, the Åland Islands were declared a demilitarized zone.[9] Interestingly, the Convention was never signed by Sweden itself (but solely by Great Britain, France and Russia). This meant, at

[8] The Russians argued that to annex Finland without the Åland Islands would be like acquiring a box of jewels while throwing away the key, cf. *Napoleon’s…*, 2016.

[9] The Åland Islanders celebrate March 30 as demilitarization day.

least in theory, that the archipelago’s status could only be changed by an agreement of these three powers, thus possibly giving Sweden no say in the decision making (Hoyt, 1959, p. 214).[10]

The 1856 Convention is viewed in international law as an example of servitude. As a consequence, any rules in place are considered permanent and a change, if any, of the country that rules the area bears no significance. In other words, each successive sovereign will automatically be bound by the servitude principle (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 360).

One question arising against this background concerns the nature of the British endorsement for the Swedish demand to demilitarize the islands. Great Britain’s approach resulted not only from the fears that Russia would excessively dominate the region. To maintain its strong rule over the seas, Great Britain needed to secure timber for ship building and ship repairs. One possible source of this material was the Baltic region. Thus, free access to Swedish ports, and especially those in the Gulf of Bothnia, was of essential importance. From the British perspective, Russian control over the archipelago, and specifically over maritime traffic in the Gulf, would become a major inconvenience. Having the Islands fortified was therefore out of the question.

The Ålands Convention was a very brief document, consisting of merely two articles. It did not specifically delimit the area it governed nor define the control system it envisaged. As it only concerned land, it theoretically allowed, for instance, the laying of mines on waters. It also lacked a provision granting Russia the right to defend the archipelago in times of war (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 360).

Following the end of the Crimean War, the Åland Islands received little attention until the beginning of the following century. Only then did Russia’s newly-appointed Foreign Minister Aleksander P. Izvolski, who took office in 1906, make the Åland Islands his policy priority. The Russian army returned in the archipelago with 750 troops. A radio station was constructed while tsar warships patrolled the waters around the Islands. Such actions were justified as a necessary response to internal unrest and with the need to combat arms smuggling (Barros, 1968, p. 13). For the Russian Foreign Minister, the absence of opposition to such moves[11] suggested that renewed attempts to lift the restrictions imposed on the Åland Islands could be successful. In July 1907, A. Izvolski lodged an official request with the British Foreign Office for the repealing of the 1856 provisions. Even though Germany was not a signatory of the document, it approved the amendments together with France. Izvolski’s proposal was also firmly supported by Norway, which feared that a revived dispute over the Åland Islands could delay the signing of a treaty granting independence and territorial integrity to this young nation (Barros, 1968, p. 14). Taken off-guard by the proposal, the British did not initially resist. While they conceded that the half-a-century-old document did not reflect current realities, they nevertheless noted that its repealing could harm Sweden, and that the matter should be resolved jointly by all the states concerned. However, vehement protests on the part of Great Britain and Sweden convinced Russia to abandon the idea. Instead, the Baltic Declaration was concluded on April 23, 1908 in St. Petersburg. Signed by Ger-

[10] When Russia attempted to renounce its 1856 commitments, Sweden, which was not a signatory, protested more vociferously than any other country, cf. Hoyt, 1959, p. 215.

[11] After the matter was raised in the UK Parliament, the final conclusion was reached that Russia did not in fact breach the Convention of 1856.

many, Denmark, Russia and Sweden, the document merely acknowledged the existing *status quo* in the region. A Memorandum enclosed with the Declaration stated that the Declaration could not be applied if the states holding territory in the Baltic Sea region were to exercise their sovereign rights. Some argued that Russia was relieved of the commitments imposed thereon in 1856. In legal terms, the 1908 Declaration had no impact on the 1856 provisions as neither Great Britain nor France proceeded to sign it. The role played by Sweden on the Åland Islands at the time was well summarized in a warning sent to France by the Swedish Foreign Minister in early 1914, which suggested that the only project in which Sweden could be swayed to cooperate with Germany was the fortification of the archipelago (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 362).

The demilitarization rules were violated repeatedly over the course of the following century. Without a doubt, part of the reason for this was the absence of precise regulations on the defense of the archipelago during the war. Even as early as World War I, the Russians raised robust military fortifications on Åland Islands. Sweden was highly apprehensive about the militarization of the Ålands, as illustrated by its demand to destroy not only the fortifications and “other military facilities,” as requested by the Finns, but also any barracks, roads, bridges, telephone stations and other facilities constructed by Russia (Barros, 1968, p. 98). It should nevertheless be noted that the existence of the Russian fortifications had been known to Stockholm and received its consent. Even in early 1915, Russia revealed its plans with assurances that the fortifications would be purely defensive. They were meant to prevent Germany from using the archipelago and ensure uninterrupted trade on the Baltic Sea (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 362).

The situation in the region changed radically in 1917 with a revolution in Russia and Finland’s declaration of independence. As early as December 1917, Sweden sent a note to the governments of Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Turkey, which were the signatories of the 1856 Convention. The document suggested tearing down the Russian fortifications erected during the war. As the Convention itself failed to offer any specific solutions, Sweden demanded that the Islands be fully neutralized (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 364).

Germany placed the Åland Islands on the agenda of the Brest peace talks.[12] Article 6 of the Treaty of March 1918 stipulated that Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard were to immediately clear out of Finland and the Åland Islands and that all Russian warships and naval forces were to be removed from Finnish ports as promptly as possible.[13] In addition, any fortifications constructed on the Åland Islands were to be demolished (they were in fact torn down between April and October 1919) under the joint supervision of Finland and Sweden (Rotkirch, 1986, p. 365). Further clarifications of the status of the Archipelago were to be provided in a future agreement. However, after the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the downfall of the German Empire, Russia withdrew its support for the new treaty (*Peace*, 1918).

In the meantime, changes on the archipelago and in the general region picked up pace. As the Ålanders stepped up their effort to reunite with Sweden, a civil war broke out in Finland, a Finnish contingent of about 600 troops arrived on the Islands, and Russia broke off the Brest peace talks. The Swedes responded by dispatching their

[12] Sweden did not take part in the negotiations.

[13] This concerns the ice cover that would prevent Russian warships from reaching their own ports.

troops to the Ålands in February 1918 to, as they put it, protect the local population. The Swedish government described the operation as launched at the request of the inhabitants, solely for humanitarian reasons. Owing to Swedish mediation, the Finnish and Russian troops stationed on the Åland Islands pulled out. In early March, a German naval unit landed on the archipelago, which Germany viewed as a crucial launching pad for an invasion of Finland. Neutral Sweden allowed the move, as the German military was coming to the rescue of the Finnish “White” troops. Subsequently, however, the Finns repeatedly cited the incident as evidence that Sweden could not be trusted not to allow the military use of the Islands by the Germans or other powers in the future (Sierpowski, 2005, p. 79).

As mentioned earlier, following the end of World War I, Sweden and Finland failed to resolve the Åland Islands question through bilateral talks. The case was referred to the League of Nations. Attempts at resolving the issue within its framework followed two paths: legal and political. The League appointed appropriate committees: the International Committee of Jurists and the Committee of Rapporteurs, to address the matter. A three-person committee of international law experts was set up in the fall of 1920 to clarify two points. Firstly, the Committee was asked whether the Åland question was an internal problem of Finland, or whether, under Article 15 of the Charter of the League of Nations, the League had the jurisdiction to resolve it. Secondly, the Jurists were to take a stand on the demilitarization of the Åland Islands. After hearing from all of the stakeholders, the Committee presented its conclusions on September 5, 1920.

On the latter issue concerning the status of international commitments to demilitarize the Islands, the jurists expressed the view that the 1856 Convention signed by Great Britain, France and Russia, remained in force. According to the Committee, the 1856 provisions “gave the Ålands [...] a special international status as military grounds. This meant that as long as those provisions were not lawfully replaced by others, any concerned state had the right to insist that a proper status be maintained” (*Official*, 1920a, p. 16).[14] The League of Nations even suggested adopting stricter rules to prevent another case of the militarization of the Islands by the Russians, as seen during World War I (Barros, 1968, p. 318). In the course of the Committee’s proceedings, the idea was born to neutralize the Islands by a treaty signed by all Baltic countries.

The League of Nations announced its unanimous decision on June 24, 1921. Referring to “geographic, ethnic, political, economic and military” considerations, and its desire to ensure maximum security for the Åland Islanders as well as both of the concerned parties, the League’s Council resolved to:

1) Recognize Finnish authority over the Åland Islands;
2) Proclaim the Åland Islands a demilitarized and neutralized area;
3) Require that Finland grant the Åland Islands autonomy and the archipelago’s inhabitants the right to use the Swedish language while preserving their own culture and customs (*Minutes*).

According to the League’s Council, it was advisable to replace the 1856 Convention with a new, more elaborate international document that would be additionally signed by

[14] It was Finland’s position was that while the treaties should be binding upon Russia, they should not require the new independent state of Finland to make the same commitments. However, the League of Nations firmly rejected such an interpretation.

Sweden. The demilitarization and neutralization of the Islands was to ensure that neither party would view the archipelago as a military threat (*Minutes*).

On the demilitarization and neutralization of the Åland Islands, ten countries, including Poland, signed the Geneva Convention of October 20, 1921 on the non-fortification and neutralization of the Åland Islands.[15] Article 1 of the Convention acknowledged the Paris Agreement of 1856. Article 2 referred to 17 points, identified by their geographical coordinates, used to delimit the boundaries of the Åland Islands for the purposes of the Convention. The area so established along with its territorial waters extending to a distance of three nautical miles from the lowest water-mark of all islands, islets and reefs, formed a demilitarized and neutralized zone (Bugajski, 2006a, p. 15).

The demilitarization provisions were laid down in Art. 3. The article prohibits the maintenance or creation of any military establishments (military, aeronautical or naval), bases of operations or any other installations utilized for war purposes. Articles 4 and 6 refer to neutralization. No military, naval or air force of any Power may enter or remain in the zone. The manufacture, import or transport of arms or war material within the zone is prohibited. Article 6, in turn, stipulates that in time of war, the zone is to be considered neutral and, as such, may not, directly or indirectly, be used for any purposes connected with military operations. However, in the event of a war, Finland was allowed to lay mines in the zone.[16]

All this notwithstanding, Article 4 gives Finland the right to temporarily place additional forces in the military zone in addition to regular police forces if necessary for the maintenance of order and public security. The provision only refers to the “time of peace.” In order to inspect the zone, Finland may send one or two light surface warships.[17] The entry of submarines into the zone is strictly prohibited. No military aircraft may fly over the zone. Aircraft may only land on the Islands when imperiled.[18] Article 5 upholds the right to innocent passage through the territorial waters in accordance with existing international rules and usages (Kleemola-Juntunen, 2014, pp. 208–209).

Should the neutrality of the zone be imperiled by a sudden attack, Finland may take the necessary measures to check and repulse the aggressor until the parties to the Convention take adequate action. However, the guarantee system itself is relatively complex and inefficient (Rotkirch, 1968, p. 370). Art. 8 of the Convention states also that the provisions would remain in effect irrespective of changing circumstances, thereby eliminating the *rebus sic stantibus* clause.

The states signatories of the Convention markedly excluded the Soviet Russia. The Russian head of diplomacy Georgi Chicherin repeatedly stated that the solutions applying to the Åland Islands that were adopted by “the so-called League of Nations”

[15] The signatories of the Convention were (in alphabetical order in the French version): Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Sweden. Poland’s signatory was Szymon Askenazy, the Minister representing Poland in the League of Nations from 1920 to 1923. Original French text: see: *Convention...*, 2006.

[16] Under current terms, it would be required to accordingly notify the United Nations.

[17] During the time of peace, the Convention allows the entry into the zone and the maintenance in it of one foreign warship. The clause was used during Queen Elizabeth II’s visit to the Islands in 1976. The other two ships, which escorted the Queen’s vessel, had to remain outside of the zone.

[18] However, Finnish civilian aircraft as well as military helicopters engaged in rescue operations are allowed into the zone, cf. Rotkirch, 1986, p. 369.

would not be accepted by the Soviet government, which demanded to be included in the negotiations (*Dokumienty*, 1958). However, this position was subsequently relaxed and, as early as June 1921, a wire from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, announced that the solution would be accepted provided that the Åland Islands remain a province of Finland. Should any further amendments be made, including a change to the political status of the archipelago, Russia reserved the right to vote and take part in any further negotiations (*Dokumienty*, 1958a).

Some authors suggest that although the autonomy, demilitarization and neutralization of the Åland Islands were all governed by a single resolution of the League of Nations, dated June 24, 1921, they should be seen as two separate documents (Scarpulla, 2002, p. 28). Therefore, the provisions on autonomy refer to “the Province of the Åland Islands” while those governing the special military status apply to “the Åland Region” (Hannikainen, 1992, p. 56). Moreover, the territory to which the demilitarization and neutralization provisions applied is not identical as the political boundaries of the Åland Islands. An additional issue, and one of great consequence under international law, is that of the retreat of glaciers causing the Åland Islands to rise at the rate of 4.5 to 6.5 mm per year. This results in the emergence of new islets that geographically belong to the archipelago (Bonusiak, 2009, pp. 31–32). The ultimate result is that the Finnish province of Åland is subject to provisions relating to autonomy while the Åland archipelago is governed by regulations on military status (Scarpulla, 2002, p. 28).

On the eve of the outbreak of World War II, faced with a deadlock in the League of Nations and fearing that the defenseless islands would become an easy target for other states, Finland again raised the issue of fortifying the archipelago. The proposed changes required the consent of the countries guarantors of the demilitarization agreement and the leaders of the League of Nations. The Soviet Union expressed keen interest in the fortification of the Islands, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen its position, and especially its capacity to defend the city then known as Leningrad. Yet, the consent of the eastern neighbor was contingent upon its involvement in arming the fortifications and its control over the placement of armaments. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposed that Finland agree that the Soviets erect fortifications on the Finnish island of Suursaari[19] (Jussila, Hentilä, 2001, p. 194). The Finnish government firmly opposed all of the Soviet proposals.

In July 1938, acting in agreement with Sweden, Finland drew up the so-called Stockholm Protocol,[20] which – as an inter-governmental covenant – was signed by foreign ministers in January 1939. The covenant envisaged the joint fortification of the three southern islands of the Åland archipelago – Lågskär, Kökar and Björkor – and the establishment of conscription duty on the Islands over a 10-year period. All states signatories of the Åland Islands Agreement of 1921, with the exception of the USSR, signed the covenant. The solution was opposed by the inhabitants of the archipelago, more than 6,000 of whom took to the streets in the capital of Mariehamn. The plan was never carried out (Rotkirch, 1968, p. 371).

[19] The island is known as Gogland or Hogland in the English language. It is the largest island in the Gulf of Finland, located ca. 40 km from the Finnish coast.

[20] Kersten calls it “the Stockholm Plan,” cf. Kersten, 1973, p. 381.

Despite the failure of the plan, Finland sent its troops to the Åland Islands after the Soviet attack during the so-called “Winter War” and again in June 1941, during the so-called “Continuation War.” The deployments were explained with the need to defend the neutral status of the archipelago.

After the “Winter War” ended in September 1940, the USSR forced Finland, to enter into a separate treaty with the Soviets (*Treaty*, 1940). In a short document comprising merely four sections, the governments of both states stressed that the treaty’s aim was to strengthen security and peace in the Baltic Region. Finland reiterated its assurances regarding the demilitarization of the Islands, their non-fortification and unavailability for the armed forces of other states. The Soviet Union was allowed to establish a special consul, who, in addition to customary powers, would oversee the observance of the adopted provisions (Article 3). Should any irregularities be discovered, the consul was to submit his objections to the Finnish authorities, who would then set up a joint investigative committee. Interestingly, the document refers solely to the demilitarization of the islands, islets and reefs located on the Åland Islands while ignoring the legal status of the surrounding waters (Bugajski, 2006b, p. 13).

After the end of World War II, the Paris Peace Treaties, signed in February 1947, included an article on the Åland Islands. Article 5 thereof provided for the Åland Islands to retain their demilitarized status “in accordance with the situations as at present existing.”[21] One year later, the Soviet Union confirmed that the treaty of 1940, among other agreements, would remain in force (*Letter*, 1948). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the document was mentioned in the 1992 Protocol, in which Russia enumerated the treaties between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation that were to remain in effect (*Protocol*, 1992).

It is worth noting that, in 2005, the Finnish Ministry of Justice recognized the need to precisely demarcate the demilitarized and neutralized zones of the Åland Islands. Although the changes to their borders made in 2012 by the EUREF-FIN method differed only slightly from the limits proposed in 1921 (*Technical...*, 2012), they definitively resolved the issue.

Finland is clearly determined to protect the status of the Åland Islands as a demilitarized and neutralized area. Finnish President Tarja Halonen considers the demilitarization of the islands to be a major factor for stabilizing the Baltic Region. She emphasized that Finland would consistently advocate the strictest possible definition of the archipelago’s status to ensure the welfare of Åland Islanders and safeguard regional security (*Peace*, 2006). In 2004, a governmental committee on foreign and security policy, acting jointly with the Finnish President, blamed Sweden and Norway for having violated the status of the archipelago. The case they referred to concerned the Swedish soldiers who, on their way to the Nordic Peace maneuvers in Finland, used a passenger ferry which called at the port on the Ålands. Similar comments were presented to the Norwegians whose helicopters breached the archipelago’s airspace. The only military aircraft allowed to enter and remain in the Åland airspace are those carrying the highest ranking politicians. Even those, however may not be armed or

[21] To learn more about the validity of the 1921 Convention, which was contested e.g. in connection with the United Nations’ refusal to assume the commitments of the League of Nations, see Filipek, 2011, pp. 145–148.

contain spying equipment. The Prime Minister of the Åland Islands thanked the Finnish government for its interventions (*Tighter*, 2004).

Conclusions

The 1921 regulations applying to the Åland Islands did not fully satisfy any of the concerned parties. In spite of the widespread frustration, especially among the Swedes, each party benefited from the solution. Finland retained its sovereignty over the archipelago, Sweden received assurances that the Ålands’ status as a demilitarized and neutralized area would not pose a military threat and that the Åland Islanders themselves could enjoy a far greater autonomy (Eriksson, 1995, p. 13). The solutions were also widely accepted by the Baltic states.

The Ålands have been used as a bargaining chip on many occasions since the mid-19th century. This reflected the wider logic of rivalry not only among the countries of the region, but also among major European powers. Despite international rules, the archipelago was fortified repeatedly, albeit always for defensive purposes to prevent an occupation of the Islands (Rotkirche, 1968, p. 373). The intention behind granting the archipelago its unique status was thus achieved. No direct conflict ever broke out over the Åland Islands, navigation in the region remained free, while the status of the Islands helped build confidence and establish security measures.

Despite broad interest in the “Ålandian model,” both the Finns and the Åland Islanders stress that the mechanism is far from universal and cannot be easily applied to any other potential conflict. Former Finnish President Martti Oiva Ahtisaari warned against excessive optimism: “I think we need a bit more restraint in delighting in the solution employed on the Åland Islands. While the system is working exceptionally well in this particular case, I am not entirely sure that it is indeed universal. One has to be careful not to believe that all of the world’s problems can be resolved by following the Åland model” (Mykkänen, 2005).

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Demilitaryzacja i neutralizacja na przykładzie Wysp Alandzkich

Streszczenie

Demilitaryzacja i neutralizacja należą do katalogu szczególnych ograniczeń wykonywania zwierzchnictwa terytorialnego. Pomimo, iż są to rozwiązania stosowane w praktyce międzynarodowej stosunkowo często, to brakuje powszechnie uznanej definicji tych kategorii. Prowadzi to do wielu różnych podejść interpretacyjnych, co szczególnie wyraźnie widać w odniesieniu do demilitaryzacji.

Klastycznym przykładem obszaru zmilitaryzowanego i zneutralizowanego są Wyspy Alandzkie. Ze względu na swoje strategiczne położenie kilkukrotnie stały się ważnym elementem politycznych rozgrywek pomiędzy mocarstwami w Europie, na przestrzeni ostatnich dwóch stuleci. Wyspy postrzegano bowiem jako swoisty klucz do realizacji bałtyckiej polityki i równoważenia sił europejskich potęg.

Konflikty, które targały regionem w XIX w., doprowadziły do stopniowego wypracowania rozwiązań demilitaryzacji, a później neutralizacji archipelagu, co zostało ostatecznie uregulowane w 1921 r. w międzynarodowej konwencji i potwierdzone po zakończeniu II wojny światowej. Przyjęty wtedy status prawnomiędzynarodowy archipelagu zachował trwałość, a obecnie służy jako swoisty wzorzec efektywnej demilitaryzacji i neutralizacji.

Słowa kluczowe: demilitaryzacja, neutralizacja, Wyspy Alandzkie, region Morza Bałtyckiego

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Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, *Konsolidacja państwa w Republice Mołdawii*, published by University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2016, pp. 282.

The monograph entitled *Konsolidacja państwa w Republice Mołdawii* [State Consolidation in the Republic of Moldova]**,** was published in 2016. Its author is dr hab. Bartłomiej Zdaniuk (PhD)[1] – an employee of the Faculty of Journalism and Political Science at the University of Warsaw. The book consists of 4 chapters, introduction, conclusion, annexes, bibliography, and (something that deserves attention and which should become a publishing practice) a list of contents and abstracts in congressional languages, and those specific to the research area (English, French, Romanian and Russian). The monograph consists of 282 pages of material reviewed by three independent experts, including a representative of a foreign research center.

The author of the monograph refers to a very interesting issue – the problem of state cohesion in the Republic of Moldova (RM), building a theoretical basis for the argument of the concept of "consolidation," understood as "fixing the established political system" (p. 17). Until now, in the literature on the subject, the concept of consolidation was most often associated with democracy, and the statement "consolidation of democracy" has become quite popular. Such terminology applies to stable democracies, where political processes are based on rivalry – not political struggle. As we can read in the monograph: "In many countries, the problem is not only the consolidation of democracy, but the consolidation of the state in general" (pp. 17–18). Thus, in the case of selected countries of Eastern and South-East Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia, the term "state consolidation" as used by the author is more appropriate. Bartłomiej Zdaniuk has attempted to structure the "conceptual grid of the processes of state consolidation" (p. 18), and the Republic of Moldova became the case study on the basis of which the author has created the model (p. 19). As Bartłomiej Zdaniuk points out in his publication, the state has little experience in the field of the "art of government" (p. 91). The author's ambition was to not to confront the definition of consolidation with democracy, but with the state (p. 83). Importantly, the consolidation of the state is discussed as a process rather than the description of its perfect condition (p. 88).

Professor Janusz Solak, describing the Republic of Moldova, drew attention to the basic fact that it was a "republic split into three" (Solak, 2009), thus highlighting the apparent split of both the territory and the nation. In addition, he stressed the importance of Transnistria in a center-periphery relationship, pointing out the historical, social, military and geopolitical aspect of the conflict which has continued uninterrupted since the 1990s. Most of the researchers dealing with Moldovan issues focus primarily on the phenomenon of Transnistrian separatism (Oleksy, 2016). The author of the reviewed monograph highlights the fundamental question: "The main challenges for the consolidation of the state of the Republic of Moldova concern primarily the «main» part of the territory of the state. The Gagauzian issue and, paradoxically, even more the Transnistrian seems to be of a secondary character" (p. 19). The above statement can be considered as one of the main theses of the reviewed monograph, and the author begins his further considerations by setting out 5 major and 14 detailed hypotheses of his research (pp. 21–22).

[1] On 15 September 2017, dr hab. Bartłomiej Zaniuk was nominated Polish ambassador to the Republic of Moldova.

In Chapter I (pp. 37–91), the author discusses the notion of consolidation in political science by concluding these considerations with state consolidation. He draws attention to the historical premises, dimensions of consolidation, its determinants, directions, time, measurement, state role, its processes and statehood. The study of consolidation is subjected to considerations as a science (p. 43), and its focus is first and foremost on the degree of institutionalization of the rules of systemic transformation (p. 51); as a phase in the evolution of a regime (p. 62); or as a phenomenon expressed by time, moment and rhythm (p. 64). Within the framework of consolidation, there are discussions on consolidated and non-consolidated democracies. The first can be defined as becoming routinized and assimilated in social, institutional or mental life (p. 44). The author rightly points out that a consolidated democracy is one that has “democratic citizens” (p. 66). On the other hand, the lack of consolidation, i.e. an unregistered democratic regime, is otherwise a defective regime (p. 53). It becomes a “dicto-democracy” in which the phenomenon of erosion of the system, which promotes the emergence of hybrids (p. 60).

Based on a number of theoretical categories, the author aptly points out that consolidation is the process that follows transformation (p. 45), and is the last stage of democracy (p. 49). This is the culmination of the process of change initiated (p. 48) which results in the inclusion of democratic values, the formation of a pro-democratic political culture and the achievement of progress. In such an arrangement of forces, a regime is defined as credible, and consolidated patterns of behavior and political behavior begin to function in a society (p. 47). All these activities have a positive dimension that is characterized by: structured variation (p. 50) or a progressive enlargement of procedures by an ever wider circle of political actors (p. 51). Consolidation can also take a negative dimension (p. 46), when it promotes specific groups of interests (p. 47) dominated by party leaders, clientelism and regional particularism, or “constitution without constitutionalism,” which loses meaning as a reference to the political system (p. 56).

Consolidation is a multidimensional concept. It can be defined as a strengthening; as a process and a purpose; the victory of democratic political consciousness; a reflection on the moral condition of the elites (p. 46); as a theory of order and stability (p. 52); as institutionalization (p. 60); as deepening of state reforms, which consists in achieving the most advanced form of the system (p. 61); a time of change undermining the hitherto rules of the political game; a moment of deinstitutionalization in which the institutions of the previous regime are questioned (p. 41). Consolidation begins with the first parliamentary meeting of the first parliament elected in free elections (p. 72), but the establishment of democracy does not have to be the only possible goal of constitutional evolution (p. 39).

In the monograph, based on a number of definitions of consolidation, we are able to find an important consideration of the concept of *transition* ↔ *transformation*. *Transition* is described by the author as a perfect process – as the transition from one particular stage of the political system to another (p. 39). Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, following Andrzej Antoszewski, stresses that this is the beginning of the dismantling of a specific political regime and the consolidation of the new regime (p. 42). He also cites the term present in the literature on the subject of “double transition,” according to which the first “portion” of change tends to democracy and the other to consolidated democracy (p. 53). Sometimes this double transition becomes a complement to an unfinished transformation, during which “reserved domains” are eliminated (p. 61). *Transformation*, on the other hand, is an evolution from an authoritative authoritarian regime to an unknown one, which may be the reconstruction of the authoritarian regime (p. 40). Transition applies to time-limited activities, whereas transformation is a long-term process of institutionalizing a new system (p. 42), especially if it embraces the dimension of a democratic change.

The author clearly points out that “in the case of post-Soviet countries, it is difficult to talk about the transformation of the system and the consolidation of democracy, because of the weak-

ness of the state framework” (p. 83). In the monograph, we can read that “in the case of post-Soviet states, the problem lies primarily in the fact that, at the time of their creation, the borders of these countries did not coincide with the sense of national identity of the inhabitants” (p. 69), thus, in this case, consolidation becomes multi-level. Constitutional, representative, behavioral, or democratic consolidation of political culture (pp. 78–80) can be distinguished here. According to Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, “some Soviet countries may need to be examined for decolonization,[2] because their characteristics are very similar to the problems faced by postcolonial African countries” (p. 40). Three basic dependencies can be identified: the problems of partial regimes that consolidate according to different rules and procedures (p. 58); various oligarchs, dominated by wealthy citizens with an anti-cultural reputation (p. 60); and also “bonded transactions” (p. 81) that have a significant impact on every political system.

In the context of the deliberations on state consolidation, the author points to the rather significant challenge of every transformation – transforming a “mobilized civil society” into an “institutionalized civil society” and breaking down the habits of the previous regime (p. 57). He also states that democracy does not need to have roots to be established, and that this process can take place in countries with different conditions (p. 39). The important thing is that the pace and direction of change are influenced by the actors functioning in political life (p. 41). Among the most important dimensions of consolidation are: territory, population and power (p. 89), and these issues subordinate further reflections.

In the next three chapters, Bartłomiej Zdaniuk highlights the specificity of territory, population and power, which in turn enables him to isolate the challenges facing the consolidation of the Republic of Moldova, and to formulate forecasts on the prospects for its development (p. 91).

In chapter II, entitled “Consolidation of the territory of the Republic of Moldova” (pp. 93–126), the issue of borders is discussed. The author refers to the issues of internal separatism: Gagauzian and Transnistrian, and also touches on the Ukrainian thread connected with the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border. On the basis of these considerations, he states that the territory of the Republic of Moldova totally fits into the theoretical schema of the consolidation indicated in the theoretical chapter, adding that it is a correlate of that process with respect to the state. Based on rich source material, the author argues that the main part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova is marked by tensions related to the identity and specificity of its population. Chapter III, entitled “Consolidation of the People of the Republic of Moldova” is devoted to Moldovan society (pp. 128–170). Here, the author touches on national and civic themes. He points at two dimensions: the ethno-political one and the state ambitions of the national community and civic political culture, as a political community governed by the people. In the area of considerations on national identity, the author asks numerous research questions, associated with the name of the state: the Republic of Moldova ↔ Moldova[3] or the language: Moldovan ↔ Romanian. These and other dilemmas of national identity lead to unequivocal claims that the population residing in the Republic of Moldova does not have a uniform ethnic background, because the nation is made up of citizens of different origins, including a large Russian population. The author concludes with clear statements that the Republic of Moldova is a state of ‘ethniticization’, in which the so-called *Homo Moldovanus* is a common attitude – a shy and passive citizen, without of a sense of competence, living in society characterized by a high level of economic emigration. Bartłomiej Zdaniuk emphasizes that the challenge for citizens of the

[2] See: Czachór, 2015.

[3] So far, in the literature on the subject, there has been no consideration of this subject. In her publication devoted to the party system of the Republic of Moldova (See: Sikora-Gaca, 2013), the author of this review very often uses the names Republic of Moldova ↔ Moldova interchangeably. Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, by numerous historical-worldview correlations, clearly demonstrates that they are not identical.

Republic of Moldova in the field of consolidation is a feeling of national pride, which, at this moment, is difficult to find in the society.

Chapter IV, entitled “Consolidation of the Republic of Moldova” (pp. 171–221), deals with aspects of the political game. The author discusses the experience and traditions of statehood in the Republic of Moldova. It indicates that the state apparatus is not being rebuilt, thus consolidating the rule of law is hampered by a deep-rooted Soviet heritage. Thus, he points to a rather significant problem which is often erroneously overlooked – the “social rejection of the law,” which means the indifference of the inhabitants to norms and their functioning. A very negative phenomenon is the creation of a low-income social stratum, opposed by business elites. “At the time of the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Moldova, and in the first years of its existence, the agronomists and managers of the kolkhoz, the so-called ‘Green barons’ [...], the nomenclature and the officers of the Secret Service succeeded in transforming political power into financial capital.” From the very beginning of the existence of the independent state, continuity of political personnel has been developed which has contributed to the lack of unity of worldview and the diversity of the elites. The high degree of their social heterogeneity made the transformation process most dependent on the will of the ruling clans. Hence, it is clear that state consolidation depends to a great extent on the models of political elites. It is true that circulation within the elites is noticeable, but a change in the style of government does not give another dimension to the political game and maintains sociopolitical divisions for years. “Even the content of the constitutional provisions so far has not been a sufficient condition for the consolidation of the political system,” or for any change in established attitudes and behaviors. As pointed out by the author – the deadlock in geopolitical identity leads to a deadlock of the party-personal arrangement, which in turn consolidates the stagnation and preserves the heterogeneous heritage of the country. In the shadow of the usurpation of power, the political parties are fighting for the survival of their networks, which only increases the level of social aggression and civil opposition on the one hand, and strengthens the position of political and business partners on the other. This political impasse makes any improvement in the area of the rule of law unfeasible. It is true that the international environment and its influence are an inherent part of shaping the state, but the lack of coherent developmental project for the Republic of Moldova has removed the prospect of consolidation of power in this political system.

In his monograph, Bartłomiej Zdaniuk presents numerous challenges to the consolidation of the state entity of the Republic of Moldova. He identifies this entity as a “geopolitical bastard,” where the appropriation of political leadership leads to the alienation of civil society. He also refers to the phenomenon of “irresponsible pluralism” in which inefficient and corrupt elites distance citizens from the public sphere, emphasizing the phenomenon of political apathy. At the same time, he stresses that the future of consolidation depends on internal and external factors. The author gives the reader an extremely interesting publication where he presents a sprawling inconsistency, in which a weak state is faced with a weak society.

The premise of a review is that it should be critical. However, it is difficult to find faults in a publication of a uniformly high standard. This is so from the first pages of the monograph, where the preliminary questions are given (assumptions and hypotheses, the state of research, research methods and techniques), through all the subsequent chapters and annexes. The graphic presentations are also worth noting (pp. 233–243), including maps developed by Jakub Pieńkowski, which are extremely precise, accurate, substantive and comprehensible. It may be considered that, apart from the reliable analytical work of the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW),[4] and that by Mr Kamil Całus, this paper is one of the more accurate studies on the Republic of Moldova in the Polish publishing market. In the opinion of the reviewer, the monograph should be translated into one of the congress languages as soon as possible.

[4] See: www.osw.waw.pl/.

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In memory of Andrzej Chodubski (1952–2017)

In July 2017, Professor Andrzej Chodubski, full professor at the University of Gdańsk passed away. He was a distinguished scholar, renowned academic teacher and lecturer, and a friend to extensive circles of domestic and foreign researchers, as well as doctoral and graduate students.

Professor Andrzej Chodubski was the author of several dozen monographs and over 1,100 other publications, including articles in academic periodicals, chapters in collective studies and reviews of scholarly works. Although the majority of them were published in Polish, a number of them were also issued in English and Russian. The texts he penned present the results of studies primarily into topics related to political science, but a considerable portion also penetrates the research areas of history, sociology and other disciplines. In each case, the analyses are founded on a robust base, encompassing multiple, frequently unpublished sources and different types of academic studies. The considerations published in print were always accompanied by interesting presentations of Professor Chodubski's views and concluded with convincing assessments and findings. His consistency in his research work and publishing of his results deserves the highest recognition.

On account of the great number and multiple topics of the works authored by Professor Chodubski, and the limited size of this commemoration, only his crucial interests will be mentioned. The results of his studies have facilitated better understanding of such topics as the specific nature and problems faced by national and ethnic minorities in Poland and other states; the identity and position of the Polish diaspora, in particular in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Scandinavia; the development determinants of the Caucasus; the problems of modern civilization; the distinct nature of the culture of Gdańsk; the determinants of political culture in Poland as well as the methodology of political studies. It is beyond doubt that Professor Chodubski has made a huge mark on the advancement of Polish academia by expanding knowledge about these aspects of socio-political life.

Professor Chodubski was a distinguished scholar, initiator and organizer of academic life as well as a superb academic lecturer. He made a considerable contribution to the advancement of academic studies and curricula offered by the University of Gdańsk, among others, where he established a school of researchers dealing with the studies of modern civilization. He is also the author of the handbook *Wstęp do badań politologicznych* [Introduction to political science studies] which has been reissued repeatedly and which features in the canonical obligatory reading lists in university majors teaching social sciences. He also takes considerable credit for spreading academic knowledge, owing to his numerous popular science works, journalistic articles and interviews. He made a profound contribution to over a dozen encyclopedias and dictionaries, including the *Encyklopedia politologii* [Encyclopedia of political science], published in Kraków in 1999. His achievements in educating faculty members deserve appreciation. He served as an academic advisor to 33 doctoral students, reviewer of several dozen doctoral dissertations (96), post-doctoral (35) and professorship proceedings. He gave lectures, conducted colloquium classes and degree seminars of high popularity among doctoral and graduate students of the University of Gdańsk, but also universities in Warsaw, Poznań, Olsztyn and Łódź. He also promoted several hundred BA and MA graduates.

Professor Chodubski was an extremely diligent man with enormous achievements in different fields of academic activity. Being extremely knowledgeable, he was also exceptionally modest.

His studies were distinguished by utmost reliability. He was more than willing to advise and aid others, especially junior faculty members. Regardless of his own position in academia, on different occasions he would emphasize his respect for his own teachers and masters, whom he had had the honor to have met as a student and colleague. He enjoyed widespread respect and appreciation. A meaningful expression of the acknowledgement of Professor Chodubski’s achievements by academic circles was the fact that, from 1999, he was consistently elected to the Political Science Committee at the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) and invited onto the academic and program boards of over a dozen academic periodicals from the list B of periodicals conducted by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. He was an exemplary editor-in-chief of the “Cywilizacja i Polityka” [Civilization and politics] periodical distinguished by superb editorship.

Another distinctive feature that deserves mentioning is that Professor Chodubski successfully combined his academic and research activities with the responsibilities of a teacher and initiator of academic life. He also frequently took active part in academic conferences. He was a popular and renowned professor. His exceptional conscientiousness and concern for the development of higher education and Polish academia were distinctive. Polish academic circles admired his kindness, organizational skills and the ability to carefully listen to the arguments of his colleagues and co-workers. He was an authority to many people.

Unfortunately, Professor Andrzej Chodubski has passed away, but he has left his oeuvre to be taken advantage of by successive generations of political scientists and other scholars dealing with social studies and the humanities.

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Komunikat z posiedzenia Kapituły Ogólnopolskiego Konkursu im. Czesława Mojsiewicza

Na posiedzeniu VI edycji Kapituły Ogólnopolskiego Konkursu im. Profesora Czesława Mojsiewicza na najlepszą książkę o tematyce politologicznej, które odbyło się 9 października 2017 r. na zakończenie sesji naukowej pt. „Profesor Andrzej Chodubski – Uczony i Przyjaciel”, zorganizowanej przez Wydział Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politologicznych UŁ, Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM oraz Wydział Nauk Społecznych UG zebrali się członkowie Kapituły Konkursu w składzie:

– prof. dr hab. Andrzej Stelmach – dziekan Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza – przewodniczący;
– prof. dr hab. Magdalena Musiał-Karg – prezes Ośrodka Badań i Edukacji Europejskiej – wiceprzewodnicząca;
– dr Stanisław Zyborowicz – prezes Oddziału Poznańskiego, Polskiego Towarzystwa Nauk Politycznych – wiceprzewodniczący.

Członkowie:

– prof. dr hab. Iwona Hofman – Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej,
– prof. dr hab. Alicja Stępień-Kuczyńska – Uniwersytet Łódzki,
– prof. dr hab. Arkadiusz Żukowski – Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski,
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– prof. dr hab. Jan Iwanek – Uniwersytet Śląski,
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Po dokonaniu oceny merytorycznej zgłoszonych publikacji Kapituła Konkursu postanowiła w VI edycji Ogólnopolskiego Konkursu im. Profesora Czesława Mojsiewicza na najlepszą książkę o tematyce politologicznej przyznać I nagrodę **Arturowi Lipińskiemu, za publikację *Prawica na polskiej scenie politycznej w latach 1989–2011. Historia, organizacja, tożsamość*, Wydawnictwo ELIPSA.** Ponadto Kapituła Konkursu postanowiła wyróżnić trzy prace: Herberta Gnasia, *Protokół z Kioto. Analiza decyzji międzynarodowej*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek; Wojciecha Tomasza Modzelewskiego, *Paradyplomacja regionów. Studium województw Polski wschodniej*, Instytut Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego w Olsztynie; Macieja Potza, *Teokracje amerykańskie. Źródła i mechanizmy władzy usankcjonowanej religijnie*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

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Nowak R. (1999), *Władza i demokracja*, in: *Demokracja i władza*, ed. J. Kowalski, Wydawnictwo XYZ, Warszawa.

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